1 Redmond v. Liverpool, etc. Steamship Co. 46 N. Y. 578, was to the effect that a mere deposit of goods by a common carrier by water on his own wharf, without acceptance by the consignee, not separated and set apart from the rest of the cargo, and without a reasonable opportunity and time for their removal, did not discharge the carrier, but that the goods remained at his risk.

* abandon them utterly, even if the consignee refuses or neglects to take charge or notice of them. (d)

While the goods are in lighters belonging to or employed by the carriers, and going to or from the wharf, the carriers are liable. (e)

If the carrier be a warehouseman, or if, without being a regular warehouseman, he has, as most common carriers have, a * place of reception and deposit for his goods, it may often be a question of some difficulty, after the transportation is completed, whether the carrier retains that character and its peculiar responsibility. The answer, in general, is this.

(d) See the cases in the preceding note, and The Peytons, 2 Curtis, C. C. 21; The Grafton, Olcott, 43.

(e) Morewood v. Pollock, 18 E. L. & E. 341; s. c 1 E. & B. 742.

Where, by the known usage and course of business, the goods, when they arrive, are to be placed in the carrier's warehouse or office, and kept there without pay to him until the owner takes them, then his responsibility as carrier ceases upon their arrival and notice to the owner, and a sufficient time has elapsed to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to take them away; (ee) l because keeping them in his office is now for the benefit of the owner of the goods exclusively, as it is for the interest of the carrier to have them removed, so that they may no longer encumber his office. (f) This reason does not apply, where compensation is made for the storage, distinct from that for transportation. But here the two duties of storing and of carrying are perfectly distinct, made so by the undertaking of the party; and the responsibility which belongs to one of these contracts cannot be extended to the other. (ff) It has been held, wisely we think, that the liability of a common carrier has not been lost, and that of a warehouseman taken its place, until the goods are placed in a secure warehouse. (fg)

Where there is no usage, nor any special agreement, which requires that the goods should be left in the store or office of the carrier after their arrival, then, as we have seen, he is not justified in keeping them there; it is his duty to deliver them at once.

(ee) Wood v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 345.

(f) See ante, p. * 140, note (l), and p. * 188, note (t).

(ff) Where a railroad company gave notice to a consignee that his goods were ready for delivery, and, unless taken away without delay, they would be at his risk, and he began to take them away, but before all were removed the remainder were burned in the depot, the railroad company were held liable. Hedges v. Hudson R. R. R. Co. 6 Rob. 119.

(fg) Bartholomew v. St. Louis, etc. R. R. Co. 53 111. 227.

1 Graves v. Hartford, etc. Co. 38 Conn. 143. The same is true where a carrier holds goods for delivery to a connecting carrier, his liability continuing until the goods are ready for delivery, and a reasonable time for taking them away has elapsed. Wood v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. 27 Wis. 541. - In Massachusetts a railroad corporation ceases to be a common carrier and becomes a warehouseman, as matter of law, when it has completed the duty of transportation and assumed the position of warehouseman as matter of fact and according to the usages and necessities of the business in which it is engaged. Rice v. Hart, 118 Mass. 201. So in Iowa. Mohr v. C, etc. R. Co. 40 la. 579. But in New York, a common carrier by railroad which carries goods to their final destination and deposits them in its freight-house ready for delivery, does not cease to be liable as an insurer, for a reasonable time after their arrival, until the consignee can have an opportunity to take charge of them. Fenner v. Buffalo, etc. R. Co. 44 N. Y. 505; Sherman v. Hudson, etc. R. Co. 64 N. Y. 254; Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413. In the last case, goods transported from New York to Boston were put into a warehouse on one day too late for delivery, and destroyed during the ensuing night by fire. -Where a carrier notified a consignee that certain flax was ready for delivery, and that he should hold it "as warehouseman, at owner's sole risk," and the consignee took a part of the flax away, but before he removed the remainder the flax was damaged by wet through the carrier's failure to take reasonable care of it, the carrier was held liable. Mitchell v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway, L. R. 10 Q. B. 256.

And if he does not deliver them, and so fails in this duty, he continues liable as carrier; or, if not as carrier, still liable absolutely for loss or injury to the goods while in his possession, because that possession is wrongful. (g) And in some

(g) Miller v. The Steam. Nav. Co. 13 Barb. 361. In this case goods belonging to the plaintiff were received at the city of New York by the defendants, who were common carriers on the Hudson River, between Albany and New York, to be carried by them to Albany, and there delivered to A, the agent of a line of boats on the Erie canal. The goods were put on board a barge of the defendants at New York, and taken to Albany, where they arrived on the morning of the 17th of August, 1848. A portion of them were unloaded from the barge, and put into a float in the Albany basin, belonging to the defendants, which was a stationary floating craft, kept for the purpose of receiving goods brought up the river, and from which goods were reshipped into canal boats to be taken west. While the goods were in the process of being passed from the barge to the float, and before they were delivered to A, they, together with the barge and float, were destroyed by a fire which originated in the city of Albany, and afterwards spread to the piers and shipping. Held, that the defendants, having contracted to deliver the goods to A, at Albany, they continued to hold the relation of common carriers until the goods were so delivered, or until a reasonable time should have elapsed after notice to A of their arrival, and an offer to deliver; and that they were liable for the value. Held, also, that the defendants were not to be treated as warehousemen of the goods, after the arrival of the barge at the pier at Albany; that they had no right to warehouse the goods, except in case of the absence of A, or his refusal or neglect to receive them, after notice. Welles, J., said:"It is contended on behalf of the appellants, that upon the arrival of the barge at the pier at Albany, their relation became changed from common carriers to that of warehousemen of the goods in question, and that as there is no negligence imputed to them, and as warehousemen are only liable in case of negligence, no recovery can be had against them. The contract of shipment was to deliver the goods to F. M. Adams, the agent at Albany, of the Rochester City Line, which line the respondent had selected for their transportation west of Albany; and, in my judgment, the appellants continued to hold the relation of common carriers in reference to the goods, until they were so delivered, or until a reasonable time should have elapsed after notice to the agent of their arrival, and an offer to deliver. We so ruled on a similar question in the case of Goold and others v. Chapin and Mallory, 10 Barb. 612. The appellants had no right to warehouse the goods, unless in case of the absence of the person authorized to receive them, or his refusal or neglect to receive them, after reasonable notice. If the contract was to deliver them to Adams, they had no more right to store them at Albany than at New York, or any intermediate point on the river, unless for one of the reasons mentioned. The legal obligations and liabilities of the appellants, as common carriers, were fastened upon them from the time they received the goods in New York, until they had performed the service which the transaction implied, and delivered them agreeably to their contract, unless prevented by the conduct of the owner or his agent. There does not appear to have been any notice given to Adams of the arrival of the goods; no offer to deliver them to him; no act on the part of the appellants, indicating that they desired or intended to change their character from common carriers to that of warehousemen. Adams went on board the barge some two or three hours after its arrival, and saw the trip book. He testifies that he had a boat near by, ready to take the goods from the float, upon which, as appears by the testimony of the captain of the barge, it was the invariable custom of the defendants to ship goods brought by them up the river, before they were delivered on board the canal boats. The goods in question were in the process of being passed from the barge to the float, and before it was completed, and while a portion of them was in the float and the residue in the barge, the fire drove away the hands engaged, and destroyed both the barge and float, with all the goods they contained. Under these circumstances, it is preposterous to contend that there was anything like an attempt or intention to store the goods, or any occasion or justification for storing them, if such had been the intention. On the contrary, the appellants were merely preparing and getting ready to deliver them, but had not commenced the delivery. They were not in fact ready or in a situation to commence cases of non-delivery the carrier may be sued in trover, as having converted the goods to his own use. (h)