The amount which can be recovered by one who has performed in part under a contract which is discharged by impossibility, is generally limited to the value of the property which actually passed to the adversary party by reason of such performance, or to the value of the services of which the adversary party actually had the benefit.1 If a contract to build a part of a building is discharged by the destruction of the building, the contractor can not recover the value of materials which had not become a part of the building when it was destroyed.2 It has been said that the tests for determining whether the materials in place have become a part of the building is whether such materials could be removed for a reasonable sum.3 Recovery can be had for preliminary work which is done upon the building itself,4 such as work in removing the part of the building which the contractor is to replace.5 No recovery can be had for the expense of preliminary work which is not done upon the building itself,6 such as digging trenches,7 or furnishing forms which were to be used for the construction of concurrent work, but which were not to remain as part of the building when completed.8

On the other hand, where an executory contract for hauling and delivering lumber to a corporation was discharged by the dissolution of the corporation on account of insolvency, the contractor was allowed to recover not only the value of the services rendered to the corporation under the contract, but also expenditures for tools, appliances, construction of roads, and the like, as preparation for the performance of such contract.9

1Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006, 164 Pac. 143; Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky. 199, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 43, 137 S. W. 1045; Dame v. Woods, 73 N. H. 222, 70 L. R. A. 133, 60 Atl. 744

See also, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 848, 160 S. W. 759; Clifton v. Clark, 83 Miss. 446, 102 Am. St. Rep. 458, 36 So. 251.

2 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006, 164 Pac. 143; Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky. 199, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 43, 137 S. W. 1045; Dame v. Woods, 73 N. H. 222, 70 L. R. A. 133, 60 Atl. 744.

3 Dame v. Woods, 73 N. H. 222, 70 L. R. A. 133, 60 Atl. 744.

4 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006, 164 Pac. 143.

5 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006, 164 Pac. 143.

6 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006, 164 Pac. 143; Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky. 199, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 43, 137 S. W. 1045.

7 Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky. 199, 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 43, 137 S. W. 1045.

8 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, L. R. A. 1917D, 1006, 164 Pac. 143.

9 Griffith v. Blackwater B. & L. Co., 55 W. Va. 604, 69 L. R. A. 124, 48 S. E. 442 [for a former opinion, see Griffith

Recovery can be had for the value of partial performance where full performance is prevented by subsequent impossibility, only if the services or property by which recovery is sought were required by the contract between the parties.10 If A rendered services to B, not under any contract for such services, but because A and B had agreed to intermarry in the future, and such contract is discharged by B's death before the time fixed for such marriage, A can not recover reasonable compensation for such services from B's estate.11