(p) See Loomis v. Eagle Ins. Co. 6 Gray, 896; Miller v. Eagle Ins. Co. 2 E. D. Smith, 268; Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 N. J. 576, decided in New Jersey, in which State all wagers are not contrary to law. In Rose v. Mat Benefit Ins. Co. 26 Barb. 556, 561, it is said: "We think that the operation of the recent rule upon this question there might be some doubt. But if the reason of it were logically carried out, it would certainly seem, that the creditor may retain, not only the whole payment, which he receives from the insurers, but the whole of his claim against the representatives of the debtor.

(sic) the plaintiff's application in writing for the insurance, which was accepted by the defendants, and in which the plaintiff stated that he had an interest in the life of Bugbee (the life-insured), to the full amount of the sum of $2,000, sufficient proof of such interest as between the parties, if any proof of interest was necessary." In Bevin v. Conn. Ins. Co. 23 Conn. 244, there is a dictum to the effect that the English statutes are but declarations of the common law, and that a life policy is a contract of indemnity. Craig v. Murgatroyd, 4 Yeates, 169, cited in the notes of the American edition to Godsall v. Boldero, in Smith's Leading Cases, as confirmatory of that case, involved a marine and not a life insurance. In New York, on the contrary, it is held, that where a debtor procures an insurance on his life and assigns the policy, the right of the assignee to demand and enforce the stipulated payment is no more liable to doubt or dispute than that of an executor or administrator. St. John v. American Ins. Co. 2 Duer, 419.

(pp) Campbell v. New England Ins. Co. 98 Mass. 881.

(q) Cutler v. Rand, 8 Cash. 89.

(r) Humphrey v. Arabia, Lloyd & Goold's Cas. temp. Plunkett, 318. See also Henson v. Blackwell, 4 Hare, 484.

1 But a certificate expressed to be payable to a "friend " of the assured was decided to be against public policy, and absolutely void. Mutual Benefit Ass. v. Hoyt, 46 Mich. 478.

Where the death of the life-insured was caused by a third party, who was a stranger to the contract, and the insurers paid the loss, and brought an action against this third party, it was held, that the action could not be sustained on account of the want of any privity between the parties. (s)

If a wife is considered as a feme sole by the law of the State * wherein the policy was made, and she causes herself to be insured on the life of her husband, the policy is entirely beyond his reach, not only so far that he cannot transfer or cancel it, but it cannot be impeached by proof, derived from his own declarations, that his statements in regard to his health, made at the time of the insurance, were misrepresentations. (t) And if a wife insures the life of her husband, for her own benefit, and dies before the husband, the policy vests at her death in her administrator for the benefit of her children. (tt) l A policy of life insurance for the benefit of the widow and child of the insured, cannot be affected by his will. (tu) 2

(s) Conn. Ins. Co. v. N. Y. & New Haven R. Co. 25 Conn. 265.

(t) Fraternal Ins. Co. v. Applegate, 7 Ohio State, 292. In Rison v. Wilkerson. 3 Sneed, 565, where a statute provided that any husband might effect insurance on his own life, and the same shall in all cases enure to the benefit of his widow and heirs, without in any manner being subject to the debts of the husband, it was held, that this did not prevent the husband, who had insured his own life, without saying for whose benefit, from assigning the policy.

(tt) Swan v. Snow, 11 Allen, 224.

(tu) Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154. See also, as to assignment, Knickerbocker, etc. Ins. Co. v. Weitz, 99 Mass. 157.

1 That, in such a case, the interest descends to her heirs, see Hutson v. Merrifield, 51 Ind. 24. A policy payable to wife and children becomes, if there are no children, the wife's property, and she may exchange it for a paid-up policy even after divorce. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 46 Conn. 79. If children are not mentioned, she has, in Massachusetts, an absolute life interest assignable by her for husband's debts. Newcomb v. Mutual Ins. Co. 9 Ins. Law J. 124. Where a wife insured her husband's life for the benefit of herself and children, and she and a child died before him, the latter leaving a child, the grandchild took the interest of its parent. Continental Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60.

2 A person, however, who procures insurance on his life for another's benefit, and pays premiums thereon, may dispose of it by will or otherwise, to the exclusion of the beneficiary, the latter's interest, subject to such revocation, at least with insurer's consent, being actual and subsisting. Foster v. Gile, 50 Wis. 608. See De Ronge v. Elliott, 8 C. E. Green, 486.