As between the person who deposits his own money with one who is thus bound to account to him, and the person with whom such money is deposited, it became settled that if the person with whom such money was deposited refused to account, he could be treated as a debtor against whom the action of debt would lie; and this right was finally extended to the beneficiary, and upon default of the obligor, in whose hands money or property was placed for the benefit of the beneficiary, and upon his refusal to render an account, the beneficiary was allowed to choose between debt and account,1 wherever, by reason of the transaction between A and B, "the right of the money" was in C.2 The theory that the beneficiary might choose between debt and account did not, of course, develop until the courts had abandoned their original theory that only one kind of action could be brought upon a given right; and that if an earlier action were given in the historical development of law, newer actions which developed might be made the means of enforcing analogous rights, but that they could not be made the means of enforcing the identical rights for which a remedy was already given, even though such remedy might be insufficient.3 It is said that debt will lie if it is sought to recover the bare deposit, but that if the increase thereof is sought, account must be brought.4