Thus, where an agent made a promissory note, commencing "I promise to pay," and signed it with his own name, adding the great multiplication of corporations, extending to almost all the concerns of business, that trading corporations, whose dealings embrace all transactions from the largest to the minutest, and affect almost every individual in the community, are affected like private persons with obligations arising from implications of law, and from equitable duties which imply obligations; with constructive notice, implied assent, tacit acquiescence, ratifications from acts and from silence, and from their acting upon contracts made by those professing to be their agents, and generally by those legal and equitable considerations which affect the rights of natural persons. We are not dealing here with the weight, force, or effect of the evidence, but only whether any evidence aliunde could control the presumption arising from the note; and we think there was evidence competent to go to the jury, from which they might infer that the defendants had so adopted a name, other than their corporate name, for the special purpose of giving notes, as to be bound by it when used by a general agent, in liquidation of their own debts. This results from a series of decisions both in England and in this country, but particularly in America, quite too numerous to be reviewed here. I will allude to a few. In the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 7 Cranch, 299, it was held that a corporation might be bound both by express and implied provisions, and that by acting on the contracts made by their agents, they adopted and ratified them. In the case of United States Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, the subject was considered at great length, and it was held that a corporation is bound by the same presumptions which would affect a natural person; that the authority of agents may be proved from their acts, and that corporations may be affected by parol proof and presumptions of fact in the same manner as natural persons. The case is an instructive one, and though the Chief Justice dissented, it has been generally acquiesced in as sound law. In Massachusetts, in the case of Canal Bridge v. Gordon, 1 Pick. 297, it was held that a corporation could be bound without vote or deed by implication from corporate acts. This proceeded on the broad ground that corporations can be bound by implication as well as individuals. In Minot v. Curtis, 7 Mass. 444, the court say: ' We know not why corporations may not be known by several names, as well as individuals.1 As that case arose on pleading, the court further say that if this point had been before the jury as a question of fact, the defendants would have been bound to prove the identity of the parish thus acting under different names. This, of course, could be done by any proof tending to establish such identity. The case of Medway Cotton Man. Co. v. Adams, 10 Mass. 360, is in point with the present, except that there the corporation was plaintiff, whereas here it is defendant. The averment was, that the defendants, by their promissory note, etc, promised the said Medway Cotton Manufacturing Company, by the name of Richardson, Metcalf, & Co. That came before the court on demurrer, and the declaration was held good. The opinion was "agent Bellamy Man. Co.," and at the same time executed a mortgage in the name of the company, to secure the payment given by Sewall, J., who states the principle on which it was founded. He says, it was a question of identity, which was sufficiently there stated by way of averment, to be good on demurrer; but had it been traversed or tried, would, as he states, depend on an inquiry of facts, which might or might not be proved, and might be provable by evidence extraneous to the note. The same point was subsequently decided in Commercial Bank v. French, 21 Pick. 486. Without going more at large into authorities that a corporation may have several names, I will cite the third edition of Angell and Ames on Corp. 206 (4th ed. § 234), which lays down the rule that the misnomer of a corporation in a grant, obligation, or other written contract, does not prevent a recovery thereon by or against the corporation in its true name, provided its identity with that intended by the parties to the instrument be averred in pleading, and apparent in proof; and the authors cite many cases in support of the rule thus stated. The court are therefore satisfied that it was competent for the plaintiff, if he could, to show by evidence that the notes were in fact the notes of the defendants, given in a name adopted by them to authenticate their contracts, and therefore that the modification prescribed to the rule asked for by the defendants and given, was correct, and adapted to the case then in proof. In this connection several authorities were cited to the point, that when a creditor knowing that one acts as agent for a principal in making purchases, takes the note of the agent, without that of the principal, he waives the responsibility of the principal, and gives credit to the agent. This principle, though taken with some qualifications (Thomas v. Davenport, 9 B. & C. 78. In this case Littledale, J., says, - ' the genuine principle is, that the seller shall have his remedy against the principal rather than against any other person'), is no doubt correct, but not applicable to the present case. The ground of the plaintiff is, not after taking the note of the agent to revert back to the principal, but to show that the note taken was in fact and in legal effect the note of the defendants. It was urged in this connection that the court should have given an opinion on the questions of law stated in this prayer for instructions, and upon the facts there stated; but as we understand it, these facts were only a part of the evidence; there was much other evidence which was competent, such as the fact, that the company had no meetings except a formal annual meeting; that there was no vote appointing Horace Gray & Co. agents, or appointing any agent, or prescribing the powers of agents; that a large amount of business was done by and in the name of the Boston Iron Co., in the way of purchases, sales, and other dealings, which was done wholly by Horace Gray & Co.; that these were open and notorious, from which constructive notice to the company might be presumed, - from all which a jury might infer the authority which is the subject of inquiry. If so, the judge could not be called upon to express an opinion on a question of law, arising from a part of the evidence; the only question is, whether the judge was corof it, it was held that the note would bind the company as their note, if the agent had authority at the time to execute it, rect in submitting the evidence to the jury; and he was so, if there was competent evidence proper for their consideration, and from which they might infer the fact sought to be proved. Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. & C. 73. Under this same objection also, the question was discussed, whether a corporation can adopt the name of a mercantile firm, and bind themselves by notes given in its name. It may not be a wise arrangement, but we are not prepared to say they cannot do it. Suppose the case, which actually occurred, as appears in the case of Goddard v. Pratt, 16 Pick. 412, that a manufacturing company pass a vote or by-law, providing that all their mercantile business shall be done, and contracts made in the name of a partnership, whose stock they have taken, and to whose business they have succeeded. It may be wise in such a case, in order to keep up an established, extensive, and valuable correspondence, and retain the run of custom and good-will of an old-established firm. That case was the reverse of the present, and the struggle there was to charge the firm, who defended on the ground that their firm name designated the obligations of the company, and not their own, and the case turned on the question whether the plaintiff, when he dealt with them, knew of the dissolution of the old firm; if he did not, then, by a well-known rule of the law of partnership, the firm were bound to him, not having given notice of their dissolution. Had the point in that case been whether the corporation were bound, we can have no doubt they would have been held bound by their vote, for notes made in the name designated. It was further relied on by the defendants, that it was not the intent of Horace Gray & Co. to give the note of the Boston Iron Co., even if they had authority so to do; but further, that there was no evidence that they had such authority. In regard to the first, it depended wholly upon the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, which, for reasons already given, we do not go into. As to the authority, it requires some further consideration. Undoubtedly to charge a party by the act of an agent, and corporations can be charged in no other way, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the authority of the agent. But how is such authority to be proved ? No doubt the vote of the corporation entered on their records or minutes is the regular and proper evidence; but suppose they pass no votes, or keep no records, or refuse to produce them, and yet, de facto, transact a large amount of business. If the authority of agents could be proved in no other way than by the production of such a vote, those who deal with them would have but a precarious security for their rights. But we think that it is established by the cases cited, and many others which could be produced, that having proved the constitution of a corporation by the act of incorporation, and the acting under it by the persons incorporated and their associates, the powers of agents as well as any other fact necessary to charge them, may be proved by corporate acts, and by the acts of persons professing to be their agents and servants, and the tacit acquiescence of the corporation. This was decided in the case of- Narragansett Bank v. or if the transaction was subsequently ratified.1 bo, also, where a corporation and a firm have the same name, if the party contracting with the corporation suppose the name to be used as the corporate name, and such supposition be induced by the corporation, it would be liable.1 Indeed, generally, the law of agency applying to private individuals applies with equal force to corporations, and they are equally affected with implied obligations, such as constructive notice, implied assent, tacit acquiescence, and implied ratifications, in respect to contracts made by persons held out by them as their agents.