1 Jackson v. Tollett, 2 Stark. 37; Mayhew v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 423; McKinney v. Neil, 1 McLean, 540.
2 Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; Gough v. Bryan, 5 Dowl. P. C. 765; McKinney v. Neil, 1 McLean, 540; Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 Car. & Payne, 694, note; Munroe v. Leach, 7 Metcalf, 274.
3 Per Best, C. J., in a charge to the Wilts Grand Jury, cited in 8 Car. & Payne, 694, note; Munroe v. Leach, 7 Metcalf, 274; Churchill v. Rose-beck, 15 Conn. 359. See, also, as to improper speed on a railway, Carpue v. Brighton & London Railway, 5 Q. B. 747; Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Co., 4 Metcalf, 49; Steamboat New World v. King, 16 Howard, 469, 474.
4 Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181.
5 Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Peters, 181; Story on Baihn. § 598, and cases cited there and in previous notes; Jackson v. Tollett, 2 Stark. 37; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metcalf, 1; Eldridge v. Long Island Railroad Co., 1 Sandf. 89; McKinney v. Neil, 1 McLean, 540; Galena Railroad v. Yarwood, 15 I11. 471. See, also, Delamatyr v. Milwaukee, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Wis. 578 (1869); South Western Railway Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356; Railway Co. v. Aspell, 23 Penn. St. 147; Frink v. Potter, 17 I11. 406. But a passenger who leaps from a train after it has passed the station where he desired to stop, in order to avoid being carried farther, has no claim against the company for injuries thus sustained. Damont v. New Orleans Railway Co., 9 La. An. 441. And see Siner v. Great Western Railway Co., Law R. 3 Exch. 150.
6 Dudley v. Smith, 1 Camp. 167.
7 Dudley v. Smith, 1 Camp. 167; Ker v. Mountain, 1 Esp. 27; Story on Bailm. § 600.
§ 970. As to the time in which carriers are to carry, they are ordinarily bound to carry with all reasonable diligence,6 and may become liable to carry by certain stipulated or advertised time-tables; in which case they are bound to start and to arrive, unless for good excuse, at the published time;1 and if they change the hour of starting, they ought to give reasonable notice thereof, which it seems should be coextensive with the original advertisement; and a usage to change the hours by a more limited notice, if not known to the traveller, does not exonerate the company from their duty to run on their former time.2 However, merely selling a ticket for a journey by a railway does not amount to a contract on the part of the company to have a train ready to start at the time at which the passenger is led by the company's servants to expect it, unless the time-tables of the company stipulate for such time.3
1 Porter v. Steamboat New England, 17 Mo. 290.
2 Jeremy on Carriers, 23; Angell on Carriers, § 531; Ker v. Mountain, 1 Esp. 27; Massiter v. Cooper, 4 Esp. 260.
3 Richards v. London, Brighton, etc. Railway, 7 Com. B. 839; Butcher v. London & S. W. Railway Co., 16 C. B. 13; 29 Eng. Law & Eq. 347. In this case the plaintiff was a passenger by railway from F. to W., bringing with him as luggage a small carpet-bag, which was placed in the carriage he rode in. On the arrival of the train at W. station, the plaintiff got out upon the platform with the bag in his hand, and it was taken from him by a railway porter to be placed in one of the cabs which were standing in the station. In an action against the railway company for the loss of the bag, it was proved that the plaintiff never saw the bag again after the porter had so taken it from him, and that the porter was unable to find it. It was also proved to be the practice of the railway company for their porters to assist in carrying the passengers' luggage, on the arrival of a train, to the cabs in the station. Held, that there was evidence of the railway company having contracted to deliver the plaintiff's bag to a cab in the station, and of their not having performed such contract. Held, also, that whether the plaintiff had accepted a delivery of the bag on the platform or elsewhere, in lieu of such delivery to a cab, was a question of fact for a jury to determine.
4 Powell v. Myers, 26 Wend. 591; Camden & Amboy Railroad v. Belknap, 21 Wend. 354.
5 See Colt v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 33 N. Y. Superior Ct. Rep. 189 (1871).
6 Weed v. Panama Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362.
§ 971. There are certain rules of the road, which have by long custom become a kind of law, which should here be adverted to. First, the rule in England is that all carriages meeting shall pass each other on the left.4 In America the rule is that they shall pass on the right. Second, where one carriage overtakes another, the foremost carriage bearing to the left, the other shall pass on the off side. Third, in crossing,
1 Denton v. Great Northern Railway Co., 5 El. & B. 860; 34 Eng. Law & Eq. 154; Hamlin v. Great Northern Railway Co., 1 H. & N. 408.
2 Sears v. Eastern Railroad Co., 14 Allen, 433. See, further, Bol-lands v. Manchester, etc. Railway Co., 15 Irish Com. Law, 560; Wren v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 1 Law Times (n. s.), 5.
3 Hurst v. Great Western Railway Co., 19 C. B. (n. s.) 310. But carriers may he bound by the positive contract of their freight agent or other authorized person to transport freight within a certain fixed or stipulated time. Deming v. Grand Trunk Railroad Co., 48 N. H. 455 (1869); Page v. Great Northern Railway Co., Irish Rep. 2 C. L. 228 (1868); Strohn v. Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad Co., 23 Wis. 126 (1868). See, further, Gordon v. Manchester & L. R. Co., 52 N. H. 596 (1873); Prevost v. Great Eastern Railway Co., 13 Law Times (n. s.), 20; Benson v. New Jersey Railroad Co., 9 Bosw. 412; Page v. New York Central Railroad Co., 6 Duer, 523. A promise by a carrier without additional consideration to forward goods already on the route, by an earlier train than usual, is gratuitous and not binding. Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176 (1869).
4 According to the old English rhyme, -
"The law of the road is a paradox quite: As you journey the highway along, If you keep to the left, you are sure to go right; But if you go right, you go wrong." the coachman must bear to the left hand and pass behind the other carriage.1 But these rules are not very strictly enforced, and, when the road is broad, he may often pass on the near side.2 Deviations from the rule are not only often justifiable, but sometimes even necessary and incumbent on the driver, as, for instance, where he sees a horse coming furiously along on the wrong side, and unmanageable.3 So, also, where the street is very broad, the driver may ordinarily drive on the wrong side, provided he leave sufficient room for the other to pass on the proper side;4 and if no carriage be on the road, he may drive on either side he chooses.6 The sole effect of a violation of these rules seems to be, that it affords a presumption of negligence against the party violating them. But he may repel such presumption by proof of proper skill and care; and whether he was on the right or wrong side, he will only be liable where the circumstances indicate improper negligence on his part;6 and where it appears that both parties were in fault, no recovery can take place.7