1 Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 647, supra.
2 1 Russell on Crimes, B. 2, ch. 20, p. 176; Strange v. Brennan, 10 Jur. 649.
3 1 Russell on Crimes, B. 2, ch. 21, p. 183; 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 27, 466; 4 Black. Comm. 140.
4 1 Russell on Crimes, B. 2, ch. 21, p. 183; 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 27, 466: 4 Black. Comm. 140.
5 2 Inst. 564; 2 Roll. Abr. 116; Bac. Abr. Maintenance, B. 5; In re Masters, 4 Dowl. P. C. 18; 1 Russell on Crimes, B. 2, ch. 20, p. 179.
1 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1049; Strachan v. Brander, 1 Eden, 303, and note; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. 44, 48; Wood v. Griffith, 1 Swanst. 55; Wallis v. Duke of Portland, 3 Ves. 494; Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Port.. 488.
2 Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415. See also Spencer v. King, 5 Ohio, 183; Lathrop v. Amherst Bank, 9 Met. 489; Byrd v. Odem, 9 Ala. 755; Satterlee v. Frazer, 2 Sandf. 141. See also Boardman v. Thompson, 25.. Iowa, 488 (1868), overruling Wright v. Meek, 3 Greene (Iowa), 472;. Kennedy v. Broun, 13 C. B. (n. s.) 677 (1863); 2 Am. Law Reg. (n. s.) 372, note; Lafferty v. Jelley, 22 Ind. 471; Coquillard v. Bearss, 21 Ind. 479; Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 117.
3 Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389 (1866); Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Port. 488; Weakly v. Hall, 13 Ohio, 167. A statute prohibiting attorneys from purchasing bonds, chases in action, etc, for the purpose of bringing suits upon them, does not apply to a purchase of stock in a corporation. Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb. 399 (1870).
4 Grell v. Levy, 16 C. B. (n. s.) 73 (1864).
5 Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167; Hitchings v. Van Brunt, 38 N. Y. 335 (1868). Some cases are still more strict. Evans v. Ellis, 5 Denio, 640; Howell v. Ransom, 11 Paige, 538.
§ 714. There is another species of champerty, which consists in buying or selling a pretended or doubtful title to land not in possession of the seller, but held adversely by another person.5 In such a sale it is immaterial whether the title of the vendor be good or bad, if the land be held adversely to him.6 But where the party selling land does not know that there is an adverse possession, he would not be liable to the statute penalty for selling the pretended title, even although he should know that there was an adverse claim.7 So, also, where an executory contract is made for the sale of land, while the vendor is in peaceable possession, a deed in pursuance thereof afterwards given, when the land is in adverse possession, is not void for champerty.1 But the purchase of an estate which is in suit, if made with a knowledge that it is in suit, is void for champerty, unless it be made in consummation of a previous bargain, or be founded on the ties of blood.2
1 Earle v. Hopwood, 9 C. B. (n. s.) 566 (1861); and see the learned note of the American editor.
2 Kennedy v. Broun, 13 C. B. (n. s.) 677 (1863), a very interesting case.
3 Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369; Hartley v. Russell, 2 Sim. & Stu. 244.
4 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1049; Strachan v. Brander, 1 Eden, 303, and note; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. 44, 48; Wood v. Griffith, 1 Swanst. 55; Wallis v. The Duke of Portland, 3 Ves. 494.
5 Whitaker v. Cone, 2 Johns. Cas. 58; Brinley v. Whiting, 5 Pick. 355; 1 Russell on Crimes, B. 2, ch. 20, p. 181; Dexter v. Nelson, 6 Ala. 68; Martin v. Pace, 6 Blackf. 99; Williams v. Hogan, Meigs, 187; Ring v. Gray, 6 B. Monr. 368; Burhans v. Burhans, 2 Barb. Ch. 398; McGoon v. Ankeny, 11 111. 558. But see Edwards v. Parkhurst, 21 Vt. 472; Dunbar V. McFall, 9 Humph. 505.
6 Tomb v. Sherwood, 13 Johns. 289.
7 Etheridge v. Cromwell, 8 Wend. 629; Hassenfrats v. Kelly, 13 Johns. 466; Le Roy v. Veeder, 1 Johns. Cas. 417; Preston v. Hunt, 7 Wend. 53 j Sessions v. Reynolds, 7 Sm. & M. 132.
§ 715. This rule does not, however, apply to sales or assignments of personal property or choses in action. In relation to personal property, the rule is that any debt or claims may be assigned after the institution of a suit for the recovery thereof, unless the assignment savor of maintenance, as if it be made on condition that the suit shall be prosecuted, or if the assignee undertake to pay costs, or make advances beyond the mere support of the exclusive interest he has so acquired.3
§ 716. At law, whenever a debt is assigned, suit should be brought in the name of the original creditor, unless there be a privity between the debtor and the assignee.4 But it is the policy of courts of equity to uphold assignments, when bond fide made, and to enable the assignee to sue in his own name, and enforce payment of the debt directly against the debtor, making him, as well as the assignor (if necessary), a party to the bill.5
§ 717. There is another class of contracts, coming under this head, the object of which is a violation of the laws of another nation, which should, upon principle, be treated as utterly void, but which has never been directly pronounced to be void by any court of common law, and, therefore, seems to form an exception to the general rule. It is greatly to be regretted that this class of cases should not be em-braoed within that lofty principle of law which annuls every contract having the taint of immorality, and that the common law of England should crouch before the dictation of its commercial interests, so far as to permit its courts to be polluted by contracts which are founded in any species of fraud, bad faith, and immorality. In this respect, England and America may well receive a lesson from the principle, which is boldly enunciated in the Roman code: Pacta quoz contra leges constitutionesque, vel contra bonos mores, fiunt, nullum vim habere, indubitati juris est.1 The broad principles of international law seem to demand that universal comity, by which no one nation shall connive at the infraction of the laws of another. The highest policy of a people, as of an individual, is honesty. It is, also, the highest morality, which is far better; and, in an age in which commercial and maritime intercourse is so extended, as to draw all nations closer into a peaceful brotherhood of interest and feeling, and to smooth the asperities of political economy, this doctrine deforms the whole system of international jurisprudence.