§ 1353. In the next place, as to the effects of Receipts. A receipt for money paid constitutes generally only presumptive proof of payment, and may be explained by parol evidence,1 or it may be rebutted by proof of mistake, falsity, or fraud.2 And this is equally true of an acknowledgment of receipt in a deed, the recital operating only as primÔ facie evidence.3 But in some cases a receipt may, when acted upon by a third person, estop the party giving it to deny its purport, as in the case of a warehouse receipt (for grain or produce) passed for value to a stranger.4 Acknowledgment of receipt of premium in a policy of marine insurance also forms an exception, being ordinarily conclusive, for peculiar reasons.5

1 Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 32; Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 561; Putnam v. Lewis, 8 Johns. 389; Monell v. Lawrence, 12 Johns. 521; Melledge v. Boston Iron Co., 5 Cush. 158 (see ante, § 1344, note); Vancleef v. Therasson, 3 Pick. 12. See post, § 1354.

2 Straton v. Rastall, 2 T. R. 366; Lampon v. Corke, 5 B. & Ald. 611; Skaife v. Jackson, 3 B. & C. 421; Farrar v. Huchinson, 1 P. & Dav. 437.

3 See Bigelow on Estoppel, 313-318.

4 McNeil v. Hill, Woolw. 96 (1865); Bigelow on Estoppel, 471; such instruments possessing a quasi negotiability. Ibid.

5 See Arnould on Insurance, 180, 181 (4th ed.).