1 When a party has been expressly forbidden to give credit to a wife, in order to render the husband liable for subsequent supplies, it is incumbent on the party so forbidden to show affirmatively and clearly that the husband did not supply her with necessaries suitable to her condition in life: Keller v. Phillips, 40 Barb. 390.

2 It must not, however, be supposed that a husband will not be liable for necessaries furnished the wife, when he, without fault on her part, refuses to supply her with them, even although he may have given notice not to trust her. It is only when he himself supplies her with necessaries that a notice will be effectual to protect him: Rotch v. Miles, 2 Conn. 638; Kimball v. Keyes, 11 Wend. 33; Emery v. Neighbour, 7 N. J. 142; Billing v. Pilcher, 7 B. Mon. 458 : Fredd v. Eves, 4 Harring. 385; and it would seem that in any case notice by newspaper is insufficient, unless it was proved to have reached

But the prohibition of the tradesman to trust *the wife need not always be an express prohi[*49l] the party who supplied the articles: Fredd v. Eves. In such cases as these the husband is liable without his assent, and hence his liability necessarily rests on other grounds than those springing from the law of principal and agent, as is clearly shown in the American note to Manby v. Scott, 2 Smith's L. C, 8th Am Ed. 458.-R.

Harshaw v. Merry man, 18 Mo. 106. The husband is bound to pay for necessaries furnished to the wife, unless he has made other suitable provision for her: Tebbetts v. Hapgood, 34 N. H. 420. Recovery can be had for supplies to a wife during separation only when it was caused by the misconduct of the husband, or was by mutual consent without adequate allowance for the wife's support: Reese v. Chilton, 26 Mo. 598 It is wholly unaffected by the creditor's knowledge or ignorance of the facts on which the liability depends: Gill v Read, 5 R. I. 343. And see further, "Williams v. Coward, 1 Grant, 21. If a wife leave her husband without his consent or fault, he is not liable even for necessaries, unless furnished by his orders: Collins v. Mitchell, 5 Harring. 369; Kemp v. Downham, lb. 417; Pool v. Everton, 5 Jones, 241; Morgan v. Hughes, 20 Tex. 141; Black v. Bryan, 18 lb. 453; Descelles v. Kadmus, 8 Iowa, 51; Mayhew v. Thayer, 8 Gray, 172; Rea v. Durkee, 25 111. 503; Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 558. As to what are necessaries, see Hall v. Weir, 1 Allen, 261.-s.

The following have been held to be necessaries-Board, lodging, medicine, and medical attendance: Mayhew v. Thayer, 8 Gray, 172; Cotteran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380; Spann v. Mercer, 8 Neb. 357; articles of wearing apparel and jewelry suitable to the wife's position: Morton v. Wethens, Skin. 348; Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424; proper legal expenses in proceedings against the husband : Shepherd v. Mackord, 3 Camp. 326; Wilson v. Ford, L R. 3, Ex. 63; Porter v. Briggs, 38 Iowa, 166; Warner v. Heiden, 28 Wis. 517; Morris v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123; the services of a dentist: Freeman v. Holmes, 62 Ga. 556; Gilman v. Andrews, 28 Vt. 241. On the contrary, it has been held that the following are not necessaries : The expense of unwarranted legal proceedings against the husband: Grindell v. Godmond, 5 Ad. & El. (31 E. C. L. R ) 255; Smith v. Davis, 45 N. H. 566; Whipple v. Gates, 55 lb. 139; Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227; Thompson v. Thompson, 3 Head, 527; Chelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417; Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal. 121; medical attendance rendered, without the husband's assent, by a quack doctor: Wood v. O'Kelley, 8 Cush. 406 (see, however, M'Clallan v. Adams, 19 Pick. 333); religious instruction or the rent of a pew in a church: St. John's Parish v. Bronson, 40 Conn. 76.

In Parke v. Kleeber, 37 Pa, St. 251, which was an action for the price of a. piano, Woodman, J., said : " It is impossible to state a comprehensive definition of family necessaries. They must be left for cases to define as cases arise. It is not to be doubted that in some circumstances a piano would be necessary to the support of a family, as where the wife should teach music for a livelihood, or a daughter was to be educated, for education may fairly

32 497 bition communicated to him. A general prohibition to the wife to pledge the husband's credit may, though uncommunicated to the tradesman, be sufficient to prevent his holding the husband liable. Thus in the case of Jolly v. Rees (l) it was held, "that the presumption which exists during cohabitation, and from that circumstance, that the husband assents to contracts made by the wife for necessaries suitable to his degree and credit, may be rebutted by showing that he has forbidden his wife to pledge his credit, although no notice of that fact has been communicated to the tradesman" (m). This case has been followed by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in the case of Deben-ham v. Mellon (n). But in order to make such a secret revocation of authority binding there must have been nothing in the previous conduct of the husband to lead the particular tradesman to think that the wife was authorized to pledge the husband's credit. If there had been such conduct the husband would not be allowed to deny the authority (o). In fact the general law of agency in this respect is strictly applicable (p). *The points which we have been hitherto considering all arise in cases in which the husband and wife continue to live together. But if the enough be included in the word support. In other circumstances it would be a luxury and not a necessity. The best the judge could do with such a question was to commit it to the jury under all the evidence, and to accompany it, as was done in this case, with observations calculated to give the deliberations of the jury a right direction." But see Chappell v. Nunn, 41 L. T. N. S. 287.

(l) 15 C. B. (N. S.) (109 E. C. L. E.) 628; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 177.

(m) 2 Smith L. C. 499, 8th edit, (note to Manby v. Scott).