1 Read v. Legard, 6 Exch. 636; Shaw v. Thompson, 16 Pick. 198.

Abilities of a lunatic are in many cases more extended than those of an infant, particularly in executed contracts which are not for necessaries.

"This extract states the law as settled in this commonwealth; that the deed is voidable; that it becomes a binding contract upon the grantor only when, being of sound mind, and understanding the nature of the contract, he adopts and ratifies it; and that the availing himself of the contract, by receiving the purchase-money due upon it, after his restoration to sanity and with an understanding of the contract, is a ratification and adoption.

"The case of Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, 1 Gray, 434, goes no further. The report of the referees found that the plaintiff was restored to his right mind, and after his restoration, knowing the nature and effect of the conveyance, and that the notes were part of the purchase-money for the premises conveyed, received several payments upon them. By so doing, it was held, he affirmed the deed. The decision is put directly upon the authority of Allis v. Billings, as ' so like in all its essential features, that it seems hardly necessary to do more than cite that case.' 1 Gray, 437.

"The tenant relies upon some remarks of the Chief Justice in delivering the opinion of the court, as sustaining his position. Nothing is more unsafe than to rely upon such remarks, taken from the connection and context by which their meaning is limited and qualified. In their relation and application to the facts under discussion, they may be sound and pertinent; wrested from their connection and application, and applied to a different state of facts, they may be neither just nor sound.

"In the case of Arnold v. Richmond Iron Works, the plaintiff had been restored to his sound mind. Being so restored, and understanding fully the contract he had made, he chose to avail himself of its benefits. The Chief Justice remarks: 'If then the unfortunate person of unsound mind, coming to the full possession of his mental faculties, desires to relieve himself from a conveyance made during his incapacity, he must restore the price, if paid, or surrender the contract for it, if unpaid. In short, he must place the grantee, in all respects, as far as possible, in statu quo.' 1 Gray, 437. As applied to the case of a grantor having in his possession the notes which were the consideration of the deed, and restored to the full possession of his mind, these remarks are just. The retention of the notes, still more the receiving payments upon them, is evidence of ratification, is an election to abide by the contract.

"But they have no just application to a case where the grantor has not he might repudiate the contract, yet if he keep them and avail himself of them after he becomes sober, he would be liable for the value of the goods, - for in such cases the law implies a promise to pay for them.1 So, also, in cases where absolute necessaries are supplied to and consumed by a person in a condition of complete intoxication, he would be liable therefor, on the same ground.2 But the action which should be brought in such a case, is assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, and not for goods bargained and sold.3