1 Statutes like that of 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 42, have been enacted in Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Mississippi, Arkansas, and perhaps in some of the other States: Colburn v. Averill, 30 Me. 310; Williams v. Gridley, 9 Mete. 4S5; Wadsworth v. Thomas, 7 Barb. 445; Thornton v. Crisp, 14 Sm. & M. 52; Ringgold v. Dunn, 8 Ark. 497. Apart from the operation of such statutes, it is now very generally held, on both sides of the Atlantic, that the fullest acknowledgment of a debt is not sufficient to take the case out of the limitation acts, if such acknowledgment be accompanied with expressions inconsistent with a definite promise to pay. Thus, a promise to make an arrangement to pay will not be sufficient, as it shows that the defendant instead of being wiledgment is expressly made for the purpose of preventing the operation of the statute, no difficulty arises. But where admissions have been made for other purposes, and it is sought to convert them into equivalents for the acknowledgment required by the statute, some ling to pay the debt as it stands, contemplates paying it in some other manner: Kensington Bank v. Patton, 14 Pa. St. 479; Morgan v. Walton, 4 lb. 322; Oakes v. Mitchell, 15 Me. 360. So the statement of a debt in an insolvent petition, for the circumstances under which it is made are inconsistent with an immediate provision of payment: Christy v. Flemington, 10 Pa. St. 129. Such a statement as "I owe the debt, but won't pay it," which would be, under the older decisions, entirely sufficient to take the case out of the statute, would at the present day be wholly insufficient: Moore v. Bank of Columbia, 6 Pet. 92; Sigourney v. Drury, 14 Pick. 390; Barnard v. Bartholomew, 22 lb. 291; Mun-ford v. Freeman, 8 Mete. 432; Allen v. Webster, 15 Wend. 284; Berghaus tv Calhoun, 6 Watts, 220; Allison v. James, 9 lb. 381; Kensington Bank v. Pat-ton, supra; Carruth v. Paige, 22 Vt. 179 (approving Phelps v. Stewart, 12 lb. 256); Ventris v. Shaw, 14 N. H. 422; Burton v. Wharton, 4 Harring. 296; Gardner v. M'Mahon, 3 Q. B. (43 E. C. L. R.) 561; Hart v. Prendergast, 14 M. & W. 741.-r.

Sherman v. Wakeman, 11 Barb. 254; Harbold v. Kuntz, 16 Pa. St. 21; Hazlebaker v. Keeves, 12 lb. 264; Patterson v. Cobb, 4 Fla 481; Ayres v. Richards, 12 111. 146; Gillingham v. Gillingham, 17 Pa. St. 302; Bell v. Crawford, 8 Gratt. 110; Moore v. Hynian, 13 Ired. 272; Boxley v. Gayle, 19 Ala. 151; Bryan v. Ware, 20 lb. 687; Grant v. Ashley, 12 Ark. 762; fen Eyck v. Wing, 1 Mich. 40; Brainard v. Buck, 25 Vt. 573; Deloach v. Turner, 6 Rich. 117; Pool v. Relfe, 23 Ala. 701; Mitchell ». Clay, 8 Tex. 443; Guy v. Tarns, 6 Gill, 82; Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 111. 127; Blakeman v. Fonda, 41 Conn. 561; Patton v. Hassinger, 69 Pa. St. 311; Johns v. Lantz, 63 lb. 324; M'Clelland v. West, 59 lb. 487; Hunter v. Kittredge's Estate, 41 Vt. 359; Brayton v. Rockwell, lb. 621; Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194. The acknowledgment must be to the party or his agent, and not to a third person: Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 111. 127; Sibert v. W'ilder, 16 Kan. 176; M'Kinney v. Snyder, 78 Pa. St. 497; Trousdale v. Anderson, 9 Bush, 276; Cape Girardeau Co. v. Harbison, 58 Mo. 90.-s.

In Reed on the Statute of Frauds, §§ 1080-1093, and note, it is stated that** the new undertaking is required to be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, in England, Ireland, Canada, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Arizona, Dakota, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming; and need not necessarily be in writing in Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.

[*51l] nicety occurs, as it always does when *a question of equivalents arises. Thus, where an action was brought by an executor on a covenant in an indenture of mortgage executed by the defendant to the testator in June, 1824, to secure payment of the money borrowed and interest, and the defendant relied upon the lapse of time as a defence, the plaintiff attempted to prove an acknowledgment by giving in evidence a deed executed within twenty years by the defendant. The deed recited the execution of the mortgage by the defendant to the testator, for securing certain money and interest, and stated that he conveyed the property mortgaged, with other things, to trustees to sell, and to pay out of the proceeds the mortgage and other incumbrances on the property; and the Court of Exchequer held that this was not such an acknowledgment as was required by the statute (y), not being an admission of any existing debt. On the other hand, where the action was on a covenant in a mortgage-deed, to pay the plaintiff principal and interest on the 1st of November, 1830, and the question on a defence of the Statute of Limitations was upon the fact of an acknowledgment of the debt, the plaintiff proved a deed of conveyance from the defendant to Thompson of the equity of redemption in the premises mortgaged. It was dated within twenty years, and after reciting the mortgage-deed, recited also that *the principal sum still remained due by virtue of that deed, all the interest having been paid up to the date. It also contained a covenant by Thompson with the defendant to pay the principal and interest, and to indemnify the defendant in case he should be called upon to pay them. "The deed," said the Court, "furnishes ample evidence that all interest was paid up to the date; for that fact is expressly recited, and the date is within the twenty years" (z)

(y) Howcutt v. Bonser, 3 Exch. 491.

A similar provision as to the operation of an acknowledgment is contained in 37 & 38 Vict., c. 57 (Real Property Limitation Act, 1874), s. 8, with reference to contracts within the meaning of that section.