Although the examples here given, and indeed by far the greater number of instances of contracts in restraint of trade, have been instances of restraint in time or place, the restraint which the law forbids within the limits before mentioned, is not confined to restraints in time or place. Thus, in one of the cases on the subject, a covenant by a licensee of a patent for a term of years not to make or vend during the residue of the term, any machines for effectuating the same thing as the patent was obtained for, without having the *patented invention applied to those machines, was considered, and held not void (b).

Another example of contracts, illegal because in contravention of the policy of the law, is afforded by those cases in which contracts in general restraint of marriage have been held void (c). Thus, in Lowe v. Peers (d), a defendant entered into the following covenant: - "I do hereby promise Mrs. Catherine Lowe that I will not marry any person besides herself. If I do, I agree to pay her 1000 within three months after I shall marry anybody else." The Court of King's Bench held this contract void, remarking, "that it was not a promise to marry her, but not to marry any one else, and yet she was under no obligation to marry him." This case was affirmed in error (e).

(b) Jones v. Lees, 26 L. J. (Ex.) 9; 1H.&N. 189. See Hilton v. Eckersley, 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 353, 25 L. J. (Q. B.) 199, in Ex. Ch.;6E.& B. (88 E. C. L R.) 47.

(c) See Newton v. Marsden, 31 L. J. (Ch.) 690; Robinson v. Ommaney, 21 Ch. Div. 780; 23 lb. 285; 51 L. J. (Ch.) 894; 52 lb. 440.

(d) 4 Burr. 2225. (e) 4 Burr. 2234.

So, where a lady gave a bond conditioned not to marry, the Court of Chancery ordered it to be delivered up (f).

On the subject of marriage I may further mention, that a deed tending to the future separation of husband and wife is void on grounds of public policy (g); although a deed providing a fund for the *lady's support on the occasion of an immediate separation is not so (h). And the Chancery Division will exercise its jurisdiction in giving effect to arrangements of property contained in articles of separation, such separation having previously taken place (i), and will restrain the husband from doing any act contrary to his covenant in such articles not to molest his wife (k). And even where the parties, after executing a lawful deed of separation, have been reconciled and have cohabited, the deed is not necessarily annulled thereby (I); but the performance of covenants therein will be compelled if it appear that such reconciliation was not intended to annul them (m). The distinction between the two cases of future and existing separation is obvious. The deed, in the former case, contemplates and facilitates that which the law considers an evil-namely, the separation of husband and wife; in the latter case, the evil is inevitable, and the effect of the deed is but to save the wife from destitution.

(f) Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215.

(g) Hindley v. Marquis of Westmeath, 6 B. & C. (13 E. C. L. R.) 200.

(A) Jee v. Thurlow, 2 B & C. (9 E. C. L. E.) 547; Jones v. Waite, in Dom. Proc. 4 M. & Gr. (43 E. C. L. R.) 1104.

(i) Wilson v. Wilson, 1 H. L. Cas. 538; Gibbs v. Harding, L. R. 8 Eq. 490, 5 Ch. 336; S. C. 38 L. J. (Ch.) 604, 39 lb. 374; Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. Div. 605.

(k) Sanders v. Rodway, 22 L. J. (Ch.) 230.

(I) Wilson v. Mushett, 3 B. & Ad. (23 E. C. L. R.) 743; Randle v. Gould, 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 57; 8 E. & B. (92 E. C. L. R.) 457.

(m) Webster v. Webster, 22 L. J. (Ch.) 837. 244

Almost the converse of these cases of deeds of *separation are what are called Marriage brocage contracts, that is, where a man has agreed, in consideration of money, to bring about a marriage. These are all void as against public policy, the law considering that unions so brought about are unlikely to be happy ones. This class of cases is founded upon a case in the House of Peers (n),1 in which Thomas Thinne gave an obligation of 1000 to Mrs. Potter, conditioned to pay her 500 within three months after he should be married to Lady Ogle, "a widow," the reporter says, "of great fortune and honour, for she was the daughter and heir of Jocelyn Percy, Earl of Northumberland." The Master of the Rolls decreed this bond to be void; the Lord Keeper reversed the decree; whereupon there was an appeal to the House of Peers; and, upon hearing the cause there, all the Lords but three or four were of opinion that all such contracts are of dangerous consequences, and ought not to be allowed; and they reversed the decree of dismissal made by the Lord Keeper, and decreed the obligation to be void.

Another, and an extensive class of cases is that in which the contract has a tendency to obstruct the course of public justice. These must be left for the next Lecture.

(n) Hall v. Potter, 3 Lev. 411.

1 Hall v. Potter (which is also reported in 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 89, and 3 P. Wms. 392, and Show. P. C. 76) has been followed by a numerous class of cases : Cole v. Gibson, 1 Ves. 503; Roberts v. Roberts, 3 P. Wms. 74, see Mr. Cox's note; Smith v. Pruning, 2 Vern. 392; Duke of Hamilton v. Lord Mohun, lb. 652; Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112; and Lord Redesdale, when Chancellor of Ireland, declared void a bond given to the obligee as a remuneration for having assisted the elopement of the obligor without the consent of the wife's friends, though the bond was given voluntarily after the marriage, and without any previous agreement therefor: Williamson v. Gihon, 2 Seh. & Lef. 362. The civil law, however, it is well known, in its approval and encouragement of the institution of marriage, allowed the proxenelce, or match-makers, to stipulate, within limits, for a reward for promoting marriages: Code, Lib. 5, tit. 1, 1. 6. [Crawford v. Russell, 62 Barb. 92.-s.]-R.