1 If a consignor instructs an express company not to permit the consignee to examine the goods sent, before delivery and payment of charges, the company's agent is authorized to refuse such an examination, and incurs no personal liability by returning the goods to the consignor. Wiltse v. Barnes, 46 Ia. 210.

2 See Green v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. 38 Ia. 100.

3 Kent v. Midland R. Co. L. R. 10 Q. B. 1. Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, held that the owner of a steamship is not liable as a common carrier for a watch worn by a passenger on his person by day, and kept by him within reach by night, whether retained upon his person, or placed under his pillow, or in a pocket of his clothing hanging near him.

The same person may be a common carrier and also a warehouseman, or an innkeeper, or a wharfinger, or a forwarding-merchant. And goods may be delivered to him and lost, under circumstances which would render him liable if he received them as a carrier, but not if he received them in another capacity, the loss not having occurred through his negligence. And it is sometimes quite difficult to determine in what capacity the goods were received. (s)

White v. Winnisimmet Co. 7 Cosh. 155; Maybin v. Railroad Co. 8 Rich. L. 241; Midland Railway v. Bromley, 17 C. B. 372.

(p) Cobban v. Downe, 5 Esp. 41. But a delivery to any of the crew is not sufficient, they not being authorized agents for that purpose. Leigh v. Smith, 1 C. & P. 638. And, generally, a delivery to a servant of the carrier must be to one authorized to receive the goods. Therefore, where the plaintiff delivered a package to the driver of a coach, who had no authority to receive and enter it on the way-bill, but consented to carry it on to the next agent and have it entered; it was held to be no delivery to the carrier. Blanchard v. Isaacs, 3 Barb. 388. The master of a vessel cannot bind the owner by a bill of lading for goods not actually put on board. Grant v. Norway, 2 E. L. & E. 337; s. c. 10 C. B. 665; Hubbersty v. Ward, 18 E. L. & E. 551; s. c. 8 Exch. 330; Coleman v. Riches, 29 E. L. & E. 823; s. c 16 C. B. 104.

(q) Therefore, where a package was delivered to the agent of a stage-coach company, at the post-office, where the stage was standing, and not at the office of the company, to be carried from Boston to Hartford, and was entered on the way-bill by the agent when he received it, he having previously directed the person who had the care of the package to bring it to the post-office; and the package was lost before reaching Hartford; it was held, that the owners of the coach were liable to the owner of the package for its value, the delivery at the post-office being with the assent of their agent. Phillips v. Earle, 8 Pick. 182. See also Pickford v. The Grand Junction Railway Co. 12 M. & W. 766; s. c. 8 id. 372. So in Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. R. Co. 24 How. 247, it was decided, that after a railroad company had received goods into their depot on Sunday, their duty of safekeeping was not within the prohibition of the Virginia Sunday law, and if the foods are burned the company is responsible for the loss.

(r) Citizens Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co. 2 Story, 16, 35.

[rr) Cronkite v. Wells, 32 N. Y. 247; and see Missouri, etc. Co. v. Hannibal, etc. R. R. Co. 35 Mo. 84; and Hotchkiss v. Artisan's Bank, 42 Barb. 517.

(rs) Grosvenor v. N. Y., etc. R. R. Co. 39 N. Y. 34.

(s) See the case of Roberts v. Turner, 12 Johns. 232, cited and stated fully ante, p. * 139, note (k). The point considered in that case came under discussion again in the case of Teal v. Sears, 9 Barb. 317. It was an action on the case against the defendants as common carriers, to recover for the loss of a case of goods. The facts were as follows: On the 6th of October, 1846, the plaintiffs shipped, at Albany, three cases of goods for Buffalo, on a canal boat. A bill of lading was made out by the plaintiffs, and forwarded by the captain of the canal boat, with directions to deliver the goods in the bill as addressed, and collect the charges for transporting on the canal. The three cases were marked on the bill, "A. B. Case, Chicago, by vessel, care of Sears & Griffith, Buffalo." The cases were received by Sears & Griffith (the defendants), at Buffalo, on the 14th of October, and they paid the canal charges, indorsing a receipt therefor, and a memorandum of the receipt of the poods, on the bill of lading. The defendants were at the time engaged in the forwarding and commission business at B. That was their principal business, but they were interested to some extent in a transporting line on the canal, and also in at least one vessel carrying freight upon the lakes. On the 17th of October, the defendants shipped the goods on board the schooner C, a transient vessel which ran between Buffalo and Chicago, in which they had no interest. They took the captain's receipt, and made a bill of lading for the goods, agreeing with the captain as to the amount of freight he should receive. The vessel was a good one, and her captain in good credit. One of the cases of goods was lost before arriving at Chicago. Upon these facts the court held, 1. That the legal import of the memorandum was not that the goods should be stored at Buffalo, and that the defendants should act as agents of the plaintiffs in procuring a carrier of them from Buffalo to Chicago; but that they were consigned to the defendants at B., with a request or direction that they should be carried, by vessel, from B. to Chicago. 2. That the defendants, receiving the goods with the accompanying memorandum, and transporting or causing the same to be transported by vessel to Chicago, were to be regarded as impliedly contracting to carry; and upon such a receipt the risk of a carrier, and not that of a warehouse' man or forwarder, attached. Roberts v. Turner having been cited for the defendants, Wright, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, thus endeavored to distinguish the two cases: "We are referred to Roberts v. Turner, 12 Johns.232, as controlling this case. That case was decided in 1815. But without referring to the actual condition of the business of the country since that decision, the case is distinguishable from the present, in that the whole facts showed that Turner acted but as a forwarder of the goods. He kept a store at Utica, where produce was left by the public to be forwarded by boats or wagons to Albany. He had no interest in the boats or wagons. The plaintiff knew, when his ashes were left to be sent to Albany, that Turner's only business, in relation to the carriage of goods, consisted in forwarding them. This was also understood by the public; and that without any concern in the vessels by which the goods were forwarded, or any interest in the freight, they were stored with him merely for the purpose of forwarding by others; he taking upon himself the expenses of transportation, for which he received a compensation from the owners of the goods. But this was not the position of the defendants in the present suit. They were in a measure engaged in the carrying business, and were interested to some extent in vessels on the canal and lakes. They kept a public office for the transaction of their business, at a place of transshipment; receiving and carrying all goods that might be directed to their care, in their own vessels when convenient, and in such other vessels as they could employ on terms most advantageous to themselves. They received the goods in question directed to them, which were destined west on the lakes. They employed a vessel to carry them forward, making out a new freight-bill, and returnriage, taking them as it were anew into his possession for this specific purpose.