But notwithstanding the strong terms in which estoppel is often described as peculiar to a deed, it must not be supposed that a party cannot be estopped by any other act (d), although estoppel by deed is much the lord's title has expired, or that he has sold his interest to another: Horner v. Leeds, 25 N. J. 106; Russel v. Allard, 18 N. H. 222. He may purchase his landlord's title at sale on execution, and may set up the title thus acquired against his landlord: Elliott v. Smith, 23 Pa. St. 131; Wolf v. Johnson, 30 Miss. 513; Bettison v. Budd, 17 Ark. 546. A tenant may show that his landlord's title has ceased, even though he has paid rent to the assignee: M'Devitt v. Sullivan, 8 Cal. 592. If one in possession under claim of title is hy fraud or mistake induced to helieve that another has a better title, and therefore to take a lease from him, the tenant will not be estopped by that lease from denying the lessor's title: Alderson v. Miller, 15 Gratt. 279; Pearce v. Nix, 34 Ala. 183; Cramer v. Carlisle Bank, 2 Grant, 267; Schultz v. Arnot, 33 Mo. 172; Cain v. Gimon, 36 Ala. 168. A tenant is not estopped from denying the title of his landlord after he has surrendered possession: Zimmerman v. March-land, 23 Ind. 474.-3.

(c) Hall v. Cazenove, 4 East, 477.

(d) M'Cance v'. London and North Western Railwaj, 34 L. J. (Ex.) 39.

A tenant is estopped from denying the title of his landlord's assignee: People v. Angel, 61 How. Pr. 159. A tenant who accepts a lease under an entire misapprehension of its purport is not estopped to deny the title of his landlord: Wiggin v. Wiggin, 58 N. II. 235. A lessee who has never taken possession is not estopped to deny his landlord's title: District of Columbia v. Johnson, 1 Mackey (D. C.) 51.

(c) Co. Litt. 352.

(f) 6 A. & E. (33 E. C. L. R.) 474; Heane v. Rogers, 9 B. & C. (17 E. C. L. R.) 586.

(g) 2 Ex. 654, 663.

In truth, in most cases to which the doctrine in Pickard v. Sears is to be applied, the representation is such as to amount to the contract or license of the party making it." Again, where a railway company had been deceived by a forged transfer into registering shares, and granting certificates of registration of the shares, *in the names mentioned in the forged transfer, whereby innocent persons were induced to purchase those shares, under the belief that the vendors were registered shareholders; it was held that the principle above laid down was applicable, and that the company were estopped by their own act from denying the right of the innocent transferees of the shares to be registered as shareholders (A).1 In short, nental Bank v. Bank of Commonwealth, 50 N. Y. 575. Although there is a seeming conflict in the decisions, yet the decided weight of authority is that a party is not estopped by his acts or declarations from showing the truth, unless such acts or declarations were intended to influence the conduct of another, or he had reason to believe they would: Kuhl v. Mayor, 23 N. J. Eq. 84. Silence alone will not postpone unless in cases where it is a fraud; but positive acts of encouragement bar the assertion of a right even though they were done with no fraudulent intent: Maple v. Kussart, 53 Pa. St. 348; Chapman v. Chapman, 59 lb. 214. A party has no right, in his dealings with another, to state a fact to be true, which he does not know to be true, and which fact may influence the conduct of the other party. If such a fact be stated to obtain a benefit at the expense of the other party and to his prejudice, and it appears that there was no reasonable or probable ground for a belief in the existence of such fact, the inference is that there was no belief, and the statement under such circumstances has the effect of and may be properly treated as a fraud: Nugent v. Cincinnati R. R. Co., 2 Disu. 302; Rice v. Bunce, 49 Mo. 231. See further as to estoppels in pais: Heath v. Derry Bank, 44 N. H. 174; Judevine v. Goodrich, 35 Vt. 19; Shaw v. Beebe, lb. 205; Wooley v. Edson, lb. 214; Lesley v. Johnson, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 359; Whitacre v. Culver, 8 Minn. 135; Hazleton v. Batchelder, 44 N. II. 40; Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 245; Mason v. Williams, 8 Jones (Law) 478; Edwards c. Evans, 16 Wis. 181; Martin v. Zellerback, 38 Cal. 300; Simpson v. Pearson, 31 Ind. 1; Austin v. Thomson, 45 N. H. 113; Cain v. Busby, 30 Ga. 714; Martin v. Fox Co., 19 Wis. 552; Casco Bank v. Keene, 53 Maine, 103; Garlinghouse v. Whitwell, 51 such and such things do exist, and you may act upon the basis that they do exist,' and the other man does really act upon that basis, it is of the very essence of justice that between those two parties their rights should be regulated not by the real state of the facts, but by that conventional state of facts which the two parties agree to make the basis of their action; and that is what is meant by estoppel in pais"

(h) In re Bahia, etc, Kail. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 584; 37 L. J. (Q. B.) 176; followed in Hart v. Frontino, etc, Co., L. R. 5 Ex. Ill; 39 L. J. (Ex.) 93; see also Shaw v. The Port Philip and Colonial Gold Mining Co., 13 Q. B. D. 103; 53 L. J. (Q. B.) 369. The issue, however, of the certificate of registration

1 It is not necessary to an estoppel that the party should design to mislead, if his act was calculated to mislead, and actually has misled another acting upon it in good faith : Bank v. Hazard, 30 N. "Y. 226; contra, Plumer v. Lord, 9 Allen 455; Turner v. Coffin, 12 lb. 401; Rice v. Bunce, 49 Mo. 231; Contito use the words of Lord Blackburn in Burkinshaw v. Nicolls (i), "when a person makes *to another the representation, ' I take upon myself to say does not necessarily estop the company from setting up the forgery as between themselves and the person who innocently brings the forged transfer to them, and invites them to register it; although they would be estopped by the certificate as against those who might have purchased from that person on the faith of that certificate. See Simm v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co., 5 Q. B. D. 188; 49 L. J. (Q. B ) 392. For other illustrations of the doctrine of estoppel by conduct see Webb v. Heme Bay Commissioners, L. R. 5 Q B 642; 39 L J. (Q. B ) 221; Ashpitel v. Bryan, 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 91; 33 lb. 328; Phillips v. im Thurn, L. R. 1 C P. 463; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 220; Carr v. London and Northwestern Railway Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 307; 44 L. J. (C. P ) 109; Coventry v. Great Eastern Railway Co, 11 Q. B. D. 776; 52 L. J. (Q. B.) 695. The student is also referred to 2 Smith's L. C, notes to Doe v. Oliver, pp. 879-912, 8th ed.