(not purporting to be by way of charge only), of any debt or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing shall have been given to the debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be, and be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee if this Act had not passed), to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action from the date of such notice, and all legal and other remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same, without the concurrence of the assignor." See also ante, pp. *31, *238. There may be a valid assignment of a "debt or other legal chose in action" within the meaning of this enactment, although there is nothing actually due at the time of the assignment: Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. D. 569; 47 L. J. |Q. B.) 722; Buck v. Robson, 3 Q. B. D. 6S6; 48 L. J. (Q. B.) 250; Walker v. Bradford Old Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 511; 53 L. J. (Q B.) 280. See also as to what does or does not amount to an absolute assignment not purporting to be by way of charge only, Burlinson v. Hall, 12 Q. B. D. 347; 53 L.J. (Q. B.) 222; National Provincial Bank v. Harle, 6 Q. B. D. 627; 50 L. J. (Q. B.) 437; and for an instance of an assignment of the benefit of a contract subject to equities as between the assignor and the contractee, see Young v. Kitchin, 3 Ex. Div. 127; 47 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 579. The notice of the assignment need not necessarily be given in the life time of the assignor : Walker v. Bradford Old Bank, supra.

1 Corporation bonds payable to bearer, though under seal, have the qualities of negotiable instruments : Mercer v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, lb. 175; Meyer v. Muscatine, lb. 384; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Cleveland B. R. Co., 41 Barb. 9; New Albany Plank Road Co. v. Smith, 23 Ind. 353. Claims for property, and for tort done to property, are assignable, and such assign ment may be by parol: Jordan v. Gillen, 44 N. H. 424; Lazard v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 139. The assignment of a debt may be by parol, or may be inferred from the conduct and acts of the parties: Spain v. Hamilton, 1 V\ all. 604. A right of entry for condition broken it not assignable: Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 468-s.

(l) The statute of Anne has been repealed by 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 (Bills of Exchange Act, 1882), s. 96, Sch. II.; of which Act see Part IV. ss. 83-89, as to Promissory Notes; and s. 31, as to the transfer of Bills.

1 These cases were Bowyer v. Bampton, 2 Str. 1155; Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Dougl. 636; Lowe v. Waller, lb. 736; Ackland v. Pearce, 2 Camp. 599. The words of the usury and gaming acts were thought too strong to be got over, and the law has been held the same way under similar statutes on this side of the Atlantic: Unger v. Boas, 13 Pa. St. C92; Lucas v. Waul, 12 Sm. & M. 157.-R.

Although, since the passing of this statute, many alterations have been made in the law of gaming, yet the stat. 5 & 6 Will. IV., c. 41, is still in force (m),and the law is still as just described.

(m) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 15. See Bayley on Bills, by Dowdeswell, 524. It has been held that bonds are within the equity of this statute: Hawker v. Hal-liwell, 3 Sm. & Giff. 194; 25 L. J. Ch. 558.

1 The provisions of the statute 58 Geo. III., c. 98, were adopted in the New York Revised Statutes, v. 1, 772, § 5, under which act it has been obviously held, that as soon as the defendant shows there has been usury between the prior parties he casts on the plaintiff the burden of proving that he is a holder for value: YVyat v, Campbell, M. & M. 80; Hackley v. Sprague, 10 Wend. 113; Young v. Berkley, 2 N. H. 410; Williams v. Little, 11 lb. 66; Hanrick v. Andrews, 9 Port. 10; as is the case in every instance where fraud, duress, or illegality is shown between the prior parties: Munroe v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 412; Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615; Beltzhoover v. Blackstock, 3 Watts, 26; and it seems at one time to have been thought that if the defendant could prove want or failure (not an illegality) of consideration between the prior parties, this would throw on the plaintiff the burden of proving himself a holder for value: Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516; Paterson v. Hardacre, 4 Taunt. 114; De la Chaumette v. Bank of England, 9 B. & C. (17 E. C. L. R.) 208; Heath v. Sansom, 2 B. & Ad. (22 E. C. L. R.) 291; but in Whitaker v. Edmunds, 1 Moo. & Rob. 366 Patterson, J., said, "Since the decision in Heath v. Sansom (2 B. & Ad. 291), the consideration of the judges has been a good deal called to the subject, and the prevalent opinion amongst them is, that the courts have of late gone too far in restricting the negotiability of bills and notes. If, indeed, the defendant can show that there has been something of a fraud in the previous steps of the transfer of the instrument, that throws on the plaintiff the necessity of showing under what circumstances he became possessed of it; so far I accede to the case of Heath v. Sansom, for there were in that case circumstances raising a suspicion of fraud; but if I added on that occasion that even independently of these circumstances of suspicion, the holder would have been bound to show the consideration which he gave for the bill, merely because there was an absence of consideration as between the previous parties to the bill, I am now decidedly of an opinion that such doctrine was incorrect." The opinion thus expressed has since been confirmed in many cases. See also Heydon v. Thompson, 1 A. & E. (28 E. C. L. R.) 210; Low v. Chifney, 1 Bing. N. C. (27 E. C. L. R.) 267; Knight v. Pugh, 4 W. & S. 448, where the reason for the change of decision is thus clearly given. " In cases other than those of negotiable notes obtained or put in circulation by fraud or undue means, the maker, by its negotiable character, agrees that the payee shall put it in circulation. He has no right, therefore, tion of course fails, for it is impossible for the party who has paid the money to enforce the performance of the illegal contract. Still, no action will lie to recover it back again. The reason of this is, that the law will not assist a party to an illegal contract. He has lost his money, it is true, but he has lost it by his own folly in entering into a transaction which the law forbids. You will see *instances of this in the cases cited below (n), the last but one of which, Lubbock v. Potts, is the very case I put, that of an insurance, in which, if the risk be not run, the premium may be recovered back again; but in that case the insurance was an illegal one, and it was therefore held that, though it could not have been enforced, the insured should not recover back the premium. The point is forcibly put by L. C. J. Wilrnot, in his celebrated judgment in Collins v. Blantern, which I have several times cited from 2 Wilson, 341. "Whoever," says his Lordship, "is a party to an unlawful contract, if he have once paid the money contracted to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not have the help of a Court to fetch it back again. You shall not have a right of action when you come into a Court of Justice in this unclean manner to recover it back."1