(x) Parsons v. Alexander, 24 L. J. (Q. B.) 277; 5 E. & B. (85 E. G. L. R.) 2G3. (y) Rosewarne v. Billing, 33 L. J. (C. P.) 56.

Where money is deposited with a stakeholder to abide the event of any wager, there is nothing, in the section under consideration, to prevent such a depositor, who repents of his venture and repudiates the wager, from revoking the authority given by him to the stakeholder to pay the money to the winner, at any time before the stakeholder has paid over the money, and suing the latter for his deposit, and recovering it from him (b). But the winner, after the happening of the event on which the wager depended, cannot recover his winnings unless the transaction comes within the protection of the proviso with which section 18 *concludes (c). Where the deposit comes within s. 5 of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119 (for the suppression of Betting-houses), it may under that section be recovered from the receiver as money received for the use of the depositor (d).

(z) Beeston v. Beeston, 1 Ex. D. 13, 45 L. J (Q. B., etc.) 230. See also Ex parte Pyke, In re Lister, 8 Ch. Div. 754.

(a) Beyer v. Adams. 26 L. J. (Ch.) 841.

(b) Diggle v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. (C. A.) 422, 46 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 721; Hampden v. Walsh, 1 Q. B. D. 189; 45 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 238; Varney v. Hickman, 5 C. B. (57 E. C. L. R.) 271; Martin v. Hewson, 24 L. J. (Ex.) 174; 10 Ex. 737; Trimble v. Hill, 5 App. Cas. 342; 49 L. J. (P. C.) 49.

(c) Varney v. Hickman, Parsons v. Alexander, supra, Savage v. Madder, 36 L. J. (Ex.) 178.

Where, however, a person employed a turf commission agent to bet for him in the agent's own name, and the agent made the bet accordingly and became himself personally liable for payment in the event of loss, incurring serious disabilities if a defaulter, it was held that the principal after the bet was made could not, where the bet was lost but before the money was paid over, repudiate the authority and subsequently refuse to repay the agent the money he had paid in pursuance of the lost bet. The authority was held irrevocable, both on the ground that an authority coupled with an interest in the donee of the authority is irrevocable, and also on the ground that if one man employs another to do a legal act (e), which in the ordinary course of things will involve the agent in pecuniary obligations or otherwise, a contract on the part of the employer to indemnify his agent is implied by law (f).

*Although a foot-race comes within the proviso in s. 18 as being a "lawful game, sport, or pastime" (g), yet an agreement to walk a match for 200 a-side, the money being deposited with a stakeholder, is a wager, and null and void under that section; and the deposit of the money is not a subscription or contribution for a sum of money to be awarded to the winner of a lawful game, within the meaning of the proviso (h). And the proviso does not extend to much upon B.'s death. If B. owes him money, and his object is to secure himself, it is a bond fide insurance; but if B. is a mere stranger, in whose life be has no interest, it is a mere wager. In order to prevent the contract of insurance from being thus abused, the statute 14 Geo. III., c. 48, prohibiting wager policies, as they are called, *altogether, prevents a man from insuring an event in which he has no interest, and where he has an interest, but not to the extent insured, prohibits him from recovering more than the amount of his interest. The effect of this Act, in a word, is to invalidate wagers framed in the shape of policies of insurance-thus, a wager on the price of Brazilian shares framed like a policy was held invalid (I). But where the- transaction would not be commonly understood to be a policy of insurance, and therefore would not fall within the words of the stat. 14 Geo. III., c. 48, taken in their ordinary acceptation, the Courts would probably not consider it as within this Act (m).

(d) See as to that section, Doggett v. Catterms, 34 L. J. (C. P.) 46.

(e) That making a bet is not an illegal act, see ante, p. *260.

(/) Head v. Anderson, 10 Q. B. D. 100; 52 L. J. (Q. B.) 214, affirmed by a majority of the C. A., diss. Brett, M. R, 51 L. T. Rep. N. S. 55. See also Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. 685; 48 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 289, ante, p. *268.

(g) Batty v. Marriott, 5 C. B. (57 E. C. L. R.) 818.

(h) Diggle v. Higgs, 2 Ex. D. (C. A.) 422; 46 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 721; overruling Batty v. Marriott, 5 C. B. (57 E..C. L. R) 818, where it was held that a case where two persons ran their horses against each other, the winner to have both horses, there being no subscription or contribution towards any plate, prize, or sum of money to be awarded to the winner(i).

There is, however, one class of wagers which requires some attention. I allude to wagers in the shape of policies of insurance. An insurance, as you doubtless are aware, is a contract by which, in consideration of a premium, one or more person or persons assure another person or persons in a certain amount against the happening of a particular event; for instance, the death of an individual, the loss of *a ship, or the destruction of property by fire. These three classes of policies, upon ships, lives, and fire, are of the most common occurrence; but there is nothing to prevent insurance against other events; for instance in Carter v. Boehm (k), one of the most celebrated cases in the Reports, Lord Mansfield, and the rest of the then Court of King's Bench, supported a policy of insurance against foreign capture effected in a fortress. Now, this contract of insurance, though one of the most beneficial known to the law, since it enables parties to provide against events which no human skill can control, to provide, for instance, against the ruin of a family by the sudden death of a parent, the ruin of a merchant by the loss of his venture at sea, or of a manufacturer by the outbreak of a fire on his premises, though productive, therefore, of most beneficial consequences to society, yet is very liable to be abused, and made an engine of mere gambling; for instance, A. insures B.'s life, i. e., he pays so much a year, or so much in the lump, to some one who is to pay him so such a deposit was within the protection of the proviso: Trimble v. Hill, 5 App. Cas. 342; 49 L. J. (P. C.) 49.