The board of an infant is included among the necessaries, for which he may pledge his credit: Bradley v. Pratt, 23 Vt. 378. Circumstances may exist which would render a home suitable to an infant's fortune and station in life: Aaron v. Harley, 6 Rich. 26. An infant who has an allowance from the Court or any other source, of a sum sufficient to supply himself with necessaries, suitable to his fortune and condition is not liable ordinarily for necessaries supplied on credit: Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. Eq. 274. Where it appears that a minor has been furnished with money enough to mocure all necessaries, the law presumes that he has been fully supplied, and the plainfeel no difficulty in putting a case in which a horse might be considered necessary. Suppose, for instance, the infant were a young man in a genteel station of life, and had been ordered horse exercise by a medical attendant.

Thus, in a case subsequently decided (e), soda water, oranges, and jellies, for an infant undergraduate at college, were held, prima facie, not to be necessaries, though they might have been shown to have been so.

"This," said Mr. Baron Parke, "is the case of a young man resident in the town, and having from his college everything necessary for a person in statu pu-'pillari" Had there been evidence that his medical attendant recommended them, they would undoubtedly tiff must negative that presumption. And if it appears that he has been furnished at other places, at or about the same time, those who supplied him first have a prior right to be paid: Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Ga. 467. Whether certain articles furnished a minor were necessaries or not is generally a question of fact for the jury, depending on all the circumstances of the case; the two principal circumstances being whether the articles were suitable to the minor's estate and condition, and whether he is without other means of supply : Davis v. Caldwell, 12 Cush. 512. If an infant is under the care of a parent or guardian, who has the means and is willing to furnish him what is actually necessary, he can make no contract for any article that will bind him : Elrod v. Myers, 2 Head, 33. A contract for the insurance of his property against loss or damage by fire is not a contract for necessaries: New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Noyes, 32 N. H. 345. Nor is a contract to repair his estate: West v. Gregg, 1 Grant, 53; Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 562. As to what are necessaries see Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Sams v. Stockton, 14 B. Mon. 232; Freeman v. Bridger, 4 Jones, 1; Wilhelm v. Hard-man, 13 Md. 140. An infant may bind himself to pay for necessaries he obtains so much as they are reasonably worth, but not what he may foolishly have agreed to pay for them: Locke v. Smith, 41 N. H. 346; Squier v. Hyd-liff, 9 Mich. 274. A minor is liable for money paid at his request by the plaintiff to a third person for necessaries furnished him: Swift v. Bennett, 10 Cush. 436. Payment to a minor under a contract for services made directly with him, but with the knowledge of the parent is a good defence to an action brought by the parent to recover for such services: Nixon v. Spencer, 16 Iowa, 214. See also Munson v. Washband, 31 Conn. 303; Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102.-s.

(e) Brooker v. Scott, 11 M. & W. 67.

(f) Wharton v. Mackenzie, 5 Q. B. (48 E. C. L. R.) 606. (g) 8 T. R. 578; Coates v. Wilson, 5 Esp. 152.

(h) In Ex. Ch., L. R. 4 Ex. 32, 38 L. J. (Ex.) 8, reversing S. C, L. R. 3 Ex. 90, 37 L. J. (Ex.) 48.

(i) Burghart v. Hall, 4 M. & W. 727. [But see note 1, p. *313.] 332 like kind, for if he is, the tradesman cannot recover, whether he knew or not of the existing supply (k).1

It has always been considered that necessaries for an infant's wife and children are necessaries for himself (l),2 a doctrine which, together with that of an infant's liability generally, is so fully and clearly explained in the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, in the case of Chappie v. Cooper (m), that it deserves to be carefully studied. "It seems clear," said Mr. Baron Alderson, delivering the judgment of the Court, "that an infant can contract so far as to bind himself in those cases where it is necessary for him to have the things for which he contracts; or where the contract is, at the time he makes it, plainly and unequivocally for his benefit. It is with the former class that we are concerned. Things necessary are those without which an individual cannot reasonably exist. In the first Place, food, raiment, lodging and the like. About these there is no doubt. Again, as the proper cultivation of the mind is as expedient as the support of the body, instruction in art or trade, or intellectual, moral, and religious information may be a *necessary also. Again, as man lives in society, the assistance and attendance of others may be a necessary to his well-being. Hence, attendance may be the subject of an infant's contract. Then the classes being established, the subject-matter and extent of the contract may vary according to the state and condition of the infant himself. His clothes may be fine or coarse according to his rank; his education may vary according to the station he is to fill; and the medicines will depend on the illness with which he is afflicted, and the extent of his probable means when • of age. So, again, the nature and extent of the attendance will depend on his position in society; and a servant in livery may be allowed to a rich infant, because such attendance is commonly appropriated to persons in his rank of life. But in all these cases it must be first made out that the class itself is one in which the things furnished are essential to the existence and reasonable advantage and comfort of the infant contractor. Thus, articles of mere luxury are always excluded, though luxurious articles of utility are in some cases allowed. So, contracts for charitable assistance to others, though highly to be praised, cannot be allowed to be binding, because they do not relate to his own personal advantage. In all cases there must be personal advantage from the contract derived to the infant himself. It is manifest, we think, that this principle alone would not be sufficient to *decide the present case. For it would be difficult to say that there is any personal advantage necessarily derived to an infant from the mere burial of a deceased person. But there is another consideration which arises out of the circumstances of this case, which may, we think, materially affect the defendant's liability. This is the case of an infant widow, and the burial that of her husband, who has left no property to be administered. Now, the law permits an infant to make a valid contract of marriage; and all necessaries furnished to one with whom he becomes one person by or through the contract of marriage are, in point of law, necessaries to the infant himself. Thus a contract for necessaries to an infant's wife and lawful children is used by Lord Bacon as one of the illustrations of the maxim 'Persona conjuncta mquiparatur interesse proprio' (n). 'If a man,' says Lord Bacon, 'under the years of twenty-one contract for the nursing of his lawful child, this contract is good, and shall not be avoided by infancy, no more than if he had contracted for his own aliment or erudition.' Now there are many authorities which lay down that decent Christian burial is a part of a man's own rights; and we think it is no great extension of the rule, to say that it may be classed as a personal advantage, and reasonably necessary to him. His property, if he leaves any, is liable to be appropriated by his administrator to the *performance of this proper ceremonial. If, then, this be so, the decent Christian burial of his wife and lawful children, who are the persons conjunctce with him, is also a personal advantage, and reasonably necessary to him; and then the rule of law implies that he may make a binding contract for it. This seems to us to be a proper and legitimate consequence, from the proposition that the law allows an infant to make a valid contract of marriage. If this be correct, then an infant husband or parent may contract for the burial of his wife or lawful children; and then the question arises whether an infant widow is in a similar situation. It may be said that she is not, because during the coverture she is incapable of contracting, and, after the death of the husband, the relation of marriage has ceased. But we think this is not so.