§ 440. Where a factor makes advances, or incurs liabilities upon a consignment of goods, he may sell them in the exercise of a sound discretion and according to the general usage, and reimburse himself for all expenses and liabilities out of the proceeds of the sale; and the consignor cannot interfere, unless there be some existing arrangement between himself and the factor, which controls or varies this right.1 Thus, if contemporaneously with the consignment, and with the advances and liabilities, orders be given by the consignor, which are assented to by the factor, that the goods shall not be sold until a certain fixed time, the factor is bound by such agreement, and cannot sell even to reimburse himself for his liabilities and advances, until such time has elapsed.2 So, also, if orders be transmitted not to sell under a fixed price, and they are assented to, the factor cannot sell to reimburse himself for his liabilities and advances, unless, after due notice, the consignor refuse to provide any other means to reimburse the factor;3 and if he do sell, without notice or demand, he will be liable to the consignor for damages arising therefrom.4 And, indeed, in no case can the factor sell contrary to orders, so long as the consignor stands ready and offers to discharge his advances and liabilities.5 But when a consignment is made without specific orders as to the time or mode of sale, and the factor incurs liabilities and makes advances, the consignor cannot, by subsequent orders given after the liabilities are incurred, or the advances are made, suspend or control the factor's right of sale for the purpose of reimbursing himself therefor, except so far as respects the surplus of the consignment, not necessary to cover the liabilities and advances.1 This right of the factor would especially obtain in cases where the consignor becomes insolvent, and where, therefore, the consignment constitutes the only fund for indemnity.2

1 Wiltshire v. Sims, 1 Camp. 258; Illinois v. Delafield, 8 Paige, 527; s. c. 26 Wend. 192; 2 Kent, Comm. 622, 623.

2 Clark v. Van Northwick, 1 Pick. 343.

3 Messier v. Amery, 1 Yeates, 540; Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36; Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400; 2 Kent, Comm. 623; Titcomb v. Seaver, 4 Greenl. 542; Edmond v. Caldwell, 15 Me. 340; Hapgood v. Batcheller, 4 Met. 573.

4 De Valengin v. Duffy, 14 Peters, 290; Godfrey v. Furzo, 3 P. Wms.' 185; Ex parte Dumas, 1 Atk. 234; Tooke v. Hollingworth, 5 T. R. 226; Scott v. Surman, Willes, 400; Kip v. Bank of New York, 10 Johns. 63; Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason, 232.

5 De Valengin v. Duffy, 14 Peters, 290.

1 Brander v. Phillips, 16 Peters, 129; Brown v. M'Gran, 14 Peters, 479.

2 Pothonier v. Dawson, Holt, N. P. 383; Graham v. Dyster, 6 M. & S. 1, 4, 5; Brown v. M'Gran, 14 Peters, 495; Bldt v. Boiceau, 1 Sandf. Ill; 3 Comst. 78; Smart v. Sandars, 3 C. B. 380; 5 C. B. 894; Marfield v. Douglass, 1 Sandf. 360; Marfield v. Goodhue, 3 Comst 70. But see Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 46, in which a relaxation of this rule was held to obtain in favor of cases where, by reason of an untoward state of the market, the just expectations of both parties had been defeated, in which case the factor was held to be empowered to sell, after a demand upon his principal of repayment and his neglect to repay.

3 Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick. 46; Brown v. M'Gran, 14 Peters, 495; Frothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 239; Tucker v. Wilson, 1 P. Wms. 261; Lockwood v. Ewer, 2 Atk. 303; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 100.

4 Frothingham v. Everton, 12 N. H. 239; Parker v. Brancker, 22 Pick 40.

5 Brown v. M'Gran, 14 Peters, 495; Pothonier v. Dawson, Holt, N. P. 383; Graham v. Dyster, 6 M. & S. 1, 4, 5. Brown v. M'Gran was approved in Whitney v. Wyman, 24 Md. 131. The English doctrine goes further than this, and denies to the factor the right to sell contrary to the principal's orders, although the latter neglect on request to repay the advances. Smart v. Sandars, 5 C. B. 894.

1 Ibid.; Marfield v. Douglass, 1 Sandf. 360; Marfield v. Goodhue, 3 Comst. 70.

2 The same general rules as to the duties and powers of a factor are laid down in the Code de Commerce of Holland, articles 80-83, from which we quote the following passage, translated by authority from the Dutch original : "Le commissionnaire (art. 80), pour toutes les actions qu'il aurait a exercer contre son commettant, tant pour le remboursement de ses avances, interets et frais, que pour les obligations courantes qu'il a contractees pour lui,* aura un privilege sur la valeur des marchandises ou effets que le commettant lui a expedies de l'etranger pour etre vendus pour son compte, s'ils se trouvent a sa disposition dans ses magasins ou dans un depot public, ou s'ils se trouvent en sa possession de quelque autre maniere, ou si, avant leur arrivee, il peut constater l'expedition qui lui en a ete faite par un connaissement ou par une lettre de voiture." "Le meme privilege (art. 81) appartient au commissionnaire auquel ont ete envoye's des marchandises ou effets dans le meme but, d'un autre lieu situe dans l'interieur du royaume, mais seulement et exclusivement pour ses avances, interets et frais, ou pour les obligations qu'il a contractees par rapport aux marchandises ou effets sur lesquels il veut exercer son privilege." "Si les marchandises ou effets (art. 82) ont ete vendus et livres pour le compte du commettant, le commissionaire se rem-boursera sur le produit de la vente, du montant de ses avances, interets et frais, par preference aux autres creanciers du commettant." " Si le commettant (art. 83) a envoye de l'etranger au commissionaire des marchandises ou effets, avec ordre de les tenir en depot a sa disposition, ou bien s'il a limite son pouvoir de les vendre, et si le premier est reste en demeure de satisfaire aux obligations pour lesquelles il est accorde" un privilege aux termes de l'art. 80, le commissionnaire pourra, sur la production des preuves necessaires, et sur une simple requite, obtenir du tribunal d'arrondissement de son domicile, de faire vendre les marchandises ou effets sur lesquels il est privilege, en vente publique, ou par deux courtiers nommes par le tribunal,