1 Urquhart v. M'lver, 4 Johns. 103; M'Combie v. Davies, 7 East, 5.

1 Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 S. & R. 386. 2 Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & S. 140.

3 Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. & Pul. 648; Treuttel v. Barandon, 8 Taunt. 100.

4 Evans v. Potter, 2 Gall. 13; Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 S. & R. 386. This doctrine is so laid down in Story on Agency, § 113. See also note. Mr. Justice Story says : " This I conceive to be the true doctrine, notwithstanding the language used in some of the authorities. The case of Pultney v. Keymer, 3 Esp. 182, may be deemed overruled by the latter cases, and especially by the cases of Shipley v. Kymer, 1 M. & S. 484; Solly v. Rath-bone, 2 M. & S. 298; Cockran v. Irlam, 2 M. & S. 301; Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & S. 140; and Boyson v. Coles, 6 M. & S. 14, as to the point of advances made to an agent on his own account. See also Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T. R. 604; Queiroz v. Trueman, 3 B. & C. 342; Mark v. Bowers, 16 Martin, 95. In Martini v. Coles, 1 M. & S. 140, Lord Elleftborough and Mr. Justice Le Blanc recognized the right to pledge for advances and charges on account of the principal. The cases of Solly v. Rathbone, 2 M. & S. 298, and Cockran v. Irlam, 2 M. & S. 301, note, do, it must be admitted, seem to overturn the authority of Pultney v. Keymer, 3 Esp. 182, as to the point of advances and charges made on account of the principal. But in each of those cases there was this ingredient, that it was not the case of a mere pledge for advances and charges on account of the principal, but a delegation also of authority to the pledgee, as subagent or coagent, to sell the goods, which was held to be tortious; as an agent could not delegate his authority.

§ 452. If a factor take a security payable to himself from a purchaser of goods, and give his own security to his principal, without giving the name of the purchaser, the factor cannot compel his principal to refund the money paid him, on failure of payment by the purchaser.1 For he thereby induces the principal to trust to the security, and assures him of the solvency of the purchaser. At the termination of his interest, it is the factor's duty to deliver up the property to his principal.2

Pro tanto, no doubt, the authority was void. But why should the pledge be held void as to advances and charges made for the principal ? The ground seems to have been (whether it be satisfactory or not) that the sale by the pledgee, as coagent or subagent, made the whole proceeding tortious ab initio. That doctrine would not apply to a mere pledge for advances and charges required to be made for the principal, where the original agent still retained his general authority. This whole subject is very accurately and clearly discussed, and the results stated, in Mr. Chancellor Kent's learned Commentaries. 2 Kent, Comm. lect. 41, p. 625 to 628, 3d ed. What circumstances will or will not amount to an implied authority to an agent from whom advances are asked, to make a pledge for such advances, is a matter upon which the authorities leave much doubt; and especially the cases of Graham v. Dyster, 2 Stark. 21; Queiroz v. Trueman, 3 B. & C. 342; and Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 S. & R. 386; Newbold v. Wright, 4 Rawle, 195."

1 Simpson v. Swan, 3 Camp. 291; Le Fevre v. Lloyd, 5 Taunt. 749; Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159.

2 Nickerson v. Soesman, 98 Mass. 364.