Where two persons apply to the Governor of the State to be appointed to the same office, and it is agreed that one of them shall withdraw his application and aid the other in procuring the appointment, in consideration of which the fees and emoluments of the office are to be divided between them, such contract is illegal and void: Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y. 449. So no action will lie for services as agent in attending to a claim against the State, before the legislature, agreements in respect to such services being against public policy, and prejudicial to sound legislation; nor can a recovery be had in such a case on a quantum meruit, there being no legal service performed: Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489. A contract for the sale of the personal influence of the plaintiff to procure the enactment of a private statute for the benefit of the defendant is contrary to public policy and void: Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361; Gil v. Davis, 12 La. Ann. 219; Davison v. Seymour, 1 Bosw. 88; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274. Services rendered in obtaining the passages of laws by the legislature may support a claim for compensation when publicly rendered by advocates disclosing their true relation to the subject: Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. 533. An agreement between a subordinate officer in a custom-house receiving a salary as such and a merchant who claimed the return of certain duties that the former should labour to obtain them for a compensation is illegal and void : Satterlee v. Jones, 3 Duer, 102. A promise to pay for services and expenses in procuring a pardon for a convict in the state prison is not illegal or invalid: Chadwick v. Knox, 31 N. H. 226; contra, Kribben v Haycraft. 26 Mo. 396. A contract not to bid at a judicial sale is void : Hook v. Turner, 22 lb. 333. But not an agreement to purchase jointly and afterwards divide: M'Minn v. Phipps, 3 Sneed, 196. A contract for the sale of an office is void as against the policy of the law: Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 394. An indemnity against the publication of a libel is void : Lea v. Collins, 4 Sneed, 393. And see Spinks v. Davis, 32 Miss. 152; Nichols v. Mudgett, 32 Vt. 546; Devlin v. Brady, 32 Barb. 518; Morrell v. Quarles, 35 dieted, as for a misdemeanour, as well as sued in a civil action; a remedy necessary for the party injured, who, if he could proceed by action only, would be in fact remediless in cases where the defendant could not pay the damages recovered. In many such cases it can hardly be admitted that the prosecution is to be considered public, or that the public interest is concerned in bringing such an offender to justice by way of example to others. *Substantially, the only one who suffers by the wrong is the individual against whom it is committed. In instances of this kind, the law does not forbid a compromise between the injurer and the injured. "The law," says the Court of Queen's Bench, in Keir v. Leeman (f), "will permit a compromise of all offences, though made the subject of a criminal prosecution, for which offences the injured party might sue and recover damages in an action. It is often the only manner in which he can obtain redress. But if the offence is of a public nature, no agreement can be valid that is founded on the consideration of stifling a prosecution for it." The law will therefore sanction a bond, conditioned to remove a public nuisance, founded on the abandonment of an indictment for that nuisance, which is in fact a very common instance of compromise (g). The compromise of indictments for assaults is another frequent instance of the same rule (h). But if, as in Keir v. Leeman, the offence is not confined to personal injury, but is accompanied with riot and the obstruction of a public officer in the execution of his duty, these are matters of pub(f) 6 Q. B. (51 E. C. L. E.) 321.

(g) Fallowes v. Taylor, 7 T. B. 475.

(h) Baker v. Townsend, 7 Taunt. (2 E. C. L. B.) 422.

Ala. 544; Cook v. Shipman, 24 111.614; Brisbois v. Sibley, 1 Minn. 230; Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 387; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45.-s. 250 lic concern, and therefore not legally the subject of a compromise.

To return to the subject of contracts tending to obstruct the course of justice. The case of Coppock *v. Bower (i), in which an agreement to withdraw an election petition in consideration of a sum of money was held void, is another instance of their illegality. So is the case of Arkwright v. Cant-rell (k), where the grant of a judicial office to a person interested in the matters which would become the subjects of adjudication, was held void. For a similar reason, contracts to induce voters, for any consideration of advantage to themselves, to vote in favour of a particular candidate, are illegal and void. Thus, when a candidate himself makes a contract with any one to supply meat and drink to electors, it is void; and if the things be supplied, the person supplying cannot recover the price from the candidate (I); for, by the policy of the law, the electors should be free to use their own unbiased judgment in selecting the candidate most fit to serve the public as a member of the great council of the nation. Persons who have the right of appointing to public offices of trust or to any favour from the Crown, are bound to use a like discrimination. All agreements, therefore, to pay money for an appointment to any public office of trust, or for the grant of any public favour, are illegal {m)1

(i) 4 M. & W. 361, ante, p. *18.

(k) 7 Ad. & E. (34 E. C. L. E.) 365. See Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co., 3 H. L. C. 759. A very remarkable case.

(1) Thomas v. Edwards, 2 M. & W. 218.

(m) Parsons r. Thompson, 1 H. Bl. 322; Hopkins v. Prescott, 4 C. B. (56 E. C. L. B.) 578; Harrington v. Du Chatel, 1 Bro. C. C. 124; Graeme v. Wrough-ton, 24 L. J. (Ex.) 265; Corp. of Liverpool v. Wright, 28 L. J. (Ch.) 868.