1 See cases cited supra.
2 Jackson v. Lowe, 1 Bing. 9. See, also, Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 Ad. & El. 355.
3 Boydell v. Drummond, 2 Camp. 157.
4 Cooper v. Smith, 15 East, 103; Archer v. Baynes, 5 Exch. 625.
5 Cabot v. Haskins, 3 Pick. 83; Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653; Stokes v. Moore, 1 Cox, 219. In this case an agreement was made for the renewal of a lease, and the defendant wrote instructions to an attorney by which the same was to be prepared, in these words: "The lease renewed, Mrs. Stokes to pay the king's tax, also to pay Moore £24 a year, half-yearly," and it was held not to be a sufficient memorandum. Skynner, C. B., said: "The question in this case is whether the written note stated in the pleadings is such an agreement as is within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. These are instructions to the attorney for the preparation of the lease. This is no formal signature of the defendant's name, but one term of the instructions is that the rent is to be paid to Moore; and the question is whether the name so inserted and written by the defendant is a sufficient signing. The purport of the statute is manifest, to avoid all parol agreements, and that none should have effect but those signed in the manner therein specified. It is argued that the name being inserted in any part of the writing is a sufficient signature. The meaning of the statute is that it should amount to an acknowledgment by the party that it is his agreement, and if the name does not give such authenticity to the instrument, it does not amount to what the statute requires. Here the insertion of the name has not this effect. This memorandum might be drawn subject to additions or alterations, and does not appear to be the final agreement of the parties, and indeed the memorandum as a proposition, intending to sign it, if agreed to by the other party. But the question whether the party intended to be bound by the memorandum when unsigned is for the jury to determine.1 So, also, where over a as far as we can admit parol evidence, it is proved not to be so, for the subject of repairs is not mentioned in the instructions; which shows that the ends of the statute are not to be obtained, if so informal a paper is to be admitted as a written agreement. No case has been adduced in point, but it has been compared to the case of wills, where a name written in the introduction has been considered as a signature, but that seems to me a very different case. The cases on wills have been where the instrument, importing to be the final instrument of the party, has been formally attested, and it is in its nature complete, and the only question has been, whether the form of the statute has been complied with. In the present case I think it is by no means so, and it would be of very dangerous tendency to admit the memorandum to be an agreement within the statute." Eyre, B., added: "I think this cannot be considered such a signature as the statute requires. The signature is to have the effect of giving authenticity to the whole instrument, and if the name is inserted so as to have that effect, I do not think it signifies much in what part of the instrument it is to be found: it is perhaps difficult, except in the case of a letter with a postscript, to find an instance where a name inserted in the middle of a writing can well have that effect; and there the name being generally found in a particular place by the common usage of mankind, it may very probably have the effect of a legal signature, and extend to the whole; but I do not understand how a name inserted in the body of an instrument, and applicable to particular purposes, can amount to such an authentication as is required by the statute."
1 In Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653, the defendant wrote a memorandum of the contract in his books, and requested the other's signature, and it was held sufficient, although his name only appeared in the body of the memorandum. Lord Abinger said: "The Statute of Frauds requires that there should be a note or memorandum of the contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged. And the cases have decided that, although the signature be in the beginning or middle of the instrument, it is as binding as if at the foot of it; the question being always open to the jury, whether the party, not having signed it regularly at the foot, meant to be bound by it as it stood, or whether it was left so unsigned because he refused to complete it. But when it is ascertained that he meant to be bound by it as a complete contract, the statute is satisfied, there being a note in writing showing the terms of the contract, and recognized by him. I think in this case the requisitions of the statute are fully complied with." See, also, Merritt v. Glason, 12 Johns. 102; Cla-son v. Bailey, 14 Ib. 484; Ogilvie v. Foljambe, 3 Mer. 53; Penniman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87.
§ 1452. It is not requisite that the memorandum should be signed by both parties, but only by him who is to be charged by it; and if it be signed by him alone, he cannot avoid the contract by showing that the other party did not sign.3 But it is essential that the name of the other contracting party should be in some way indicated in the memorandum, or it is insufficient.4
§ 1453. Again, the signature of the party to be charged, if written in pencil,5 or stamped by him in print, will be sufficient. So a signature to a telegram sent to the other party is good.6 And if a party write out an agreement over his printed name, or allow another to do so assentingly, he will be bound thereby, especially if it appear that he is in the habit of so doing.1
1 Bluck v. Gompertz, 7 Exch. 862.
2 New York Rev. Stat. pt. 2, ch. 7, tit. 1, § 8; Davis v. Shields, 24 Wend. 322; 26 Ib. 341; Vielie v. Osgood, 8 Barb. 130; James v. Patten, 2 Selden, 9, overriding 8 Barb. 344.
3 Hatton v. Gray, 2 Ch. Cas. 164; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265; Fenly v. Stewart, 5 Sandf. 101; Egerton v. Mathews, 6 East, 307; Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C. 737; Ballard v. Walker, 3 Johns. Cas. 60; Pen-niman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87; McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 460; Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Blackf. 452; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 484; Bars-tow v. Gray, 3 Greenl. 409; Farwell v. Lowther, 18 I11. 255; Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 I11. 220 (1869); Smith v. Neale, 2 C. B. (n. s.) 66; Warner v. Willington, 3 Drew. 532; Morin v. Martz, 13 Minn. 191 (1808); Reuss v. Picksley, Law R. 1 Exch. 342. But see Lawrenson v. Butler, 1 Sch. & L. 13, in which Lord Redesdale questions this rule. It is, however, quite settled by the cases. See, also, note to Sweet v. Lee, 3 Man. & G. 462.