Blackf. 206; Dakin v. Williams, 17 Wend. 447; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1313-1318.
1 Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 T. R. 36. See, also, Crisdee v. Bolton, 3 C. & P. 241.
2 Sainter v. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716. And see Brewster v. Edgerly, 13 N. H. 278.
3 Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346.
4 Bonsall v. Byrne, Irish Rep. 1 Com. Law, 573 (1S67), explaining Kemble v. Farren, 6 Bing. 141, and Betts v. Burch, 4 H. & N. 506.
§ 1475. Where the agreement has been broken, and an action of assumpsit is brought upon it for the recovery of damages, the consequential injury fairly and naturally resulting to the plaintiff from the breach will be a ground for additional compensation.8 But merely speculative injuries founded on uncertain future contingencies9 afford no ground for damages, although damages will be given for future injury if founded upon strong probability.10 So, also, damages cannot be recovered for consequences and injuries not growing out of the breach of contract though they be connected with the contract incidentally. Thus, in assumpsit for a breach of agreement to marry, evidence of seduction cannot be given in aggravation of damages.1
1 Crisdee v. Bolton, 3 C. & P. 240; Leland v. Stone, 10 Mass. 459.
2 Ponsonby v. Adams, 2 Bro. P. C. 431.
3 Mead v. Wheeler, 13 N. H. 331.
4 Gerrard v. O'Reilly, 2 Connor & Lawson, 165.
5 Rolfe v. Peterson, 2 Bro. P. C. 436; Birch v. Stephenson, 3 Taunt. 473; Farrant v. Olrnius, 3 B. & Ald. 692; Jones v. Green, 3 Younge & Jerv. 298.
6 Brooks v. Hubbard, 3 Conn. 58.
7 Cutler v. How, 8 Mass. 257; Cutler v. Johnson, 8 Mass. 266; Baxter v. Wales, 12 Mass. 365.
8 Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1; Kendall v. Stone, 1 Selden, 14; Crain v. Petrie, 6 Hill, 522; Keene v. Dilke, 4 Exch. 388; Borradaile v. Brun-ton, 2 Moore, 582; 8 Taunt. 535; Phillpotts v Evans, 5 M. & W. 475.
9 See Fox v. Harding, 7 Cush. 523; Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61; Batchelder v. Sturgis, 3 Cush. 205; Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 424; Lawrence v. Wardwell, 6 Barb. 423; Donnell v. Jones, 17 Ala. 689; Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492.
10 Hayden v. Cabot, 17 Mass. 169; Bishop ft, Williamson, 2 Fairf. 504; Hodsoll v. Stallebrass, 8 Dowl. 482; s. c. 3 P. & Dav. 200; s. c. 11 Ad. & El. 301; Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259; 8 Dow. &Ryl. 14; Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48; Waters v. Towers, 8 Exch. 401; 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 410.
§ 1476. In a contract of sale, when the price is not paid and the articles are not delivered, the measure of damages recoverable by the vendee is their value at the time when, and the place where, they were deliverable.2 If the price have been paid, he may recover the highest market value of such goods in the same place, at any time between the stipulated delivery and the trial.3 Where there is a breach of warranty, the measure of damages will be the difference between the price given and the actual value of the goods at the time of the sale.4 If the article be warranted to be fit for a particular purpose, the vendee is also entitled to recover what it would have been worth had it agreed with the warranty, and for all losses directly resulting as a consequence from the breach of warranty.5 Again, if the contract be broken by either party, and the other party after notice sell the goods, he may recover the difference between the price they actually bring and the contract price, as well as storage and other expenses in keeping and selling.6
§ 1477. In contracts for the hire of labor and services, there is a distinction as to the measure of damages between a contract to perform mechanical work by the piece and a contract for the hire of a person to serve in a particular capacity, such as an agent, clerk, laborer, or servant, for a year or a shorter time. In the former cases the measure of damages is not the entire contract price, but a compensation for the actual injury received,1 or, rather, for such injury as by reasonable endeavors and expense the plaintiff could not have avoided incurring.2
1 Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Barr, 80. See, also, Hay v. Graham, 8 Watts & Serg. 27.
2 See ante, § 1092, and cases cited; Shepherd v. Hampton, 3 Wheat. 200; Clark v. Pinney, 7 Cow. 681; Davis v. Shields, 24 Wend. 322.
3 Ibid.; Gainsford v. Carroll, 2 B. & C. 624.
4 Ante, § 1097; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt. 566.
5 Ante, § 1095; Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 427; Bridge v. Wain, 1 Stark. 504; Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153; Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342.
6 Aute, § 1094; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt. 566; Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sandf. 297.
§ 1478. But in respect to the second class of cases, namely, of agents, clerks, laborers, or hired servants, for a year or a shorter determinate time, the rule is that if such person be improperly discharged, he may recover the entire contract price, unless it be shown that after his dismissal he had engaged in other business, or that employment of the same general nature and description as that for which he was hired had been offered him and been refused, in which case the amount recoverable by him might be reduced. The burden of proof in such case is on the hirer.3 Upon the same prin-
1 Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio, 317; Wilson v. Martin, 1 Denio, 602;
Spencer v. Halstead, Ib. 606.
2 Miller v. The Mariners' Church, 7 Greenl. 51; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 261; Davis v. Fish, 1 Greene, 406; so in trespass, Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. 284. But see contra, Heaney v. Heeney, 2 Denio, 625; Green v. Mann, 11 I11. 613.
3 Costigan v . Mohawk & Hudson Railroad Co., 2 Denio, 609. In this case the plaintiff, who had been hired as superintendent of the road, was improperly dismissed after two months' service. Beardsley, J., says: "As a general principle, nothing is better settled than that upon these facts the plaintiff is entitled to recover full pay for the entire year. He was ready during the whole time to perform his agreement, and was in no respect in fault. The contract was in full force in favor of the plaintiff, although it had been broken by the defendants. In general, in such cases, the plaintiff has a right to full pay. The rule has been applied to contracts for the hire of clerks, agents, and laborers, for a year or a shorter time, as also to the hire of domestic servants, where the contract may usually be determined by a month's notice, or on payment of a month's wages. The authorities are full and decisive upon this subject. Chit, on Cont. 5th Am. ed. 575 to 581; 1 Chit. Gen. Pr. 72 to 83; Browne on Actions at Law, 184 to 185, 504, 505; Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309; Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B. & Ad. 904; Williams v. Byrne, 7 Ad. & El. 177; French v. Brookes, 6 Bing. 354; Gandell v. Pontigny, 4 Camp. 375; Robinson v. Hindman, 3 Esp. 235; Smith v. Kingsford, 3 Scott, 279; Smith v. Hayward, 7 Ad. & El. 544. In no case which I have been able to find, and we were referred to none of that character, has it ever been held or even urged by counsel, that the amount agreed to be paid should be reduced upon the supposition that the person dismissed might have found other employment for the whole or some part of the unexpired term during which he had engaged to serve the defendant. And yet the objection might be ciple, where a merchant agrees to furnish a given quantity of freight, and he fails so to do, he must nevertheless pay dead taken in every such case, and in most of them the presumption would be much more forcible than in the case at bar. The entire novelty of such a defence affords a very strong, if not a decisive argument, against its solidity. The Duke of Newcastle v. Clark, 8 Taunt. 602. Nor do I find any case in which it was proved that other employment was offered to the plaintiff after his dismissal, and that his recovery was defeated or diminished because he refused to accept of such proffered employment.