2 See Rossiter v. Cooper, 23 Vt. 522; Seaver v. Morse, 20 Vt. 620.

3 Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657; Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247; s. c. 2 C. & K. 433.

4 Archard v. Hornor, 3 C. & P. 349; Robinson v. Hindman, 3 Esp. 235. 5 Johnson v. Blenkensopp, 5 Jur. 870.

6 Nicoll v. Greaves, 17 C. B. (n. s.) 27.

7 Nowlan v. Ablett, 2 C, M. & R. 54.

8 Lilley v. Elwin, 12 Jur. 623; 11 Q. B. 754.

9 Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309. See post, 1313, note 5, for an extract from the judgment of Mr. Ch. J. Best, in this case. See, also, Huttman v Boulnois, 2 C. & P. 510; Costigan v. The Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co., 2 Denio, 612.

10 Williams v. Byrne, 7 Ad. & El. 177.

11 Byrd v. Boyd, 4 M'Cord, 246. And see Down v. Pinto, 9 Exch. 327; 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 503.

12 Todd v. Kerrich, 14 Eng. Law & Eq. 433; 8 Exch. 151.

§ 1313. Where the contract of hiring is for a year only, no notice is necessary to determine it; it ceases by the expiration of the term.2 But in contracts with other than domestic and menial servants, when the service is from year to year, notice must be given so as to expire with the end of the year, the contract not being determinable during the year.3 But the length of notice required does not seem to be exactly settled, and in the absence of any special agreement it is governed by custom and the circumstances of the case.4 A reasonable time of notice is, however, required; and the notice should expire with the end of the year.5

1 But see Keon v. Hart, Irish R. 2 C. L. 133 (1867).

2 See Langton v. Carleton, Law R. 9 Ex. 57 (1873).

3 Williams v. Byrne, 7 Ad. & El. 177.

4 As to the sufficiency of a notice to terminate a contract, see Keon v. Hart, Irish R. 2 C. L. 138 (1867).

5 Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309. In this case, which was an action of assumpsit brought by a clerk to an army agent for a breach of contract in discharging him before the end of the year, for which he claimed to serve under a yearly hiring, Mr. Ch. J. Best said: " I entertain no doubt on the law or justice of this case. The defendant has not suggested any reason for ending the service of the plaintiff: and it would be indeed extraordinary if a party in his station of life could be turned off at a month's notice, like a cook or scullion.

"If a master hire a servant, without mention of time, that is a general hiring for a year, and if the parties go on four, five, or six years, a jury would be warranted in presuming a contract for a year in the first instance, and so on for each succeeding year, as long as it should please the parties; such a contract being implied from the circumstances, and not expressed, a writing is not necessary to authenticate it. It is not necessary for us now to decide whether six months, three months, or any notice, be requisite to put an end to such a contract, because under the circumstances of the present case, after the parties had consented to remain in the relation of employer and servant from 1811 to 1826, we must imply an engagement to serve by the year, unless reasons are given for putting an end to the contract. The defendant put an end to this engagement, without assigning any reason, and the jury, therefore, were warranted in the finding they have come to. The principles upon which the action for use and occupation proceed are the same as those which formed the ground of my direction to the jury upon the present occasion. The con-tract is for a year at first, and if the parties do not disagree it goes on wages the amount of such damages may be deducted.1 The measure of damages would ordinarily be the wages for a time equal to the agreed time of notice, unless other additional damages be proved. Yet temporary sickness and inability to work would be a sufficient excuse for quitting without notice, and full compensation could be recovered.2 Where the servant is dismissed without notice, for no sufficient cause, he is entitled to wages up to the time of the dismissal, and to damages equivalent to the wages for such time of notice as is required.3 But he cannot recover such month's wages as damages under the common indebitatus count for work and labor.4

§ 1314. In contracts of hire for the week or month, or for an indefinite period, the same rule as to notice would seem to govern as in weekly or monthly hirings of lodgings, namely, a notice equivalent to the term, - a month's notice for a monthly hiring, and a week's notice for a weekly hiring.1 But the only rule which has been laid down is that the notice should be reasonable, the courts having studiously avoided a definite statement as to the time of notice required. What is reasonable notice must depend on custom and the circumstances of the case.

§ 1315. But where there is a specific stipulation that there shall be a certain term of notice, it should be strictly complied with. So, also, if, in the business for which the servant is hired, there be a known regulation that a certain notice shall be given, it would form a part of the contract.2 Yet if the servant quit without giving such notice, he would not thereby forfeit his whole wages, but would be liable for the damages caused by not giving notice; and in a suit for from one year to another. It is true that one of the incidents of a tenancy of this kind is that it can only be determined by a half-year's notice, concluding with that day on which the tenancy commenced. We do not say that such terms are to be engrafted on contracts for the hire of servants. But the contract between the parties in this cause has been accurately described, in the first count of the declaration, as a contract for one whole year, and afterwards as long as the plaintiff and defendant should respectively please, until the expiration of the current year from the first of March; that allegation has been proved in evidence by acts from which such a contract would be implied, and, being so implied, it was not necessary that it should be reduced into writing;" and Mr. Justice Gaselee said: "There can be no doubt that a general hiring is a hiring for a year. In domestic service there is a common understanding that such a contract may be dissolved on reasonable notice; as a month's warning, or a month's wages. There does not appear to be any such practice with respect to servants in husbandry, and we have no evidence what is the custom with clerks. We must, therefore, decide this case according to the general rule, and hold the contract between the parties to be a hiring for a year." See, also, Huttman v. Boulnois, 2 C. & P. 510; Williams v. Byrne, 7 Ad. & El. 177; Lilley v. Elwin, 12 Jur. 623; Faw-cett v. Cash, 5 B. & Ad. 904; Down v. Pinto, 9 Exch. 327; 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 503.

1 Doe d. Parry v. Hazell, 1 Esp. 94; Doe d. Peacock v. Raffan, 6 Esp. 4.

2 Hunt v. The Otis Co., 4 Met. 465; Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 174.

§ 1316. Although a servant or person employed for a stated time under a parol contract may recover damages against his master for the entire term, if wrongfully dismissed, yet if an apprentice bound by indenture desert his master, the latter can recover of the apprentice or his surety damages only up to the time of action brought, and not for the entire apprenticeship, since the term is not ended.5 In an action by a domestic servant for wrongfully dismissing her upon a contract of service which provided for a dismissal without notice, the jury should not assess additional damages because the dismissal took place late at night, and under circumstances occasioning the servant great personal inconvenience.1

1 Ibid.

2 Fuller v. Brown, 11 Met. 440; Fahy v. North, 19 Barb. 341; Cuck-son v. Stones, 1 El. & E. 248 (1858); Caden v. Farwell, 98 Mass. 137 (1867).

3 Fewings v. Tisdal, 5 Dowl. & Lowndes, 196; 1 Ex. 295. A servant or clerk hired for a year, if wrongfully dismissed may recover for the remainder of the year, although his wages are payable monthly; such short payments being necessary for persons in that situation. Davis v. Marshall, 4 Law T. (N. S.) 216; 6H.&N. 916. If a servant discharged during his term bring an action for damages for such discharge, and the defendant recovers a verdict on the merits, the judgment thereon is a bar to a second action by the servant for his wages for the entire period. Routledge v. Hislop, 2 El & E. 549 (1860).

4 Hartley v. Harman, 11 Ad. & El. 798; Fewings v. Tisdal, 1 Exch. 295; Smith v. Hayward, 7 Ad. & El. 544; Archard v. Hornor, 3 C. & P. 349; Broxham v. Wagstaffe, 5 Jur. 845. And see De Bernardy v. Harding, 8 Exch. 822; 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 545.

5 Lewis v. Peachey, 1 H. & C. 518 (1862). And see Hughes v. Humphreys, 6 B. & C. 680.

1 Breen v. Cooper, Irish R. 3 C. L. 621 (1869). See East Anglian Railways Co. v. Lythgoe, 10 C. B. 726; Berry v. Da Costa, Law R. 1 C. P. 331.