(a) Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613; Nix v. <»live, cited in Abbott on Shipping, 490; Mottram v. Heyer, .5 Denio. 629; Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521.

Lewis v. Mason. 36 Up. Can Q. B. 590 Wiley v. Smith, 1 Ont. Ap. 179.

1 So if the goods are stored in a government bonded warehouse, upon the records of which they are transferred to the buyer, the right to stop them is not defeated if, by the terms of the sale, the seller is to forward them to their destination on the buyer's order Mohr v. Boston, etc. R. Co., 106 Mass 07. - K.

They are in transit until they pass into the possession of the vendee. But this possession may be actual or constructive. The doctrine that the goods must come to the "corporal touch" of the vendee, as was once said by Lord Kent/on, has long since been exploded. (d) Thus, suffering the goods to be marked and resold, and marked again by the second purchaser, has been considered a constructive delivery. (e) So a delivery by the vendor, to the vendee, of the key of the vendor's warehouse, where the goods are stored, amounts to a delivery. (f)1 So, demanding and marking the goods by the vendee's agent at the inn where the goods arrived at their destination. (g)

If the carrier, by reason of an arrangement with the consignee, or for any cause, remains in possession, but holds the goods only as the agent of the consignee, and subject to his order, this is * the possession of the consignee. (h) Yet, even in

(b) Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Perm. St. 301

(c) Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629; s. c. 1 Denio, 483, is an important case. The defendants were merchants in New York. They ordered the plaintiffs to send them from England a case of hardware. It arrived April 7, when the bill of lading was delivered to the plaintiffs, and the freight paid. On the 9th the goods were entered at the custom-house, and carried from the ship to the public store. While there, and before the duties were paid, the defendants became insolvent, and the plaintiffs demanded of them the goods. They refused to deliver them, and afterwards paid the duties, and removed them to their store. It was held, that the demand was not sufficient to revest the title in the plaintiffs.

(d) Wright v. Lawes, 4 Esp. 82; Mottram v. Heyer, 1 Denio, 483.

(e) Stoveld v. Hughes, 14 East, 308. (f) So thonght Lord Kenyan himself in Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464. '

(g) Ellis v. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464. So if the vendor agreed to let the goods lie in his warehouse for a short time, although free of rent, and to accommodate the vendee. Barrett v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107.

But see Townley v. Crump, 4 A. & E. 58, contra. So if rent be paid. Hurry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452. So delivering to the vendee a bill of parcels with an order on the storekeeper for the delivery of the goods. Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines, 182. But quaere, see post. So giving an order by the vendor to the keeper of a warehouse, for the delivery of the goods. Harman v. Anderson, 2 Camp. 243. See also Frazier v. Milliard, 2 Strob. L. 309. Delivery to mercantile house, merely for transmission to the vendee, by a forwarding house, does not take away the right of stoppage. Hays v. Mouille, 14 Penn. St. 48.

(h) This principle is well illustrated by the case of Allan v. Gripper, 2 Cr. & J 218; s. c. 2 Tyr. 217. The goods were conveyed by a carrier by water, and deposited in the carrier's warehouse, to be delivered thence to the purchaser or his customers, as they should be wanted, in pursuance of an agreement to this effect between the carrier and the purchaser. This was the usual course of business between them. It was held, that the carrier became the warehouseman of the purchaser, upon the goods being deposited there, and that the vendor's right cases where an existing usage authorizes a carrier to retain the goods in his hands as security for his whole claim against a consignee, the consignor may still stop them as in transitu, and take them from the carrier, by paying to him the amount due specifically for the carriage of those goods. (i) And the master of a ship chartered wholly, or even owned by the consignee, may, nevertheless, be a carrier in whose hands the consignor may stop the goods, if the goods are to be delivered finally to the charterer himself; but if they are on board the buyer's ship to be carried to some third party, they are so far delivered to the buyer, when they go on board his ship, as to destroy the right of stoppage. (j) of stoppage was gone. And the case was likened to Foster v. Frampton, 6 B. & C. 107; s. c 9 Dow. & R. 108, where the vendee desired the carrier for his own convenience to let the goods remain in his warehouse until he received further directions . and also took home samples of the goods; hut before the bulk was removed, he became insolvent; held, that the right of stoppage in transitu was gone. Scott v. Pettit, 3 B. & P. 469, was decided on the same principle. Goods were sent from Manchester directed to the purchasers at London; but in pursuance of a general order from the buyer to the seller, were sent to the warehouse of the buyer's packer, and by the warehouseman were booked to the buyer's account, and the warehouseman unpacked them. The transitus was held at an end when the goods reached the warehouse.

1 The giving a delivery order to the buyer, who gives it to a warehouseman, puts an end to the right of stoppage. Croker v. Lawder, 9 Ir. L. R. 21. - K.

(i) Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 B. & P. 42, is a very excellent case upon this subject.

(j) Stubbs v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453, recognizes this principle. There the vendors resided in Liverpool, England, the vendees in America. The goods were delivered on board the vendees' own ship, at Liverpool, and consigned to them or assigns, for which the master had signed bills of lading. The vendors, hearing of the insolvency of the vendees before the vessel left Liverpool, refused to let the vessel sail, claiming a right to stop the goods, and that they had not reached their destination. The right of stoppage was allowed, mainly, it seems, on the ground that the goods were, by the bills of lading, to he transported to the vendees, and were in transit until they reached them; hut it was thought that if the goods had been intended for some foreign market, and never designed to reach any possession of the purchasers, more than they then had at the time of their shipment, the case would be different, and the transit in such a case would be considered as ended Parsons, C.. J., thus laid down the law on this point: "In our opinion, the true distinction is, whether any actual possession of the consignee or his assigns, after the termination of the voyage, be or be not provided for in the bills of lading When such actual possession, after the terraina-tion of the voyage, is bo provided for, then the right of stoppage in transitu remains after the shipment. Thus, if goods are consigned on credit, and delivered on board a ship chartered by the consignee1, to be imported by him, the right of right ping in transitu continues after the shipment (3 East, 381); but if the goods are not to be imported by the consignee, but to be transported from the place of ship-ment to a foreign market. the right of Stopping in transitu ceases on the shipment, the transit being then completed; because no other actual possession of the goods by the consignee is provided for in the bills of lading, which express the terms of the shipment." The court in this case rely upon Bohtlingk v. Inglis, 3 East, 381, where a person in England chartered a ship to go to Russia, and bring home goods from his correspondent there, the goods to make a complete cargo. The vessel proceeded to Russia, and the cor respondent shipped the goods ordered at. the risk of the freighter, and Bent him the invoice and bills of lading The goods were to be conveyed to the freighter in England. It was held, that the delivery on hoard the vessel was not a final delivery, and that the goods might be stoppted on the way; and on the same ground a."* before stated that they "were in their passage or transit from the consignor to the consignee." The distinction alluded to in the next note, was, however, fully recognized. See also Coxe v Harden, 4 East. 211. New hall v. Vargas, 13; Me 98.