An infant can disaffirm any contract during minority,1 except a contract executed by the conveyance of real estate, which can be disaffirmed only after he reaches majority.2 On reaching

14 Oliver v. Houdlet, 13 Mass. 237; 7 Am. Dec. 134. In this case the above proposition was limited to contracts beneficial to the infant. So in case of a mortgage of realty. Shreeves v. Caldwell, - Mich. - ; 97 N. W. 764.

15 Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508; 93 Am. Dec. 117.

16 Mansfield v. Gordon, 144 Mass. 168; 10 N. E. 773.

17 Des Moines Insurance Co. v. Mclntire, 99 Ia. 50; 68 N. W. 565.

18 Ping, etc., Co. v. Grant, -Kan. - ; 75 Pac. 1044.

19 Tennessee Mfg. Co. v. James, 91 Tenn. 154; 30 Am. St. Rep. 865; 15 L. R. A. 211; 18 S. W. 262.

1 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142; Indianapolis, etc., Co. v. Wilcox. 59 Ind. 429; Clark v. Van Court, 100 Ind. 113; 50 Am. Rep. 774; House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109; 55 Am. Rep. 189; 4 N. E. 891; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472; 58 Am. Rep. 53; 9 N. E. 420; 7 West. 68; Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571; 15 N. E. 12; Childs v. Dobbins, 55 Ia. 205; 7 N. W. 496; Bailey v. Bamberger, 11 B. Mon. (Ky.) 113; Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. 53; 1 Am. St. Rep. 379; 8 Atl. 664; Blooming-dale v. Chittenden, 74 Mich. 698; 42 N. W. 166; Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 280; 59 Am. Dec. 345; Grace v. Hale, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 27; 36 Am. Dec. 296; Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268; 65 Am. Dec. 194. Contra, as to a compromise of personal injuries which cannot be avoided by the infant during minority. Lansing v. R. R., 126 Mich. 663; 86 Am. St. Rep. 567; 86 N. W. 147 (citing Dunton v. Brown, 31 Mich. 182; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124; Osburn v. Farr, 42 Mich. 134; 3 N. W. 299).

2 Prout v. Cock (1896), 2 Ch. 808; Welch v. Bunce, 83 Ind. 382; Phillips v. Green, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 7; 13 Am. Dec. 124; Ridge-way v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606; 73 Am. St. Rep. 464; 51 S. W. 1040; Shipley v. Bunn, 125 Mo. 445; 28 S. W. 754; Walsh v. Powers, 43 N. Y. 23; 3 Am. Rep. 654; Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St. 588; 20 Am. St. Rep. 939; 20 Atl. 625; Scott

Majority he can disaffirm a deed given by him during minority.8 His right to disaffirm contracts concerning personalty during minority has been limited to cases where such a course was evidently necessary to protect his interests,4 but this rule has been abandoned and he can now disaffirm such contracts at any time before minority that he sees fit.5 Rescission of property made during minority is final and the infant or his representatives cannot thereafter rescind such rescission. Thus if an infant surrenders a life insurance policy taken out by him and accepts cash therefor, his administrator cannot avoid such surrender and enforce payment of the policy, since the surrender is a rescission by the infant.6 So stringent is the rule that conveyances of realty cannot be avoided during minority that a minor cannot redeem realty mortgaged by his father and devised to himself and his mother, of which the mortgagee has obtained possession by acquiring the widow's estate.7 But an infant at majority may avoid a deed of his interest in remainder, though the life estate has not expired.8 With reference to his executed contracts for conveying realty, it has been held that he could at least enter during minority and take the rents and profits,9 but this view seems illogical and has been stoutly denied.10 With reference to the rule as to the length of time allowed to an infant in which to disaffirm his contracts and conveyances after reaching majority, it must be admitted that the decisions are sharply at variance. The English courts, followed by a very considerable number of American courts, hold that the infant must rescind within a reasonable time after majority ;11 v. Buchanan, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 468. Contra, Harrod v. Myers. 21 Ark. 592; 76 Am. Dec. 409 (obiter).

3 Shroyer v. Pittinger, 31 Ind. App. 158; 67 N. E. 475.

4 Farr v. Sumner, 12 Vt. 28; 36 Am. Dec. 327.

5 See cases cited in third preceding note. And see Shipley v. Smith, - Ind. - ; 70 N. E. 803.

6 Pippen v. Ins. Co., 130 N. C.

87

23; 57 L. R. A. 505; 40 S. E. 822,

7 Prout v. Cock (1896), 2 Ch. 808.

8 Ihley v. Padgett, 27 S. C. 300; 3 S. E. 468.

9 Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119; 31 Am. Dec. 285; Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80.

10 Shipley v. Bunn, 125 Mo. 445; 28 S. W. 754.

11 Edwards v. Carter (1893), A. C. 360; Viditz v. O'Hagan (1899), and this conclusion is in some states the result of specific statutory provisions.12 This rule is insisted on with especial force in contracts relating to personalty.13 What a reasonable time is, is a question of fact, depending on the circumstances of each case. It may be said at the outset that if any acts of ratification have taken place, the question of the lapse of time becomes wholly immaterial. Where there are no circumstances to show a ratification, a delay of thirty-two days,14 of three and a half months,15 of four months,16 or of eighteen months,17 has in each case been held reasonable. Delay for a much greater time has been held not to be unreasonable where there are circumstances to explain the delay. Thus where coverture prevents the wife from suing without the consent of her husband, a delay after majority, if due to coverture, of nineteen years,18 of twentyeight years,19 of thirty-two years,20 or of thirty-five years,21 has in each case been held reasonable. Where there are no special circumstances to explain the delay, a delay of forty years after executing a deed, and five years after the disability of coverture is removed ;22 a delay for fifteen years after majority, with the erection of improvements and the appreciation of the value of the realty ;23 a delay of fourteen years ;24 a delay of six years, together with treating the property purchased by him as his own;25 a delay of four years;26 a delay of three years and a half;27 and in extreme cases, where the facts pointed strongly to a ratification, a delay of two months,28 or one,29 has in each case been held an unreasonable delay. The other rule, which is followed by an equal number of American states, is that an infant has the time fixed by the statute of limitations for bringing an action to recover real property, after reaching majority before his failure to disaffirm will bar his right so to do.30 So

2 Ch. 569; 68 L. J. Ch. N. S. 553; McDonald v. Salmon Club, 33 N. B. 472; Watson v. Billings, 38 Ark. 278; 42 Am. Rep. 1; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Wallace v. Lewis, 4 Harr. (Del.) 75; Tunnison v. Chamberlin, 88 111. 378; Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind. 1; Stringer v. Ins. Co., 82 Ind. 100; Petty v. Roberts, 7 Bush. (Ky.), 410; Boo-dy v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; Amey v. Cockey, 73 Md. 297; 20 Atl. 1071; Goodnow v. Lumber Co., 31 Minn. 468; 47 Am. Rep. 798; 18 N. W. 283; Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91; 36 Am. St. Rep. 25; 27 Atl. 114; Walton v. Gaines, 94 Tenn. 420; 29 S. W. 458; Searcy v. Hun-ter, 81 Tex. 644; 26 Am. St. Rep. 837; 17 S. W. 372; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294; 5 L. R. A. 176; 11 S. W. 1101; Bingham v. Barley, 55 Tex. 281; 40 Am. Rep. 801; Sim-kins v. Searcy, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 406; 32 S. W. 849; Richardson v. Boright, 9 Vt. 368; Thormaehlen v.

Kaeppel, 86 Wis. 378; 56 N. W. 1089.

12 Bentley v. Greer, 100 Ga. 35; 27 S. E. 974; Green v. Wilding, 59 Ia. 679; 44 Am. Rep. 696; 13 N. W. 761; Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195; 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; 26 L. R. A. 177; 58 N. W. 852; O'Brien v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 347; 30 N. W. 274.

13 McKamey v. Cooper, 81 Ga. 679; 8 S. E. 312; Deason v. Boyd, 1 Dana (Ky.) 45; Robinson v. Hoskins, 14 Bush. (Ky.) 393; Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 85; 25 Am. Dec. 617.

14 Leacox v. Griffith, 76 Ia. 89; 40 N. W. 109.

15 Thormaehlen v. Kaeppel, 86 Wis. 378; 56 N. W. 1089.

16 Rapid, etc., Co. v. Sanford (Tex. Civ. App.), 24 S. W. 587.

17 Johnson v. Storie, 32 Neb. 610; 49 N. W. 371.

18 Richardson v. Pate, 93 0M. 423; 47 Am. Rep. 374.

19 McMorris v. Webb, 17 S. C. 558; 43 Am. Rep. 629.

20 Wilson v. Branch, 77 Va. 65; 46 Am. Rep. 709. But in Virginia the infant has the entire period fixed by the statute of limitations in which to disaffirm. See cases cited in note 30, this section.

21 Sims v. Bardoner, 86 Ind. 87; 44 Am. Rep. 263.

22 Amey v. Cockey, 73 Md. 297; 20 Atl. 1071.

23 Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91; 36 Am. St. Rep. 25; 27 Atl. 114.

24 Ihley v. Padgett, 27 S. C. 300; 3 S. E. 468.

25 Land Co. v. Nixon (Tenn. Ch. App.), 48 S. W. 405.

26 Carter v. Silber (1892). 2 Ch. 278; reversing (1891) 3 Ch. 553.

27 Goodnow v. Lumber Co., 31 Minn. 468; 47 Am. Rep. 798; 18 N. W. 283.

28 Spicer v. Earl. 41 Mich. 191; 32 Am. Rep. 152; 1 N. W. 923.

29 Forsyth v. Hastings, 27 Vt. 646.

30 Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300; Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 617; Gilkinson v. Miller. 74 Fed. 131; Hill v. Nelms, 86 Ala. 442; 5 So. 796; McCarthy v. Ni-crosi. 72 Ala, 332; 47 Am. Rep. 418; Eureka Co. v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 248; 46 Am. Rep. 314; Stull v. Harris, 51 Ark. 294; 2 L. R. A. 741; 11 S. W. 104; Kountz v. Davis, 34 Ark. 590; Hoffert v. Miller, 86 Ky. 572; 6 S. W. 447; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236; 35 Am. Rep. 318; Donovan v. Ward. 100 Mich. 601; 59 N. W. 254; Shipp v. McKee. 80 Miss. 741; 92 Am. St. Rep. 616; 32 So. 281; 31 So. 197; Allen v. Poole. 54 Miss. 323; Wallace v. Latham, 52 Miss. 291; Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541; Huth v. Ry.. 56 Mo. 292; Thomas v. Pullis. 56 Mo. 211; Lacy v. Pixler. 120 Mo. 383; 25 S. W. 206; Emmons v. Murray. 16 N. H. 385; Green v. Green. 69 N. Y. 553; 25 Am. Rep. 233; Cre-singer v. Welch. 15 Ohio 156; 45 where an infant delayed disaffirming a deed for eighteen years,31 or twenty years and seven months,32 he was still allowed to disaffirm. A compromise rule has been suggested in Illinois, where it was held that the minor would have a reasonable time to avoid his deed, and that the court would by analogy adopt the time fixed by the statute of limitations for one under disability when his cause of action accrued to bring an action after his disability was removed by statute, three years.33 Equity will compel an infant on reaching majority to adopt or abandon an agreement for quieting title to realty.34