(hh) Claflin v. Boston, etc R. R. Co. 7 Allen, 341. See Winslow v. Vermont, etc. R. R. Co. 42 Vt. 700. In McKeon v. Mclvor, L. R. 6 Ex. 36, it was held that the carrier was not liable for misdelivery without negligence.

(i) Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N Y. (6 Seld.) 431; Hall v. Richardson, 16 Md. 896; Merritt v. Old Colony R. R. Co. 11 Allen, 80; Blumenthal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402; Fenner v. Buffalo, etc R. R. Co. 46 Barb. 103; Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. McCool, 26 Ind. 140.

1 Joslyn v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 51 Vt 92. Such a delivery to the wrong person may be ratified by bringing suit against such person for the price, accepting from him an order on a third person, and giving a receipted bill. Converse v. Boston & Maine R. Co. 58 N. H. 521.

may be, he is not responsible for the effect of the delay, although it was not occasioned by "the act of God or the public enemy," and might possibly have been prevented; for as to the time of the delivery he is not bound to more than diligence, nor responsible unless for the want of due diligence; his liability as to the time of delivery being quite distinct from his liability for the delivery itself. (j) l And it has been held, that it is not a sufficient excuse on the part of the consignee (a bank) for refusing to receive packages, that they are tendered after banking hours, and that the vaults are locked and the cashier gone to his residence with the keys. (k) It seems, however, that if he has made an express agreement to deliver by a specified time, delay caused by unavoidable accident will be no excuse; (l) and it has been held in New York, that a delay to transport freight in the usual time, will subject a railroad corporation to damages, where the delay is caused by sudden and wrongful refusal to work, by the servants of the company. (m)

If the consignee refuse to receive the goods, or cannot receive them, or is dead, or absent, this will excuse delay in delivery, but not absolve the carrier from all duty or responsibility; for he is still bound to make all reasonable efforts to place them in the hands of the consignee, and, when these are ineffectual, to * take care of the goods for the owner, by holding them himself, or lodging them with suitable persons for him; and such persons then become bailees of the owners of the goods. (n)

[j) Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. 215; Dows v. Cobb, 12 Barb. 310, 320; Wibert v. The New York & Erie R. R. Co. 2 Kern. 245; Scoville v. Griffith, id. 509; Boyle v, McLaughlin, 4 Har. & J. 291; Hadley v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 259; Lowe v. Moss, 12 Ill. 477. See Harrell v. Owens, 1 Dev. & B. 273, contra. - But if the carrier is prevented by any cause from delivering foods in due time, his liability to deliver them within a reasonable tune, after the cause of detention is removed, still continues. Id. Therefore, where the defendants contracted to carry the plaintiff's goods from Liverpool to Leghorn, and on the vessel's arrival at Falmouth, in the course of her voyage, an embargo was laid on her, "until the further order of Council;" it was held, that such embargo only suspended, but did not dissolve, the contract between the parties; and that even after two years, when the embargo was taken off, the defendants were answerable to the plaintiff for damages for the non-performance of their contract. Hadley v. Clarke, 8 T. R. 259. See also Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341.

(k) Marshall v. Am. Express Co. 7 Wis. 1.

(l) Harmony v. Bingham, I Duer, 209.

(m) Blackstock v. New York & Erie R. R. Co. 10 N. Y. (6 Seld.) 48.

(n) Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; Fisk v. Newton, I Denio, 45. In this last case the consignee of certain kegs of butter, sent from Albany to New York by a freight barge, was a clerk, having no place of business of his own, and whose

1 A carrier of goods is not liable for mere delay in delivery caused by a strike and rioting of its employees, Pittsburg, Ac. R. Co. v. Hollowell, 65 Ind. 188; but is liable for a delay caused by the employees' refusal to do their duty, Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Hazen, 84 Ill. 36.

But the question of reasonableness of time disappears when the parties have made their time certain by the special agreement. Then it must be precisely adhered to. Any delay is a failure and a breach of the contract. (o) And where there is a custom which would wholly excuse the carrier from delivering the goods, still, if he make an express promise to deliver, he is bound by this promise, and the custom becomes inoperative.

In general, the delivery of the goods must be to the owner or consignee himself, or to his agent, (p) l or they must be carried to his residence, or they may be taken to his place of business, where, from the nature of the parcels, this is the more appropriate place for their delivery. Nor is it sufficient that they are left at the public office of the carrier, unless there be express permission for this, or a usage so established and well known as * to be equivalent to such permission. (q) But a delivery of the goods in accordance with the labels is sufficient. (r) name was not in the city directory, and who was not known to the carrier, and after reasonable inquiries by the carrier's agent could not be found. It was held, that the carrier discharged himself from further responsibility, by depositing the property with a storehouse keeper, then in good credit, for the owner, and taking his receipt for the same according to the usual course of business in that trade, although the butter was subsequently sold by the storehouse keeper, and the proceeds lost to the owner by his failure. And Jewett, J., said: "When goods are safely conveyed to the place of destination, and the consignee is dead, absent, or refuses to receive, or is not known, and cannot, after due efforts are made, be found, the carrier may discharge himself from further responsibility by placing the goods in store with some responsible third person, in that business, at the place of delivery, for and on account of the owner. When so delivered, the storehouse keeper becomes the bailee and agent of the owner in respect to such goods." See also Stone v. Waitt, 31 Me. 409; Hemphill v. Chenie, 6 W. & S. 62.