It must be admitted that where a plaintiff has furnished the defendant with the necessary means to carry out an illegal purpose the distinction between the mere knowledge of and the promotion of that purpose is often difficult to draw, and the rule gives a court or jury considerable power to turn a decision one way or the other.49 But if performance of the contract can have no other purpose or effect than an illegal one there can certainly be no recovery. Thus notes given for a gambling slot machine cannot be enforced.50

Shaw, 38 Wash. 398,80 Pac. 536 (seller of liquor, knowing the character of the place where it was to be used, recovered the price); Standard Furniture Co. v. Van Alstine, 22 Wash. 670, 62 Pac. 146, 51 L. R. A. 889, 79 Am. St. Rep. 960 (seller of goods on conditional sale not allowed to recover them on buyer's default. The court held that such a sale necessarily involved participation in the immoral business, distinguishing the case from an absolute sale on credit). Similar decisions are Case v. Monk, 7 Ala. App. 419, 62 So. 268; Abbott Furniture Co. v. Mobley, 141 Ga. 456, 81 S. E. 196. See also Col-burn v. Coburn (Tex. Civ. App.), 211 S. W. 248.

47 Jenson v. Tolteo Ranch Co., 174 Fed. 86, 98 C. C. A. 60 (loan which corporation desired for ultra vires purpose); Hines v. Union Savings Bank, 120 Ga. 711, 48 S. E. 120 (loan which the borrower desired to prevent the prosecution of her husband); Mc-Gavock v. Puryear, 6 Cold. 34 (loan used for expenses of equipping cavalry for the Confederate army); Bond v. Perkins, 4 Heisk. 364; Jones v. Planters' Bank, 9 Heisk. 455; Puryear v. McGavock, 9 Heisk. 461; Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 51 Ala. 171 (loan used for manufacture of iron for the Confederate government); Lewis v. Alexander, 51 Tex. 578 (loan used for contraband trading); Futch v. Sanger (Tex. Civ. App.), 163 S. W. 597.

No recovery was allowed in the following cases: Johnson v. McMillon, 178 Ky. 707, 199 S. W. 1070, L. R. A. 1918 C. 244 (loan of money intended to be used for removing a witness from the jurisdiction unenforceable); Phimer v. Smith, 5 N. H. 553, 22 Am. Dec. 478 (loan to prevent criminal prosecution); Leak v. Commissioners of Richmond County, 64 N. C. 132; Setzer v. County Commissioners, 64 N. C. 516; BrickeU v. Halifax, 81 N. C. 240 (loan to a county to aid the Confederacy); Kingsbury v. Flemming, 66 N. C. 524; ditcher v. Holloway, 64 N. C. 526; Kingsbury p. Gooch, 64 N. C. 528 (loan to hire a substitute for the Confederate army); Smither-man v. Sanders, 64 N. C. 522 (loan for equipment of Confederate Company).

48 Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267 (money paid by the attorney of a married woman to her husband at her request to induce the husband not to contest divorce proceedings); Johnson v. McMillon, 178 Ky. 707, 199 S. W. 1070, L. R. A. 1918 C. 244 (loan to enable borrower who was accused of murder to spirit away witnesses against him); Johnstown Land Co. v. Brainerd Brewing Co. (Minn.), 172 N. W. 211 (the lender made it a condition of his loan that the borrower should use the lender's beer in an illegally established saloon); Pierson v. Green, 69 S. Car. 559, 48 S. E. 624 (loan to prevent criminal prosecution where the lender took part in the illegal use).