1 Shoemaker v. Benedict, 1 Kern. 176. In this case Allen, J., said: "Another fact relied upon to distinguish this case from Van Keuren v. Parmelee is, that the payments were made before the Statute of Limitations had attached to the debt, and while the liability of all confessedly existed. In some cases in Massachusetts this, as well as the fact that the revival or continuance of the debt was effected by payments from which a promise was implied rather than by express promises, were commented upon by the court as important points. But I do not understand that the cases were decided upon the ground that those circumstances really introduced a new element or brought the cases within a different principle. The decisions, in truth, were based upon the authority of the decisions of the English courts, and prior decisions in the courts of that State. That a promise made while the Statute of Limitations is running, is to be construed and acted upon in the same manner as if made after the statute has attached, is decided in Dean v. Hewit and Tompkins v. Bruen. If the promise is conditional, the condition must be performed before the liability attaches so as to authorize an action. It does not, as a recognition of the existence of the debt, revive it absolutely from the time of the conditional promise. And in principle I see not why a promise made before the statute has attached to a debt should be obligatory when made by one of several joint debtors, when it would not be obligatory if made after the action was barred. The statute operates upon the remedy. The debt always exists. An action brought after the lapse of six years upon a simple contract must be upon the new promise, whether the promise was before or after the lapse of six years, express or implied, absolute or conditional. The same authority is required to make the promise before as after the six years have elapsed. Can it be said that one of several debtors can, on the last day of the sixth year, by a payment small or large, or by a new promise, either express or implied, so affect the rights of his co-debtors as to continue their liability for another space of six years, without their knowledge or assent, or any authority from them, save that to be implied from the fact that they are at the time jointly liable upon the same contract, and yet that on the very next day, without any act of the parties, such authority ceases to exist? If so, I am unable to discover upon what principle. And may the debt be thus revived from six years to six years through all time, or if not, what limit is put to the authority? If any agency is created it continues until revoked. The decision of Van Keuren v. Parmelee is upon the ground that no agency ever existed, not that an agency once existing had been revoked." See, also, Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 360; Dean v. Hewit, 5 Wend. 257; Tompkins v. Bruen, 1 Denio, 247; Channell v. Ditchburn, 5 M. & W. 494; Manderston v. Robertson, 4 M. & R. 440.