The statements in the early books assert that in order to constitute duress by threats, the threats in question must be such as to put a brave man in fear.13 Later, the standard of courage was somewhat reduced, but it was said that duress must consist of something sufficient to overcome the will of a person of ordinary firmness, and the rule in this latter form with more or less qualification is frequently repeated in modern oases,14 though in many of the cases which repeat the formula, the question was not really involved. The tendency of the modern cases, and undoubtedly the correct rule is that any unlawful threats which do in fact overcome the will of the person threatened, and induce him to do an act which he would not otherwise have done, and which he was not bound to do, constitute duress. The age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties and all the attendant circumstances must be considered.15 This fol- Dallavo, 189 Mich. 350, 155 N. W. 538; Earle v. Norfolk, etc., Hosiery Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 188; Smithwick v. Whitley, 152 N. C. 369, 67 S. E. 913; Edmond-8ton v. Porter (Old.), 162 Pac. 692; Wilkerson v. Bishop, 47 Tenn. 24; Kansas City etc. R. v. Graham (Tex. Civ. App.), 145 S. W. 632; Walla Walla Fire Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 52 Wash. 369, 100 Pac. 741; Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 81 N. W. 495, 47 L. R. A. 417.

13 See the passage from Bracton stated supra, Sec. 1601, the influence of which has continued because of its quotation in 1 Blackstone Comm. 131. See also Co. Lit. 253b.

14 Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205, 19 L. Ed. 134;,United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414, 21 L. Ed. 457; Andrews v. Connolly, 145 Fed. 43; Bosley v. Shanner, 26 Ark. 280; Hines v. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, 93 Ind. 266; Williamson-Halsell, etc., Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kans. 502, 94 Pac. 807, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 484; United States Banking Co. v. Neale, 84 Kans. 385, 114 Pac. 229, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540; Bryant v. Levy, 52 La.

Ann. 1649, 28 So. 191; Higgins p. Brown, 78 Me. 473, 5 Atl. 269; Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 27 N. E. 1010, 29 N. E. 525; Detroit Nat. Bank v. Blodgett, 115 Mich. 160, 73 N. W. 120; Flanigan v. Minneapolis, 36 Minn. 406, 31 N. W. 359; Wood v. Kansas City Home Tel. Co., 223 Mo. 537, 123 S. W. 6; Horton v. Bloedorn, 37 Neb. 666, 56 N. W. 321; Sulzner v. Cappeau-Lemley Ac. Co., 234 Pa. 162, 83 Atl. 103, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 421; Ortt v. Schwartz, 62 Pa. Super. 70; Ford v. Engleman, 118 Va. 89, 86 S. E. 852; Walla Walla Fire Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 52 Wash. 369, 100 Pac. 741; Simmons v. Trumbo, 9 W. Va. 358; Wolff v. Bluhm, 95 Wis. 257, 70 N. W. 73, 60 Am. St. Rep. 115; Barrett v. Mahnken, 6 Wyo. 541, 48 Pac. 202, 71 Am. St Rep. 953.

15 Scott v. Sebright, 12 P. D. 21, 24; United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414, 432, 21 L. Ed. 457; International Harvester Co. v. Voboril, 187 Fed. 973, 110 C. C. A. 311; Hartford, etc., Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 111 Ala. 456, 20 So. 651; McCarthy v. Tanska, 84 Conn. 377, 80 Atl. 84; Turner v. State, 10 lows the analogy of the modern- doctrine of fraud which tends to disregard the question whether misrepresentations were such as would have deceived a reasonable person, and confines the question to whether the misrepresentations were intended to deceive and did so.16