"In support of the argument for allowing interest on interest from the time it becomes due, we are referred to the case of Dodge v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 368. There is some general statement in that case, that where the payment of money due is withheld unlawfully and against right, the law will allow interest for it. Had this been a new question, depending on general principles, and not governed by precedent, the proposition stated in that case would have afforded some color to the plaintiff's claim. But it is a proposition to be taken with its well-established qualifications, as well settled as the rule itself. No question was raised in that case as to the allowance of interest on interest, and such interest was not there allowed. The only question was, whether, under the circumstances of that case, simple interest should be computed on the principal sum.

"As to the first two years' interest, we think that the action is not barred by the twenty years' limitation (Rev. Sts. c. 120, § 7), because the interest stipulated to be paid is regarded as incident to the debt, and recoverable with it; and although the creditor may recover for the interest which accrues before the principal become due, yet if he forbear to bring his action for that purpose, as he may, the interest remains incident to the debt, and may be recovered with it.

1 Lord Ossulston v. Lord Yarmouth, 2 Salk. 449; Chambers v. Gold-win, 9 Ves. 271; Case of Sir Thomas Meers, cited in Cases temp. Talbot, 40, and in 1 Atk. 304; Mowry v. Bishop, 5 Paige, 98; Wilcox v. Howland, 23 Pick. 167; Hastings v. Wiswall, 8 Mass. 455.

§ 1494. This treatise on the law relating to simple or parol contracts is now brought to a close. It will be observed that it has been generally restricted, in all its discussions, to the principles governing simple contracts. But, without professing fully to treat of those rules of law which appertain to specialties, they have been often incidentally adverted to, as affording illustrations of the different doctrines under consideration. It has, of course, been impossible to give any thing more than a succinct and general view of the principles applicable to those special contracts which form the second portion of the work; but it is hoped that that portion of the treatise which is confined to the consideration of general principles, applicable to all contracts, will be found to embrace all that is material to assist the student to a complete understanding of the numerous cases with which the subject is encumbered.

"The case of Peirce v. Rowe, 1 N. H. 179, which was decided in 1818, is opposed to the rule adopted in this State. Whether it has since been followed in New Hampshire, we are not apprised. But, whether it has or not, we cannot find in it sufficient authority for changing what we must consider a settled rule here." See, however, Kennon v. Dickens, 1 Taylor, 231; Doig v. Barkley, 3 Rich. 125; Singleton v. Lewis, 2 Hill (S. C.) 408; Peirce v. Rowe, 1 N. H. 179; Bannister v. Roberts, 35 Me. 7 5.