1 Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323; Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Denio, 517, 520; Campbell v. French, 6 T. R. 200.
2 Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323.
3 Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Denio, 512.
4 White v. Reed, 15 Conn. 457.
5 Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82.
6 Russell v. Clark, 7 Cranch, 69; Campbell v. French, 6 T. R. 200.
7 See Drummond v. Prestman, 12 Wheat. 515; Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113; Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323; Dry v. Davy, 10 Ad. & El. 30; Batson v. Spearman, 9 Ad. & El. 298; Allan v. Kenning, 9 Bing. 618; Hargreave v. Smee, 6 Bing. 244; Kay v. Groves, 6 Bing. 276; Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426.
8 Swan v. Bank of Scotland, 10 Bligh (n. s.), 627.
1 Van Alstyne v. Van Slyck, 10 Barb. 386. 2 Veazie v. Willis, 6 Gray, 90 (1856).
3 Jones v. Thayer, 12 Gray, 443 (1859).
4 Worcester County Institution for Savings v. Davis, 13 Gray, 531 (1859).
5 Remsen v. Graves, 41 N. Y. 471 (1869).
§ 1123. So, also, where the contract of guaranty or suretyship relates to the business transactions of a certain person, it extends only to the acts of that person individually. Thus, if a guaranty be given of all notes signed by A., it does not extend to notes signed by A. and B., although they be partners.1 So, also, where a guaranty is given in respect to a particular person, an assumption by him of any new relation in business by which his liability would be extended or altered materially, as if he should associate himself in business with another person as a partner, would operate as a discharge of the guarantor from all liability.2 The same rule also applies where the guaranty is in respect of several individuals; and in such case any material alteration of their relations, which would affect the risk of the guarantor, would determine the guaranty, unless some provision was made to meet such an event. Thus, if one of several persons in respect of whom a guaranty is given should die, the guaranty would be determined, unless it was manifestly intended to continue in behalf of the survivors.3 So, also, a guaranty in behalf of a firm is determined by any change of partners, because the guarantor is understood to place reliance upon the fidelity and capability of each.1 So, also, a guarantor is only responsible to the guarantee or guarantees named in the obligation.2 The principle of all these cases is that wherever a guaranty has been entered into in regard to any species of act or transaction to be done by any person or persons, any material change of mercantile situation voluntariry assumed by such person or persons will determine the contract; because, by affecting the relations and responsibilities of the guarantor, the very security on which he depended and the very consideration of his contract may be impaired.3
1 Russell v. Perkins, 1 Mason, 368. A guaranty given for the debts of an individual is not applicable to debts incurred by that individual jointly with a partner, although the partnership was contemplated at the time the guaranty was given. Montefiore v. Lloyd, 15 C. B. (n. s.) 203; Bellairs v. Ebsworth, 3 Camp. 53. And see Carr v. Montefiore, 5 B. & S. 408. But the surrounding circumstances may be sufficient in some cases to show that the guaranty applied to either kind of debts. Leathley v. Spyer, Law R. 5 C. P. 595 (1870).
2 Wright v. Russell, 3 Wils. 530; 2 W. Bl. 934; Russell v. Perkins, 1 Mason, 368; Theobald on Principal and Surety, 76, 77; Dry v. Davy, 10 Ad. & El. 30. J. S. desired to act as an insurance broker at Lloyd's. In order to do so, he was obliged to give security. The defendants signed a guaranty to become responsible for " any debts that J. S. may contract in his capacity of such broker." J. S. subsequently had a partner. By the rules of Lloyd's, only one member is allowed to act as broker. The partner of J. S. was allowed to act as his substitute. Many debts were contracted on account of the firm by J. S., and his partner as substitute, and it was held that the guaranty included all the transactions of J. S., whether by himself personally or by his substitute, and whether for his own sole benefit or for the benefit of the firm. Leathley v. Spyer, Law R. 5 C. P. 595 (1870).
3 Simson v. Cooke, 8 Moore, 588; s. c. 1 Bing. 452; Kipling v. Turner, 5 B. & Ald. 261; University of Cambridge v. Baldwin, 5 M. & W.
580; Weston v. Barton, 4 Taunt. 673; Cremer v. Higginson, 1 Mason, 323.
1 Strange v. Lee, 3 East, 484; Myers v. Edge, 7 T. R. 254; Dry v. Davy, 2 P. & Dav. 249. See New Haven Bank v. Mitchell, 15 Conn. 206. A guaranty of payment for goods to be supplied to two partners, is discharged by an arrangement between them and the creditor, by which, before payment for goods so supplied, one of the partners goes out of the business, and the other gives his individual note, payable to the creditor and another person jointly, and no demand of payment is made on the outgoing partner. Bill v. Barker, 16 Gray, 62 (1860).
2 Barker v. Parker, 1 T. R. 287.
3 Dance v. Girdler, 1 B. & P. N. R. 34.