This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by William Herbert Page. Also available from Amazon: Commercial Contracts: A Practical Guide to Deals, Contracts, Agreements and Promises.
The law of negotiable instruments is derived from the Law Merchant. The Seal is derived from the common law. Accordingly, at common law a sealed instrument could not be negotiable.1 Thus if two guarantors sign, and A adds a seal while B does not, the note is negotiable as to B but not as to A.2 This rule, however, is no longer in force in many jurisdictions.3 A corporate seal does not destroy negotiability since it is merely the common-law form whereby the corporation indicates its assent. To hold that it destroyed negotiability would be to hold that a corporation could not issue negotiable paper.4 "The at-
Archer v. Claflin, 31 111. 306; Dean v. Carruth, 108 Mass. 242; Clarke v. Marlow, 20 Mont. 249; 50 Pac. 713; Hubbell v. Fogartie, 3 Rich. L. (S. C.) 413; 45 Am. Dec. 775.
2 Famous Shoe Co. v. Crosswhite, 124 Mo. 34; 46 Am. St. Rep. 424; 26 L. R. A. 568; 27 S. W. 397.
3 Garrigus v. Missionary Society, 3 Ind. App. 91; 50 Am. St. Rep. 262; 28 N. E. 1009. (A note "to advance the cause of missions and to induce others to contribute.")
4Siegel v. Bank. 131 111. 569; 19 Am. St. Rep. 51; 7 L. R. A. 537; 23 N. E. 417; Clanin v. Machine Co., 118 Ind. 372; 3 L. R. A. 863; 21 N. E. 35; Ferris v. Tavel, 87 Tenn.
386; 3 L. R. A. 414; 11 S. W. 93.
5 Wright v. Taver, 73 Mich. 493; 3 L. R. A. 50; 41 N. W. 517.
6Choate v. Stevens.. 116 Mich. 28; 43 L. R. A. 277; 74 N. W. 289.
1 Conine v. Ry., 3 Houst. (Del.) 288; 89 Am. Dec. 230; Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135; 50 Am. Rep. 560; 19 N. W. 650; Osborn v. Kist-ler, 35 O. S. 99; McLaughlin v. Braddy, 63 S. C. 433; 90 Am. St. Rep. 681; 41 S. E. 523.
2 McLaughlin v. Braddy, 63 S. C. 433; 90 Am. St. Rep. 681; 41 S. E. 523.
3 Porter v. McCollum, 15 Ga. 528.
4 Kneeland v. Lawrence, 140 U. S. 209; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Bank, 136 tacking of a corporate seal bears a strong analogy to the signature of a natural person and is its substantial equivalent."5 A seal which may be treated as surplusage does not destroy negotiability.6 Some authorities, however, hold that a corporation seal makes the instrument a specialty and destroys negotiability.7
U. S. 268; Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 83; Reid v. Bank, 70 Ala. 199; Chase National Bank v. Faurat, 149 N. Y. 532; 35 L. R. A. 605; 44 N. E. 164; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. Lynde, 55 O. S. 23; 44 N. E. 596; American National Bank v. Paper Co., 19 R. I. 149; 61 Am. St. Rep. 746; 29 L. R. A. 103; 32 Atl. 305; Landauer v. Improvement Co., 10 S. D. 205; 72 N. W. 467.
5 Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. v. Lynde, 55 O. S. 23, 49; 44 N. E. 596.
6 Stevens v. Ball Club, 142 Pa. St. 52; 11 L. R. A. 860; 21 Atl. 797; Mackay v. Church, 15 R. I. 121; 2 Am. St. Rep. 881; 23 Atl. 108.
7Coe v. Ry., 8 Fed. 534; Frevall v. Fitch, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 325; 34 Am. Dec. 558.
 
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