4 Per Air. Chief Justice Best, in Bremner v. Williams, 1 Car. & Payne, 414. See, also, Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metcalf, 1.

5 Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bing. 457, per Mr. Justice Bosanquet.

6 Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metcalf, 12; Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. v. Burke, 18 Wend. 626; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 236; Story on Bailm. § 592-600.

§ 966. Passenger carriers, as well as carriers of goods, may become liable for injuries received by a passenger beyond their own line.2 And it had been before held that if a railway company sell a ticket from A. to B., which is on the line of another connecting road, and an accident then happen by reason of cattle straying on the track through the neglect of the connecting road to keep up their fences, the first company is liable to the passenger.3

§ 967. Notwithstanding some dicta and perhaps decisions to the contrary,4 it may now be considered the better opinion of incurring an expense which would render impossible to continue the business," was erroneous, as being calculated to mislead the jury.1

1 Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metcalf, 1, 15. The reader is referred to this case for an able review of the principal cases on this subject. See, also, Hege-man v. Western Railroad Co., 16 Barb. 353; 3 Kernan, 9; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer, 233. But if the defect were discoverable in the process of manufacture, the carrier will be liable. Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 2S2 (1872). See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Phillips, 55 I11. 194 (1870).

2 Thomas v. Rhymney Railway Co., 19 Weekly Rep. 477 (1871); Law R. 6 Q. B. 266.

3 Buxton v. North Eastern Railroad Co., Law R. 3 Q. B. 549 (1868). And see Great Western Railway Co. v. Blake, 7 H. & N. 987.

4 Burns v. Cork & Bandon Railway Co., 13 Irish Com. Law, 543; Althat carriers of passengers, whatever may be the rule as to common carriers of goods, do not absolutely warrant the soundness or roadworthiness of their vehicles; and they are not liable for injuries arising from defects therein, if such defects could not have been discovered by the utmost care and diligence. This rule harmonizes the liability of the carrier in this respect with that which applies to him in other cases; for in no other respect is he considered an insurer or guarantor of the safety of the passenger, being responsible only for the highest degree of care and diligence. This subject was recently very fully examined in the Queen's Bench,1 and the foregoing rule adopted, and the Court of Exchequer Chamber unanimously affirmed the same.2

§ 968. In regard to the means and efforts which carriers are bound to take in procuring safe vehicles or means of transportation, it has been thought they were not absolutely bound, as a matter of law, to adopt and use every new and improved method used by other carriers, although it were safer and better than their own, if the same were not required for the reasonable safety and convenience of their passengers, and " if the expense were excessive."3 But it has also been adjudged that the standard of care and diligence required does not depend upon the pecuniary conditions of the carrier, or the amount of its revenue. For example, a railroad company is bound to provide a track, rolling stock, and all other agencies suited to the nature and extent of the business it assumes to do; and it was held in one case that a direction to a jury that such a company must use such a degree of care as is practicable, "short den v. New York Central Railway Co., 26 N. Y. 102; McPadden v. New York Central Railway Co., 47 Barb. 247. Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bing. 457, on which these cases rest, was apparently decided on the ground that the defect might have been discovered by due care and diligence.

1 Readhead v. Midland Railway Co., Law R. 2 Q. B. 412, citing and approving Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. 1. And see Francis v. Cockrell, Law R. 5 Q. B. 184 & 501 (1871); Meier v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 64 Penn. St. 225 (1870).

2 Law R. 4 Q. B. 379. And see an article in the Albany Law Journal, Jan. 1870, p. 6.

3 Le Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen, 312. And see Tuller v. Talbot, 23 I11. 357.

1 Taylor v. Grand Trunk Railway Co., 48 N. H. 304 (1869). In this interesting case the law is thus laid down by Bellows, J.: "In the English courts the proprietors of stage-coaches are held to a high degree of care and skill. In Aston v. Heaven et al., 2 Esp. Rep. 533, it was said, per Eyre, C. J., that the driver was answerable for the smallest negligence. In Christie v. Greggs, 2 Camp. 79, it was held that the undertaking of the carrier of passengers went no farther than this, that as far as human care and foresight could go, he would provide for their safe conveyance.

"In Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. 319, Best, C. J., lays it down that the coachman must have competent skill, and must use that skill with diligence, must know the road, have steady horses, and a sufficient coach and harnesses; and if there be the least failure in any one of these things, the duty of the coach proprietor is not fulfilled, and he is answerable for any injury or damage that may happen.

"In Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bing. 457, the case was that the axle-tree broke in consequence of a defect in the iron, and it was left to the jury to determine whether there had been the vigilance in examining the axle-tree which was required by the engagement to carry the plaintiff safely; although from the language of the judges it seems to have been understood that the carrier was bound absolutely to see that his coach was road-worthy.

"In Bremner v. Williams, 1 C. & P. 414, it was held by Best, C. J., that every coach proprietor warrants to the public that his stage-coach is equal to the journey it undertakes, and that it is his duty to examine it previous to the commencement of every journey. See, also, Israel v. Clark etal., 4 Esp. 259, and 1 Starkie's Rep. 423.