§ 351. Where a specific legacy is given, it is appropriated to the legatee from the death of the testator, and any increase which may accrue to it in the intermediate time between the death of the testator and the delivery of the thing, belongs to the legatee.4 Nor does it matter in this respect whether the delivery be postponed by the testator to a certain specified time.1 Again, interest is allowed on general legacies after the lapse of a year from the testator's death, if no time of payment be appointed; but all interest which accrues within the year belongs to the residuary legatee.2 Nor does it matter that payment of legacies be impracticable at the end of the year; they nevertheless will carry interest, which the executor is bound to pay, if there be sufficient assets to enable him to do so.8 There are two exceptions to this general rule, however, which obtain whenever the legacy is given in payment of a debt,4 or is bequeathed to an infant child, in both of which cases interest is allowed from the time of the testator's death.5

1 Ivy v. Gilbert, 2 P. Wms. 13, 19; Trafford v. Ashton, 1 P. Wms. 418, and note by Mr. Cox; Evelyn v. Evelyn, 2 P. Wms. 666-670; Mills v. Banks, 3 P. Wms. 1; Okeden v. Okeden, 1 Atk. 550, and note by Mr. Saunders.

2 Green v. Belchier, 1 Atk. 505; Baines v. Dixon, 1 Ves. 42; Countess of Shrewsbury v. Earl of Shrewsbury, 1 Ves. Jr. 233; 8. c. 3 Bro. C. C. 120; Allan v. Backhouse, 2 Ves. & B. 65; Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Meriv. 193-233.

3 In Allan v. Backhouse, 2 Ves. & B. 75, Sir Thomas Plumer, speaking on this question, says of the phrase, "rents and profits :" "Whatever might have been the interpretation of these words, had the case been new, whatever doubt might have arisen upon them, as denoting annual or permanent profits, it is now too late to speculate; this court having, by a technical, artificial, but liberal construction, in a series of authorities, admitting it not to be the natural meaning, extended those words, when applied to the object of raising a gross sum at a fixed time, when it must be raised and paid without delay, to a power to raise by sale or mortgage, unless restrained by other words." See also 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1064 a, where this construction is said by Mr. Justice Story to be "neither artificial or technical, although it is certainly a liberal construction of the words of the testator, in order to accomplish his intent."

4 Pearson v. Pearson, 1 Sch. & Lef. 10; Laundy v. Williams, 2 P. Wms. 481; Sleech v. Thorington, 2 Ves. 563. See Cooper v. Scott, 62 Penn. St. 139.

§ 352. When a time is appointed at which the legacy shall be paid, it must be paid at that time, and interest begins to run thereafter, and not before.6 There is also an exception to this rule in favor of legacies to infant children, where there is no other provision for their maintenance,7 and to persons to whom the testator stands in loco parentis, whenever there is a manifest intention on his part that they shall receive maintenance out of the legacy.8 Where a legacy is given payable at a certain future time " with interest," interest will only begin to run after the lapse of a year from the testator's death.9