While the emancipation of an infant from parental control gives him a property in his own earnings from that time,1 it does not relate back so as to permit him to recover for services previously rendered,2 and it does not in any way enlarge the contractual capacity of the infant.3 It often is, however, of practical importance in determining with whom the contract was

4 Swinburne, pt. 2, Sec. 2, pl. 7; 2 Kent Com. 233; Met. Cont. 38; 7 Wait Act. & Def. 129; Fitzhugh v. Dennington. 6 Mod. 259; Anon. 1 Salk. 44; Roe v. Hersey, 3 Wils. 274; Wells v. Wells, 6 Ind. 447; Hamlin v. Stevenson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 597; Bardwell v. Purrington, 107 Mass. 419; Phelan v. Douglass, 11 How. Pr. 193; Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172; 16 L. R. A. 542; 19 S. W. 1090.

5 Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172, 175; 16 L. R. A. 542; 19 S. W. 1090.

6 Ross v. Morrow, 85 Tex. 172; 16 L. R. A. 542; 19 S. W. 1090.

7 In the earlier cases this rule is stated apparently as a mere dictum. Anon. 1 Salk. 44; Fitzhugh v. Dennington, 6 Mod. 259. The rule as given in the later cases is often based on Blackstone; but that author merely said, I Com. 463, " So that full age in male or female is twenty-one years, which age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person's birth. . . ."

1Clay v. Shirley, 65 N. H. 644; 23 Atl. 521.

2 Kreider v. Fanning, 74 111. App. 237.

3 Burns v. Smitb, 29 Ind. App. 181; 64 N. E. 94; Tandy v. Mastermade; and also in deciding many questions under the law of necessaries.