"In this case the right to maintain the action rests upon the alleged assertion by the wife that she had a right to distrain. But there could be no retainer of the plaintiff to distrain given by wife, nor any contract by her to indemnify him. Her representation, therefore, being made honestly, and without knowledge of its falsehood, was not sufficient to give a right of action." Again, the late case of Ormrod v. Huth, 14 M. & W. 651, which was an action on the case against the defendants, who were dealers in cotton, for fraud, in representing certain samples as fair, which were not, the court said: "The rule which is to be derived from all the cases appears to us to be, that where, upon the sale of goods, the purchaser is satisfied without requiring a warranty (which is a matter for his own consideration), he cannot recover upon a mere representation of the quality by the seller, unless he can show that the representation was bottomed in fraud. If, indeed, the representation was false to the knowledge of the party making it, this would, in general, be conclusive evidence of fraud; but if the representation was honestly made, and believed at the time to be true by the party making it, although not true in point of fact, we think this does not amount to fraud in law; but that the rule of caveat emptor applies, and the representation itself does not furnish a ground of action; and although the cases may in appearance raise some difficulty as to the effect of a false assertion or representation of title in the seller, yet it will be found on examination that in each of those cases there was either an assertion of title embodied in the contract, or a representation of title which was false to the knowledge of the seller. The rule we have drawn from the cases appears to us to be supported so clearly by the early as well as the more recent decisions, that we think it unnecessary to bring them forward in review, but satisfy ourselves with saying that the exception must be disallowed, and the judgment of the Court of Exchequer affirmed." In these two last cases it will be perceived that the representation was merely of opinion, and one was a sale where the doctrine of caveat emptor applied, and the party had no legal right to rely kind, where the misrepresentation is purely accidental and without fraudulent design, it is not necessary to consider it to on the statement. In Thorn v. Bigland, 8 Exch. 725; 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 470, which was an action on a contract of sale, in which fraudulent misrepresentation was alleged, Baron Parke said: "The law is perfectly settled, that, independently of duty, no action will lie for a false misrepresentation unless it is made by a person knowing it to be untrue, or with a fraudulent intention to induce another to act on the faith of, and alter his position to his damage. The law is so settled by Collins v. Evans, 5 Q. B. 820, and Ormrod v. Huth, 14 M. & W. 651. Was then this statement by the defendant false and fraudulent within this description ? I see no fraud at all. The account he gave is true so far as it goes, but it omits a part. It is merely inaccurate." The question in this case, it will be observed, arose upon a contract of sale, in respect to which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. Mr. Justice Story, however, in his Commentaries on Equity says: "Whether the party thus misrepresenting a material fact knew it to be false, or made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or false, is wholly immaterial; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe to be true is equally, in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known to be positively false. And even if the party innocently misrepresents a material fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive; for it operates as a surprise and imposition upon the other party." See also Doggett v. Emerson, 3 Story, 732, and Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 690, in which Mr. Justice Story affirmed the same doctrine. See also Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172; Attwood v. Small, 6 CI. & Finn. 232; Farnam v. Brooks, 9 Pick. 213; Amslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 21; Graves v. White, 2 Freem. 57; Pearson v. Morgan, 2 Bro. C. C. 389; Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. 475; De Manneville v. Crompton, 1 Ves. & B. 354; 1 Marsh, on Ins. B. 1, ch. 10, § 1; Ex parte Carr, 3 Ves. & B. Ill; M'Ferran v. Taylor, 3 Cranch, 270; Rosevelt v. Fulton, 2 Cow. 134; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 193. In Tryon v. Whitmarsh, 1 Met. 1, 9, in an action for a deceitful representation that a person was entitled to credit, it was held that it must be proved that the defendant did not believe his representation to be true, and the question whether he made his statement bond fide was for the jury. This, however, was from the nature of the case a mere statement of opinion. In Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Met. 201, the rule is clearly laid down by Mr. Justice Wilde, " Where a party affirms either that which he knows to be false, or does not know to be true, to another's loss and his own gain, he is responsible in damages for the injury occasioned by such falsehood. This is a very just and reasonable principle, and is well established." This case was reaffirmed in 3 Met. 469. In Stone v. Denny, 4 Met. 161, this case is again commented on by the court, and it is said that " fraud will be inferred when the party makes a representation which he knows to be false, or as to which he has no knowledge or information, and no grounds for expressing his belief; and in such cases the party would be held liable for his false reprebe a fraud, since, if it be made by mistake, it would avoid the contract, if it should touch its essence, on the ground of a want sentation;" and the ruling of the Chief Justice in a previous trial was supported, namely, "that an unqualified affirmation, or as of his own knowledge, of the correctness of the schedule, made by the defendant, he not knowing whether it was correct, with a view to induce the plaintiff to make the purchase, if it proved false, was a fraud which would render the defendant liable." In Mason v. Crosby, 1 Woodb. & M. 353, which was a bill in equity claiming relief on account of fraud in the sale of real estate, Mr. Justice Woodbury says: "Nor is it material in this case whether or not either of the respondents or their agent knew to be false what was stated by any of them, provided he did state what was not true, and it was to a material point and was relied on. A vendor in cases like this is not in his own person or by another to throw firebrands, and say he is in sport, or make material statements which are untrue, and excuse himself by his own ignorance." The same doctrine is laid down in Smith v. Babcock, 2 Woodb. & M. 260; and Doggett v. Emerson, 1 Woodb. & M. 205; Buford v. Caldwell, 3 Mo. 335; Snyder v. Findley, Coxe (N. J.), 48, 78. In M'Ferran v. Taylor, 3 Cranch, 280, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall says: "That this misrepresentation is material, cannot be denied; but it is contended by the defendant that it originated in mistake, not in fraud; and as the country was at that time unknown to both the contracting parties, and the material object was to give the purchaser a right to take the land he had purchased out of the tract already located for the seller, an accidental error in the description of the place where the tract in contemplation of the parties lay, an error which could have had, at the time, no influence on the contract, ought not now to affect the person who has innocently committed it.