"Justinien a transports ces decisions dans son Digeste et les a érigées en loi; en sorte que, tirant leur force du caractere de loi, et non des cir-constances particuliéres du fait d'apres lesquelles les jurisconsultes avaient raisonné, elles s'appliquent a tout contrat de vente par la nature que la loi lui reconnaft. Si done la vieille formule est abandonee, si le vendeur se sert des mots rem dare, et non plus de ceux-ci, rem habere licere, comment expliquera-t-on une loi qui declare que le vendeur ne s'oblige pas a transférer la propriété ? Et si, n'employant ni l'une ni l'autre locution, il se borne a dire: je vends, et s'en refére à la coutume pour expliquer le sens qu'elle a fini par attribuer à ce mot; quefera-t-on quandil sera constant que tous ceux qui emploient ce terme, y attachent l'idee que le vendeur s'oblige a transferer la propriété?

§ 1071. Secondly. "When an examination of goods is, from their nature or situation at the time of the sale, impracticable, a warranty will be implied that they are merchantable. Thus, if goods be at sea, or not arrived; or if they fill the hold of a ship, so that nothing but the surface can be seen; or if they be in bales, so that an examination of the centre cannot be made without tearing each bale to pieces, - the seller will be understood to warrant them to be merchantable, and of the quality demanded and expected by the buyer.1 But if the whole of the goods be open to the examdenied in the late English case of Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533; s. c. 1 Dan. & Lloyd, 304; and the general bearing of all the late cases is in favor of the doctrine as stated in the text. See Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 219, 220, and note; Winsor v. Lombard, 18 Pick. 60; Brown v. Edgington, 2 M. & G. 279; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399; Salisbury v. Stainer, 19 Wend. 159; Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Camp. 391; Oneida Manuf. Co. v. Lawrence, 4 Cow. 444. But see Mixer v. Coburn, 11 Met. 561, where the maxim of caveat emptor is fully enforced; and see, also, Lamb v. Crafts, 12 Met. 353.

"C'est précisément ce qui est advenu. Depuis bien des siécles, on enseigne dans nos écoles qu'il est de la nature du contrat de vente que le vendeur ne s'oblige point a rendre l'acheteur propriétaire: ipse dixit! Et cependant, depuis bien des siécles aussi, le mot: je vends, n'est plus paraphrase dans la formule romaine, qui en detcrminait le sens; quiconque le prononce ou l'entend, comprend sans hesiter que celui qui vend, doit rendre l'acheteur proprietaire; et chacun se demande comment il se fait que, par la nature du contrat de vente, le vendeur ne soit point engage a faire passer la propriété à l'acheteur.

"Toutcfois, depuis que le Code Civil a paru, et a declare, article 1599: 'la vente de la chose d'autrui est nulle,' plusieurs personnes ont pensé que, si la vente de la chose d'autrui est nulle, c'est done que les deux parties doivent avoir l'intention commune, l'une de conférer, l'autre d'acquérir la propriété de la chose vendue; en sorte que la nature du contrat de vente, qui, en droit romain, n'imposait pas au vendeur Pobligation de rendre l'acheteur proprietaire, en droit Francois, au contraire, compren-drait aujourd'hui cette obligation." See, also, even before the Code, the similar opinion of Denisart, vol. ix, vo. Garantie, and of Argou, Inst, au Droit Francais, Liv. 3, ch. 23, against that of Pothier, Contrat de Vente, § 98. See, also, for the Scottish Law, Erskine's Inst, book iii. tit. 3, § 4.

1 In Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, Lord Ellenborough said that a warranty that the goods sold are merchantable, would be implied where "there was no opportunity to examine." So, also, these words are cited and affirmed in Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend. 456. So, also, in Gallagher v. Waring, 9 Wend. 20; Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Har. & Gill, 495. See Lawton v. Keil, 61 Barb. 558 (1872). In Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 Gill & Johns. 110, the warranty of merchantable is limited to cases where the examination is "impracticable;" and the mere fact of labor or inconvenience is not considered as equivalent to impracticability. This limitation is recognized in Hart v. Wright, 17 Wend. 267. In New York, however, the old doctrine of the common law of caveat emptor is now established. See Wright v Hart, 18 Wend. 456; 2 Kent, Comm. lect. 39, p. 479, note (b); Waring v. Mason, 18 Wend. 425; Salisbury v. Stainer, 19 Wend. 159. But see Howard v. Hoey, 23 Wend. 350. The doctrine of the common law, however, is ination of the buyer, and the seller make no warranty, he is not understood to assume a responsibility for any defect, whether it be latent or patent, because the law will not protect a man from the consequences of his own neglect and carelessness in making a bargain, when the other party has been guilty of no fraud or improper connivance.1 "Where a man can examine the goods if he chooses, and he neglects so to do, he must suffer the consequences of his carelessness. But if he cannot examine them, he takes them upon trust that they are what he intended to buy, and what the buyer, by assenting to his order or to his self-deception, virtually affirms them to be; and the party occasioning the injury ought to bear the loss.

§ 1072. In such cases, if from the mode of packing a portion of an article only can be seen, and it be shown by the vendor, the sale will often be treated as a sale by sample. And this seems to be the most reasonable way of construing such a contract. Thus, as packed cotton can only be examined on the exterior, and by plucking portions of it as samples of the interior, it has been treated as a sale by sample.2 But the rule that in case of a sale of goods by sample there is no implied warranty that the goods are merchantable does not apply to matters which could not be discovered by an ordinary examination of the sample. As to these matters there is an implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.3 This leads us to the consideration of the warranty implied in a sale by sample.