2 Arlington v. Merricke, 2 Saund. 403; United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720. Arlington v. Merricke turned upon the particular nature of the recital in the bond, which was that the principal had been appointed for only six months, and the phrase so long as he continued postmaster was held to mean so long as he continued postmaster according to the manufacturing corporation, the condition of which provides for his faithful discharge of the duties of the office "during the time for which he has been elected, and for and during such further time as he may continue therein by any re-election or otherwise," are liable only for defaults during his continuous holding of the office.1 So, also, where the guaranty relates to a particular office, it extends only to such things as were included in the office at the time when the obligation was created.2 Thus, where a bond was given by A. as security for a collector of customs, and, after the bond was given, a new duty was laid on coals, and the collector was deputed to collect it, and a new security was taken in respect to such new duty, it was held that the first bond did not extend to this new duty.3 But a bond for the fidelity of A. R. "as writing clerk" of a banking company, and "all and every other service of said company wherein he is, shall, or may be employed," extends to his duties as cashier of a branch bank of said company, to which position he had been advanced without the knowledge of the sureties.4 The sureties on the bond of the treasurer of a railroad company, the condition of which provides for his faithful discharge of the duties of the office "during his continuance in office, during the present year and for such further periods as he may from time to time be elected to said office," are not liable recital, whether the whole of six months or only a part of that time. But sureties may bind themselves for the faithful execution of a future as well as a present appointment, if they use words fairly covering such a liability. See The Mayor, etc. v. Oswald, 1 El. & B. 295; 3 lb. 653; 36 Eng. Law & Eq. 27.
1 Middlesex Manuf. Co. v. Lawrence, 1 Allen, 339 (1861).
2 See Gregg v. Currier, 36 N. H. 200 (1858).
3 Bartlett v. Attorney-General, Parker, 277; Bowdage v. Attorney-General, Ib. 278. See Bamford v. IIes, 3 Exch. 380; Mayor v. Oswald, 1 El. & B. 295; 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 236; Frank v. Edwards, 8 Exch. 214; Ib. 477, and Bennett's note; Jamison v. Cosby, 11 Humph. 273. It has, however, been held that the sureties upon the bond of a public officer are not discharged by the imposition upon their principal of new duties of a similar nature and character by an act of the legislature. People v. Vilas, 36 N. Y. 459 (1867).
4 Thompson v. Roberts, 17 Irish Com. Law, 490 (1865), a very important case, in which the authorities are examined.
1 Lexington & West Cambridge Railroad Co. v. Elwell, 8 Allen, 371 (18(H). D. M. was elected treasurer of the borough of Berwick for the year ending Nov. 9, 1842. He gave bond with sureties for the due discharge of the duties of his office " during the whole time of my continuing in the said office, or under any future election." At this time the office was annual, and subsequently it was provided by statute that the treasurer should hold his office during the pleasure of the council. Under the latter statute D. M. was re-elected in 1843. Held, that this was a "future election," and that the sureties under the original bond continued liable. Oswald v. The Mayor, etc, 5 H. L. C. 856 (1856).
2 Skillett v. Fletcher, Law R. 1 C. P. 217 (1866); 8. c. Law R. 2 C. P. 469 (1867).
3 Harrison v. Seymour, Law R. 1 C. P. 518 (1866).
4 Mason v. Pritchard, 12 East, 227; Merle v. Wells, 2 Camp. 413; Sanson v. Bell, 2 Camp. 39; Hargreave v. Smee. 6 Bing. 244; s. 0. 3 M. & P. 573; Evans v. Whyle, 3 M. & P. 136; Bent v. Hartshorn, 1 Met. 24; Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 482; Mauran v. Bullus, 16 Pet. 528, 536. The defendant wrote the plaintiff: "Let E. W. have what flour he may want, on commission, and I will be responsible for the amount sold by him for you on commission." Such an agreement will not sustain an assumpsit for goods sold and delivered to the defendant, as it is not a contract for the purchase of goods, nor authority to sell any to E. W. on his account. Lord v. Willard, 51 Me. 196 (1862).
1 Bailey v. Larchar, 5 R. I. 530 (1858).
2 Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 680; U. S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720; Evans v. Whyle, 5 Bing. 485. In respect to the interpretation to he given to guaranties, see Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 186, and Lawrence v McCalmont, 2 How. 449. In this last case Mr. Justice Story said: "Some remarks have been made on the argument here upon the point in what manner letters of guaranty are to be construed; whether they are to receive a strict or a liberal interpretation. We have no difficulty whatsoever in saying that instruments of this sort ought to receive a liberal interpretation. By a liberal interpretation, we do not mean that the words should be forced out of their natural meaning; but simply that the words should receive a fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the objects for which the instrument is designed and the purposes to which it is applied. We should never forget that letters of guaranty are commercial instruments, generally drawn up by merchants in brief language, sometimes inartificial, and often loose in their structure and form; and to construe the words of such instruments with a nice and technical care would not only defeat the intentions of the parties, but render them too unsafe a basis to rely on for extensive credits, so often sought in the present active business of commerce throughout the world. The remarks made by this court in the case of Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169,186, meet our entire approbation. The same doctrine was asserted in Mason v. Pritch-ard, 12 East, 227, where a guaranty was given for any goods he hath or may supply W. P. with, to the amount of £100; and it was held by the court to be a continuing guaranty for goods supplied at any time to W. P. until the credit was recalled, although goods to more than £100 had been first supplied and paid for; and the court on that occasion distinctly stated that the words were to be taken as strongly against the guarantor as the sense of them would admit of. The same doctrine was fully recognized in Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & El. 309, and in Mayer v. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 605, and especially expounded in the opinion of Mr. Baron Alder-son. It was the very ground, in connection with the accompanying circumstances, upon which this court acted in Lee v. Dick, 10 Pet. 482, and in Mauran v. Bullus, 16 Pet. 528. Indeed, if the language used be ambiguous and admits of two fair interpretations, and the guarantee has advanced his money upon the faith of the interpretation most favorable intention of the parties is always the paramount rule for the interpretation of every contract.1 Whatever can be fairly included within the terras of a guaranty will bind the guarantor; and extrinsic evidence may sometimes be given to ascertain the true import of a letter of guaranty.2 Thus, where a security was given to a banking-Aowse, an intention was inferred that it was meant to be given to the house, and not to the special partners, and therefore that the sureties were liable, although there was a change of partners in the house.3 So, also, a guaranty "for any goods he hath or may supply," or for the "balance that maybe due," 4 was held to be a continuing guaranty.5 A guaranty in these words, "Mr. H., you can to his rights, that interpretation will prevail in his favor; for it does not lie in the mouth of the guarantor to say that he may, without peril, scatter amhiguous words, by which the other party is misled to his injury." 1 Where a promissory note is made payable in three years from date, and, after the expiration of that time, a party covenants that the note shall be paid "according to its tenor," the contract must be understood with reference to a note overdue, and the guaranty is equivalent to a stipulation for payment of a note payable on demand. Crocker v. Gilbert, 9 Cush. 131 (1851).