(o) See ante, p. * 289, and post, vol. ii , p. * 291, *292.

(p) Small v. Moates, 9 Bing. 574; Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; Jen-kyns v. Usborne, 7 Man. & G. 678. The case of Thompson v. Dominy, 14 M. & W. 403, shows that the mere indorsement of a bill of lading does not authorize the indorsee to bring a suit in his own name against the signers for their failure to deliver the goods according to its terms. See also Stollenwerck v. Thacher, 115 Mass. 224. 226, 227; Buffalo Bank v. Fiske. 71 NY. 353: Farmers' Bank v. Erie R. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 188; it would not be correct, therefore, to consider such bills negotiable, exactly, although they have sometimes been so called (see Berkley v. Watling, 7 A. & E. 29; Bell v Moss, 5 Whart. 189,205), but rather that an indorsement of such bill would amount to a symbolical delivery.

And if there were also a bona fide sale accompanying the transfer, the right of the vendor to stop in transitu is gone. Newsom v. Thornton. 6 East, 41, shows this. There Lord Ellenborotigh, C. J., said: " A bill of lading indeed shall pass the property upon a bona fide indorsement and delivery, where it is intended bo to operate, in the same manner as a direct delivery of the goods themselves would do, if so intended. But it cannot farther" Lawrence, J., added: "In Lick barrow v. Mason, some of the judges did was done. It was held that the transit was not at an end till the ship reached Melbourne, and that the vendors had till then a right to stop in transitu. To the -ante effect is Lyons v. Hoffnung, 15 App. Cas. 391.

such transfer, if it is in good faith and for a * valuable consideration, passes the property to the second vendee, who holds it free from the right of the original vendor to stop the goods in transitu. (q)1 But a second vendee, to whom the bill of lading is not transferred, or not so transferred as to carry good title, and who neglects to take actual or constructive indeed liken a hill of lading to a bill of exchange, and considered that the indorsement of the one did convey the property in the goods in the same manner as the indorsement of the other conveyed the sum for which it was drawn. But in the Exchequer Chamber there was much argument to show that, in itself, the indorsement of a bill of lading was no transfer of the property, though it might operate, as other instruments, as evidence of the transfer." See Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310.

(q) The leading case on this subject is Lickbarrow v. Mason, first decided in the King's Bench, 1787, and reported in 2 T. It. 63, and from thence carried to the Exchequer Chamber, where, in 1790, the decision below was reversed; reported in 1 11. Bl. 357 The record was thence removed into the House of Lords where the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was itself reversed, and a centre de noco awarded in June, 1793. Bulter's able opinion before the House of Lords is reported in 6 East, 21, n The cause was again tried before the King's Bench, in 1794, at the head of which Lord Kent/on had in the mean time been placed, and decided in the same manner as in 1787, when the case was first before them. If a writ of error was again brought, it was probably abandoned, as no further report of the case appears. A clear and succinct history of the law on this point is given in Abbott on Shipping, 471. The case of Lickbarrow v. Mason is to be understood as deciding only, that if there has been an actual and bond fide sale of goods by the cousiguee, the consignor cannot stop them, if the purchaser of the consignee has also taken an assign ment to himself of the original bill of lading from the consignor to the consignee. The mere assignment of a bill of lading, not based on an actual sale of the goods, it is believed, would not destroy the vendor's right. The delivery of a bill of lading merely, the same being in the hands of the original consignee, unin-dorsed, will not, of course, interfere with the vendor's right of stoppage. Tucker v Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516; s. c. 1 Mo. & P. 394, Parke, J. And a fortiori, the delivery to the vendee of a mere shipping note of the goods, or a delivery order for them instead of a bill of lading. Jenkyns v. Usborne, 7 Man. & G. 678; Akermany. Humphrey, 1 C. & P. 53; McEwan v. Smith, 13 Jur. 265, 2 House of L. Cas. 309; Townley v. Crump, 4 A. & E. 58. See, however, Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines, 182. In Walter v. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. 283, is an excellent summary of the law on this point. It is there held, that the indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading, or the delivery without indorsement, if by the terms of the bill the property is to be delivered to a particular person, amounts to a transfer of the property, but not to defeat the vendor's right of stoppage before the goods came actually into the possession of the vendee. But goods at sea may be sold, and if the bill of lading is indorsed, the right to stop in transitu is gone. See also Ryberg V. Snell, id. 403, and Gumey v. Behreud, 25 E. L. & E. 128; s. c. 3 E." & B. 622.

1 A seller's right of stoppage is put an end to by a transfer of the bill of lading by the buyer to a third person who bona fide gives value for it. Audenreid v. Randall, 3 Clifford, 99; Kemp v. Canavan, 15 Ir. C. L. 216; Loeb v Peters, 63 Ala. 248; Newhall v. Central, etc. R. R., 51 Cal. 345 But not by the sale of the goods without delivery of possession or assignment of the bill of lading Ocean S. S. Co. v Ehrlich, 88 Ga. 502. In Leask v Scott, 2 Q. B. D. 376, it was held that a transfer of a bill of lading for value to a bona fide transferee defeats the stoppage in transitu of an unpaid vendor, although the consideration of the transfer was past and not given at the time of the transfer. Contra, Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte, L. R. 2 P. C. 393. See also Lee v. Kimball, 45 Me 172; Loeb v. Peters, 63 Ala. 248: Clementson v. Grand Trunk By., 42 Up. Can. Q. B. 273. But if the original sale was procured by fraud of the buyer, the seller may exercise the right of stoppage against a bond fide purchaser and assignee of the hill of lading. Dows v Perrin, 16 N. Y 325; Decan v Shipper, 35 Pa 239. See also Pollard v. Vinton, 105 U S. 7 , Bergeman v Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co, 104 Mo. 77.