1 Pothier, Contrat de Vente, No. 32; Duranton, Cours de Droit Francois, Vol. 16; Contrat de Vente, Liv. 3, tit. 6, § 45; 2 Pardessus, No. 253; Bell on Sales, p. 38.

2 Thomas v. Dering, 1 Keen, 729.

3 But see Cummings v. Antes, 19 Penn. St. 287.

4 Kain v. Old, 2 B. & C. 634; Vandervoort v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Caines, 161; Mumford v. McPherson, 1 Johns. 414; Pickerings. Dowson, 4 Taunt. 779; Meyer v. Everth, 4 Camp. 22.

5 Daniel v. Mitchell, 1 Story, 172; Doggett v. Emerson, 3 Story, 700; Dobell v. Stevens, 3 B. & C. 623; Wright v. Crookes, 1 Scott, N. R. 685; post, Illegal Contract.

6 Slaymaker v. Irwin, 4 Whart. 369; Honeyman v. Marryatt, 6 II. L. C.

112 (1857); Andrews v. Garrett, 6 C. B. (n. s.) 262 (1859). For a proposition on one side, professedly accepted on the other, but with some material condition or qualification annexed, does not become a binding contract until such qualification is also agreed to by the party making the original proposal. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 3 Conn. 357. And see Gilkes v. Leonino, 4 C. B. (n. s.) 485; Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Barr, 339.

1 Honeyman v. Marryatt, 21 Beav. 14; 6 H. L. C. 112.

2 Barker v. Allan, 5H.&N. 71 (1859).

3 Holland v. Eyre, 2 Sim. & Stu. 194.

4 Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653; s. c. 3 C. & P. 267; Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225; Bell on Sales, p. 37.

5 Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns. 534; Tuttle v. Love, 7 Johns. 470; Cham pion v. Short, 1 Camp. 53; Putnam v. Tillotson, 13 Met. 517.

§ 503. But where an offer is made in the disjunctive, an acceptance of either branch will be binding. Thus, if an offer be made to lease a house at $600 per annum, or at $800 with the furniture, either branch of the offer may be accepted. So, if an order be sent to a merchant, by letter, for four hundred or five hundred bales of cotton, he may send me either quantity.4

§ 504. It is not necessary that the acceptance of a proposition made by letter should be sent by the post immediately succeeding its delivery, but it will be sufficient if an answer be posted on the day of the reception of the proposition.5 A party receiving a proposal by letter, must signify his acceptance within a reasonable time, and four months has been held not to be a reasonable time.6

1 Rommel v. Wingate, 103 Mass. 327 (1869).

2 Routledge v. Grant, 3 C. & P. 267; 4 Bing. 653; Champion v. Short, 1 Camp. 53. The subject of conditions in contracts by letter was considered by the House of Lords in the late case of English and Foreign Credit Co. v. Arduin, Law R. 5 H. L. 61 (1871). It was there held that if the person who receives a letter containing the terms of a proposed agreement, writes an answer reciting those terms, and declaring his acceptance of them, he cannot Jn any way vary the effect of them without distinctly calling the attention of the party making the offer to the fact of his desire to do so. In that case an ambiguous clause, which the defendants contended constituted a condition varying the terms of the proposal, was held of no effect in the face of the other and specific statements of the letter.

3 Bruce v. Pearson, 3 Johns. 534; Waldo v. Halsey, 3 Jones, 107; Levy v. Green, 8 El. & B. 575 (1857); Cunliffe v. Harrison, 6 Exch. 903; Hart v. Mills, 15 M. & W. 85. But if more be sent or tendered than is ordered, not to charge the buyer for the whole, but to enable him to select enough to fill the contract, the sale is complete. See Davis v. Adams, 18 Ala. 264; Downer v. Thompson, 6 Hill, 208.

4 Toullier des Contrats, § 27.

5 Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 381; 12 Jur. 295.

6 Chicago, etc, Railroad Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240 (1870).

§ 505. Where two parties simultaneously make a proposition upon the same subject-matter, by letter or message, neither knowing, at the time, of the proposition of the other, one proposal may, under some circumstances, become an acceptance of the other, although their terms be different. Thus, if one party should offer, by letter, to do a certain act, or to sell a certain article, or to make any contract for a certain consideration in money, and the other, being ignorant of such offer, should offer a larger price, the contract would be understood to be upon the smaller consideration, and would be perfect without further acceptance, following the maxim, "quod minus est in obligationem videtur deductum." Thus, if A. should offer to lease his house to B. for $500, and B. should, at the same time, offer $600 rent for it, the proposition of A. would be understood to be accepted, and the rent would be $500. The ground of such a rule is evident.1

§ 506. Again, where a party, after he has sent an offer or an order by letter, dies or becomes insane, and the other party accepts the offer, by placing his letter of acceptance in the mail, or forwards the goods, before his death, the heirs and representatives of such person sending the order or proposition will be bound in like manner as if no such event had occurred. Nor does it matter in this respect that the letter of acceptance or the goods do not arrive until after his death or insanity.2 But if the orderer should die before the letter of acceptance is placed in the post, or before the goods are forwarded or purchased, it would seem, that his heirs or representatives would not be bound thereby, on the ground that the offer or order being of a personal nature, could not survive him who made it.8 Yet, if the person to whom the order or offer is sent,

1 Toullier des Contrats, § 28; Pomponius, Leg. 12 et 109, D. de V. O. 45, 1; L. 52, D. Locati, 19, 2.

2 Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103; Pothier de Vente, No. 32; Averill ». Hedge, 12 Conn. 436.

3 This rule is so laid down by Toullier, who says (6 Toullier, des Contrats, § 31, p. 34): "Celui qui a fait les offres etant cense y perseverer jusqu'a leur acceptation, lorsqu'il n'a point manifeste de changement de volonte, on peut demander si elles peuvent etre acceptees apres sa mort, et apres la mort de celui a qui elles ont ete faites. La raison de douter est que l'heritier represente la personne du defunt, et que Ton est toujours being ignorant of the death of the party ordering, be put to any labor or expense, or subject himself to any responsibility, cens6 stipuler ou promettre pour soi et ses heritiers; d'ou il paraitrait resulter que les offres sont egalement faites pour soi et pour ses heritiers, a celui a qui elles sont faites et a ses he'ritiers, et par consequent qu'elles peu-vent útre accepte*es, apres la mort de celui qui les a faites, comme apres la mort de celui a qui elles Pont úte\ Neanmoins, il faut dire que les offres ne peuvent útre acceptees apres la mort de Fun ni de l'autre. Sans doute on est cense stipuler ou promettre pour soi et pour ses heritiers, dans le sens que le droit acquis ou confere par la stipulation ou par la promesse est transmis aux heritiers respectifs du creancier et du de'biteur: l'inte'ret de la societe exige imperieusement cette transmission; mais la volonte- ou le con-senternent reciproque qui doit former le contrat n'est pas transmissible de sa nature; c'est unt chose tellement inherente a la personne, qu'elle s'eteint avec elle, sans pouvoir passer a ses heritiers. Je puis perseverer dans la inúme volonte jusqu'a ma mort; mais cette volonte ne peut me survivre, elle meurt necessairement avec moi. Mes offres sont done par la nature m&ne attachees a ma personne. La faculte de les accepter est egalement personelle a celui a qui je les ai faites; elle ne peut passer a ses heritiers, ni faire partie de sa succession, puisqu'il n'avait aucun droit acquis avant sa mort. Si je consentais a contracter avec ses heritiers aux monies conditions que je lui avais offertes, ce serait un autre contrat que celui dont sa mort a rompu le projet, un contrat que ne confererait de droits qu'a ceux avec qui il serait passe, et du moment ou il serait passe. En un mot, le deces de celui qui a fait les offres, ou le deces de celui a qui elles ont ete faites, rompt necessairement le projet du contrat commence, parce que le concours des deux volontes ne peut plus exister. Mais le contrat est parfait, par l'accep-tation faite avant le deces, quoiqu'elle n'ait pas encore 6t6 connue de l'autre partie. Ces principes elementaires trouvent leur application dans la pratique. J'ai dessein de vendre ma maison a Titius; son ami se presente sans procuration, et passe le contrat, comme faisant et stipulant pour Titius, mais sans se porter fort pour lui. Puis-je revoquer mon consentement avant la ratification du contrat par Titius? Oui, sans doute, puisqu'il n'a aucun droit acquis, et que le contrat ne peut 6tre consid6re que comme une offre de ma part. Titius meurt; ses heritiers peuvent-ils ratifier la vente malgre moi? Puis-je la revoquer malgre eux? Je puis revoquer; c'est une consequence du principe que nous avons developpe, et qui est fonde sur la raison. II n'existe point de contrat avant la ratification de Titius, parce que les deux volontes n'ont pas concouru. S'il meurt, elles ne peuvent plus concourir. Si les heritiers de Titius ratifient, et que j'accepte leur ratification, ce sera un nouveau contrat, un contrat passe7 entre d'autres personnes, et qui n'aura point les effets qu'aurait eus le projet rompu par la mort de Titius. Si Titius etait marie, la maison ne sera point un acquit de communaute, il n'y aura point de droit de mutation ouvert par la mort de Titius." in consequence of the order, the heirs and representatives of the orderer would be bound to indemnify him therefor.1 If, therefore, goods should be forwarded after the death of the orderer, but before knowledge of such fact reached the other party, the heirs and representatives would be bound to receive the goods, or to make full indemnity to the party sending them.2 The converse of this rule would apply in case of the death of the party accepting the offer. So the acceptance and use of goods sent upon an order, though not conforming thereto, creates an implied contract to pay for them.3 But if A. sends an order for goods to B., and C. (who has bought out B.'s stock) sends the goods, A. is not liable to C. for the price of the goods if they were used before he knew they came from C.4