(z) Clifford v. Laton, M. & M. (22 E. C. L. R.) 101; see also Richardson v. Du Bois, L. R. 5 Q B. 51, 39 L. J. (Q. B.) 69.
(a) Eastland v. Burchell, 3 Q. B. D. 432; 47 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 500.
(b) Hardie v. Grant, 8 C. & P. (34 E. C. L. R.) 512; Morris v. Martin, 1 Str. 647.
1 And it is immaterial whether he does or does not know of the wife's having left her husband : Hunter v. Boucher, 3 Pick. 289; M'Cutchen r. M'Gahay, 11 Johns. 281; Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. 83; Evans v. Fisher, 5 Gilm. 569. The rule admits of no exception, of course, in the case of necessaries: Williams v. Prince, 3 Strob. 490. And even if the husband and wife have separated by mutual consent, and the wife goes to live in the house of a third person, with whom the husband makes a contract to support her, if she leave the house of that person voluntarily and without just cause, she will carry with her no authority to pledge his credit for her support, though if she were driven from that house by improper usage, it would be different: Pidgin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350. In case, however, the wife should return to her husband, or even should in good faith offer to return to him (and the question of such good faith is one upon the evidence for the jury: Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & E. 259', his liability is revived from the time of such return or offer : Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41; M'Gahay v. Williams, 12 Johns. 293; Henderson v. Stringer, 2 Dana, 292; Rennick v. Ficklin, 3 B. Mon. 166; Cunningham v. Irwin, supra; Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Den. 46. The husband is not, however, liable for anything furnished to the wife during the interval between her leaving him and her return: "Williams v. Prince, 3 Strob. 490.-R.
And where a married woman is found living apart from her husband, the prima facie presumption is, that it is neither in consequence of his improper conduct nor by his assent, and therefore it always lies on the person who gave her credit to show what were the circumstances under which they were separated (c).
It only remains to observe that, where the wife, in consequence of the circumstances under which she separated from her husband, has authority to bind him by contracts, those contracts must be for necessaries suitable to his rank and means. What are such necessaries, is a question which of course turns on the particular circumstances of each case (d). There are two modern cases involving *rather singular questions: Turners. Rookes (e), and Grindell v. Godmond (f). In Turner v. Rookes the husband and wife were living separate by consent, under a deed of separation, by which she had a separate maintenance of £112 a year; so that, as long as that was paid, she would have no authority to bind the husband for necessaries of an ordinary description; but it appeared that the husband had used threats of violence towards her, which occasioned her so much alarm that she thought it necessary to exhibit articles of the peace against him. In order to do this she was obliged to employ an attorney, and not being able to pay his bill of costs, he brought bis action to recover it against the husband. The Court held that the proceeding was necessary for the wife's safety; and, therefore, that she had a right to bind the husband by contracting for it; and that, though the maintenance allowed her might be sufficient for ordinary purposes, yet this was an extraordinary contingency not likely to have been contemplated in arranging the amount of maintenance, and which therefore was not covered by it; and they held the husband liable, as having, through his *wife, employed the attorney to exhibit articles of the peace against himself.
(c) Reed v. Moore, 5 Car. & P. (24 E. C. L. E.) 200; Mainwaring v. Leslie, M. & M. (22 E. C L. E.) 18; Edwards v. Towells, 5 M. & G. (44 E. C. L. E.) 624.
(d) Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 5 Bing. (15 E. C. L. E.) 550; Ewers v. Hutton, 3 Esp. 255. See also Ambrose v. Harrison, 20 L. J. (C. P.) 135; 10 C. B. (70 E. C. L. E.) 776; Bradshaw v. Beard, 31 L. J. (C. P.) 273; 12 C. B. (N. S.) (104 E. C. L. E.) 344. In the two last cases the husband was held liable for the funeral expenses of his wife, who was living apart from him. As to the right (originally equitable only) to recover from the husband money advanced to his wife in order to be expended in necessaries, see per Bramwell, L. J., in Drew v. Nunn, 4 Q. B. D. 661, 663; Jenner v. Morris, 3 De G. F. & J. 45; 30 L. J. (Ch.) 361; Davidson v. Wood, 1 De G. J. & S. 465; 32 L. J. (Ch.) 400.
The other case was one in which the husband had assaulted and ill-treated his wife, who preferred an indictment against him at the Beverley sessions, upon which he was convicted, and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment, and a fine of £50. The attorney who conducted the prosecution, thinking, very correctly, that if he carried it on without funds, he would have no remedy against any one, required money in hand, which the lady borrowed from her brother, and he brought an action against the husband to be reimbursed; but the Court thought that, though it might be necessary that she should exhibit articles of the peace for her own personal security, yet that it could not be necessary that she should assume the offensive, and prefer an indictment against him, and, consequently, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. In a later case upon this subject, the costs of a proctor employed by a wife to prosecute a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court against her husband for a divorce a mensd et thoro, on the ground of cruelty, were held to be recoverable against the husband, as a necessary, if it appeared that there were reasonable grounds for instituting such a suit; for where there had been cruelty such a divorce might be necessary for the protection of the wife, and where she had no means of her own she would lose that protection, unless she could pledge her *husband's credit (g). In a still more recent case (h) the legal expenses incurred by a deserted wife,-(1) preliminary and incidental to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights; (2) in obtaining counsel's opinion on the effect of an ante-nuptial agreement for a settlement; (3) in obtaining professional advice as to the proper mode of dealing with tradespeople, who were pressing her to pay them for necessaries supplied to her since she had been deserted, and also of preventing a distress threatened on furniture belonging to her husband in the house she occupied; were held to be necessaries for which she had implied authority to pledge his credit.