(g) Edmunds v. Bushell, L. E. 1 Q. B. 97; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 20.
Now the reason for this distinction between the case of a general and particular agent is very clear and simple: it is, that the public may not be deceived. If strangers see A. selling my goods day after day, month after month, and see me recognizing the transactions, and receiving payment on that understanding, they may naturally enough suppose that I have given him a general authority to sell, and that they may safely deal with him on *my account; and it would be hard indeed if I were allowed to turn round upon them and say, " True, he has a general authority, but I had revoked it in this particular instance." But, in the case of a particular agent, it is otherwise; for, as he is employed on one particular occasion only, there are no previous acts done by him for his principal, or recognitions of them by the principal, which can have a tendency to mislead any one. And there is no hardship in saying to the person who deals with him, "You must satisfy yourself that he is my agent at all, and when you do so you may as well satisfy yourself for what purposes he is my agent, and how far his authority extends."1
(h) Jordan v. Norton, 4 M. & W. 155, 162.
Such then is the distinction between a particular and a general agent; and with regard to the latter, there is, for the further protection of the public, this further rule, that the authority of a general agent is, as far as the public are concerned, measured by the extent of his usual employment. This is also a rule of common sense as well as law; for what I see a man continually doing with the approbation of another, I may fairly conclude he has a general authority to do. I have not, it is true, seen his instructions, but I am justified in believing that he acts according to them when I see that his principal does not signify disapprobation of his proceedings; and therefore the rule is, that where a man permits another to act generally for him in any line of business, he is bound by contracts made *by that other in that line of business; although, in truth and in fact, the person so acting may have a limited authority, or even no authority at all. This is laid down by Lord Holt, in homely, but forcible language, in Shower, 95, where it is thus reported :"Memorandum.-Upon evidence in an assumpsit for wares sold, it is held by Holt, C. J., that if a man send his servant with ready money to buy meat or other goods, and the servant buys upon credit, the master is not chargeable.2 But if the servant usually buy upon tick, and the servant buy some things without the master's order, yet, if the master were trusted by the trader, the master is chargeable."
1 Snow v. Perry, 9 Pick. 542; Fisher v. Campbell, 9 Port. 210; Johnson v. Wingate, 29 Me. 404; Hatch v. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538.-R.
2 Boston Iron Co. v. Hale, 8 N. H. 363. Otherwise, of course, if the servant or agent be ordered to buy, and be not furnished with money: Sprague v. Gillett, 9 Mete. 91-R.
When the authority of an agent is in question as to a certain sale, evidence of similar sales made subsequently under different circumstances is not admissible to show ratification of the first sale, such facts being collateral, and not affording a reasonable inference as to the matter in dispute : Lee v. Tinges, 7 Md. 215 -s.
There is a case of Rusby v. Scarlett (i), which affords a good illustration of this. The plaintiff was a corn-chandler, who sued the defendant for the price of hay and straw sold for the use of the defendant's horses. He had delivered it at the defendant's stables, and also bills of parcels, but had never seen the defendant or received any order from him, or any payment whatever directly from him. The defence was that the defendant had given his coachman money to pay the bills, which he had embezzled. The defendant kept a book with his coachman, in which were entered the articles procured by him, and money from time to *time advanced to him; but there did not appear to be any connection between the sums advanced to the servant, and the demands which he was to pay; but the money was advanced generally. "If," said Lord Ellenborough to the jury, "the servant was always in cash beforehand to pay for the goods, the master is not liable, as he never authorized him to pledge his credit. But, if the servant was not so in cash, he gave him a right to take up the goods on credit: and I think he would be liable, as the servant has not paid the plaintiff, though he might have received the money from the defendant, his master." Upon the law thus laid down, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. "Suppose," said Lord Denman, C. J., in another case, "a landed proprietor had to send his steward habitually to the neighbouring fairs and markets to make sales and purchases for him in matters connected with the management of his estate; that the steward makes all these contracts in his own name, but that he is universally known to have no land of his own, and to be acting solely for his employer, by his direction and on his credit. Could his intention to make himself the owner of articles bought on one particular occasion in the course of the same dealing, deprive the vendor of his recourse against the master? Clearly not." In this instance every one would naturally suppose that the proprietor who authorized him to purchase in numerous cases, authorized him to purchase in *that case also, in which he appropriated the thing purchased to himself, and the proprietor could not in common reason and justice be allowed to say to a person dealing innocently, that he did not authorize him in that instance (k). In the case (/) from which these observations are taken, the defendant, who was a merchant at St. Petersburgh, had for a long time carried on business in London through one Higginbotham, in all the transactions of which business Higginbotham always used his own name, but was universally known to represent the defendant in them. He had himself neither capital nor credit. The defendant put an end to the agency; and afterwards Higginbotham made the contract (a sale of tallow) on which the action was brought, in all respects as if it had been in the defendant's business, in his own name as usual, and notwithstanding the termination of his agency; and the defendant was quite ignorant of the transaction. These were substantially the facts in the case. The defendant was held bound to deliver the tallow. A motion for a new trial, on the ground that the sale was made by Higginbotham on his own account, was refused, on the ground that he was trading in his own name as the defendant's agent, with the defendant's full knowledge and authority; and that till the defendant *gave notice to the world that he revoked Higgin-botliam's power to act for him, all persons had a right to hold him to the contracts made by Higginbotham. "In a word," said the Court, "it was considered that the defendant was carrying on his business in the name of Higginbotham."