(x) Standen v. Christmas, 16 L. J. (Q. B) 265; 10 Q. B. (59 E. C. L. R.) 135; Brydges v. Lewis, 3 Q. B. (43 E. C L. R.) 603.

(y) Com. Dig. Assignment, C. 1, lb. Grant, D. But see now 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25, sub-s. (6), and post, Lect. VII. "Assignment of Contracts."

(z) Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16; 1 Smith, L. C. 68, 8th ed.; Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. &. Ald. (7 E. C. L. R.) 1.

Again, a deed formerly had this further advantage of a simple contract, that, in case of the death of the party bound by it, it charged his heirs (if the deceased bound his heirs by using words for *that purpose in the deed) to the extent of any assets that might have descended to them {b).

You will find the nature of the heir's liability fully explained in the notes to Jefferson v. Morton (c). If, indeed, the debtor had devised the land away, instead of allowing it to descend to his heir, the creditor could not at common law have sued the devisee. However, by stat. 3 Wm. III. c. 14, usually called the Statute of Fraudulent Devises, the devisee was made liable as well as the heir. But, as this statute did not provide for the case of there being no heir, the land in that event going to the lord by escheat, if there was no devisee, or to the devisee if one was designated by the will, a distinction which it is sometimes important to observe (d), it was repealed, and its enactments repeated, making the de visee in such case liable, with several other improve-ments, by stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 47, usually called Sir Edward Sugden's Act (e).

(a) Thursby v. Plant, 1 Wms. Saund. 240. (b) Cora. Dig. Covenant, C. 2, lb. Assets, A. (c) 2 Wms. Saund. 6.

While on this subject, it may as well be mentioned, that, although the right of bringing an action at common law against the heir or devisee was limited to specialty creditors, yet, by stat. *3 & 4 Win. IV. c. 104, the simple contract creditors had a remedy against the real estate of the deceased in equity, as they now have in the Chancery Division of the High Court (f). Their claims, however, were, by the express enactment of the statute, postponed to those of creditors by deed in which the heirs of the deceased were mentioned. And by this Act lands escheating for want of heirs are made assets, (g).

In the administration of the personal effects, also, the speciality creditors used to have, as you are probably aware, a priority over those by simple contract (A).1

These advantages, however, are now no longer given

(d) Hunting v. Sheldrake, 9 M. & W. 256.

(e) See Hunting v. Sheldrake, 9 M. & W. 263. On the construction of statute 3 W. & M. c. 14, you may see Farley v. Briant, 3 A. & E. (30 E. C. L. R.) 839.

(f) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Judicature Act, 1873), s. 34.

(g) Evans v. Brown, 5 Beav. 114; Cummins v. Cummins, 3 J. & L. 64.

(h) Pinchorns' Case, 9 Co. Rep. 88 b.

1 A striking difference has existed between the course of legislation on the different sides of the Atlantic, with respect to the liability of estates of decedents for the payment of their debts, and although the rules in the different States must necessarily be local in their application, yet it may, in general, be said that in this country lands are liable for the debts of a decedent, whether due by matter of record, specialty, or simple contract, and that in the two latter cases, although they create no lien during the debtor's life, yet by his death their quality is changed, and they become liens on the real estate, which descends to the heir, or passes to the devisee, subject to the payment of the debts of the ancestor, according to the local laws of the State.-R.

By a deed, either in the case of realty or personalty; for, by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46, sec. 1, in the administration of the estate of every person dying on or after the 1st of January, 1870, the specialty and simple contract creditors stand in equal degree; but by the proviso of that section the Act is not to affect any lien charge or other security which any creditor may hold or be entitled to for the payment of his debts.

The occasions on which for the most part a deed is necessary must now be mentioned. It will be recollected that all property is in its nature *tangible or intangible, or, as it is called in law, corporeal or incorporeal. Real property of the corporeal kind being capable of actual delivery may, by the common law, be aliened or transferred by delivery alone without deed, and is therefore said to lie in livery; while that of the incorporeal kind, being incapable of delivery, requires some other mode to be used for authenticating its alienation or transfer, which mode is a deed (i), and therefore such property is said to lie in grant (k). Although the older authorities speak of incorporeal inheritances, there is no doubt that the principle does not depend on the quantity of interest granted or transferred, but on the nature of the subject-matter: a right of common, for instance, which is a profit a prendre, or a right of way, which is an easement or right in nature of an easement, can no more be granted or conveyed for life or years without a deed than in fee simple (I).

(i) Co. Litt. 9 a; Hewlins v. Shippam, 3 B. & C. (10 E. C. L. R.) 221; Bac. Abr., Grant, E.

(k) lb.; 2 Bl. Com. 310 ad 317; Shep. Touch. 228-230; Sugd. Vend. 125; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350, n.

(I) Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838; Perry v. Fitzhowe, 8 Q. B. (55 E. C. L. R.) 757; Mayfield v. Robinson, 7 Q. B. (53 E. C. L. R.) 486; Worsley v. South Devon Railway, 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 254; 16 Q. B. (71 E. C. L. R.) 539; Taplin v. Florence, 20 L. J. (C. P.) 137; 10 C. B. (70 E. C. L. R.) 744; Hewitt v. Isham, 21 L. J. (Ex.) 35; 7 Ex. 77.

Thus, in Wood v. Leadbitter, just cited, a ticket of admission to the Grand Stand at Doncaster to see the races, issued by the steward, and for which the *holder had paid a guinea, was held, not being under seal, to convey to him no right to be there, and no remedy for having been put out. For the transfer, therefore, of incorporeal property, a deed is necessary.