(d) Lafond v. Raddock, 22 L. J. (C. P.) 217; 13 C. B. (76 E. C. L. R.) 813, & C; Strithorst v. Graeme, 3 Wila. 145; Williams v. Jones, 13 East, 439.

(e) See Cornill v. Hudson, 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 8; 8 E. & B. (92 E. C. L. E.) 429.

(f) Cornill v. Hudson, supra; Pardo v. Bingham, L. R. 4 Ch. 735, 39 L. J. (Ch.) 170. (g) Sect. 4.

12, that these places shall be within the statute of Anne in like manner as they are within the 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 42, s. 7. Such are the points of time from which Statutes of Limitation begin to run; and it must be remembered that in every case of a Statute of Limitations, if once the time of limitation begins to run, nothing that happens afterwards will stop it (k).

(h) Fannin v. Anderson, 7 Q. B. (53 E. C. L. R.) 811; Townes v. Mead, 24 L. J. (C. P.) 89; 16 C. B. (81 E. C. L. R.) 123.

(i) 1 M. & W. 70. See Battersby v. Kirk, 2 Bing. N. C. (29 E. C. L. E.) 584.

(k) Smith v. Hill, 1 Wils. 134; Rhodes v. Smethurst, 6 M. & W. 351; Cur-lewis v. Earl of Mornington, 26 L. J. (Q. B.) 181; 7 E. & B. (90 E. C. L. R.) 283; Sturgis v. Darell, 4H.&N. 622; 6 lb. 120 (Exch. Ch.); 28 L. J. (Ex.) 366; 29 lb. 472. 520

There was, moreover, a very important distinction between co-plaintiffs and co defendants. It is clear that a sole plaintiff might, if he chose, bring his action while abroad or wait till his return, when the statute began to run (l); and co-plaintiffs, if some were abroad and others in England, must have sued within six years from the cause of action accruing (m) : but where one of two co-contractors who was a defendant, was beyond seas, the statute did not run till his return in the case of either of them; for it was decided (n), that although the statute commences to run when the right of action accrues, where there are several joint claimants, and one of them is within seas, yet *where there were joint debtors, and one of them was abroad when the cause of action arose, the statute did not begin to run until his return in the case of any of them. This distinction between the position of co-plaintiffs and co-defendants was founded upon the wording of the 19th section of the statute of Anne, c. 16, compared with the 21 Jac. I., c. 16; and the reason of it seems to be, that one plaintiff could act for others and use their names in an action, and therefore the protection of the statute was not wanted. With respect to defendants, however, the reason did not apply; the plaintiff might not be able to bring the absent defendant into Court by any act of his, and therefore, if he were compelled to sue those who were within seas without joining those who were abroad, he might possibly recover against insolvent persons, and lose his remedy against the solvent ones who were absent. On the other hand, if he sued out a writ against all, and either continued it without declar(l) Le Veux v. Berkeley, 5 Q. B. (48 E. C. L. E.) 836.

(m) 2 Wms. Saund. 121. See Perry v. Jackson, 4 T. E. 516; Strithorst ». Graeme, 3 Wils. 145.

(n) Fannin v. Anderson, supra.

Or proceeded to outlawry against the absent parties, and declared against those within seas, he was placed in precisely the same situation as if the statute of Anne had never passed, and was obliged to incur fruitless expense, the avoiding of which seems to have been the object of the statute of Anne. But this evil is remedied by the statute so often cited, and now the Statutes of Limitations before mentioned (including 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 42, s. 3) run as to the joint debtor *who is not beyond seas, from the time when the action or suit accrued; but there is no bar from commencing an action, etc, against a joint debtor who was beyond seas, after his return, by reason of judgment having been recovered against another who was not beyond seas (o).

It seems also that if, after the Statute of Limitations has begun to run, the right to sue and the liability to be sued, meet in the same person by any act of the law, as where a debtor to the deceased becomes his administrator, the running of the statutes is suspended while they so continue (p).

In the fourth place, if the defendant have given an acknowledgment by wilting signed, the protection of the statute is removed. After the passing of the statute of James, and until Lord Tenterden's Act, which I shall immediately mention, an acknowledgment by mere words would have been sufficient; but by sect. 1 of that Act, which is the 9 Geo. IV., c. 14, the acknowledgment must be in writing, "signed by the party chargeable." It enacts "that no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be deemed sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of

(o) 19 & 20 Vict., c. 97, s. 11; King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494. (p) Seagram v. Knight, 36 L. J. (Ch.) 918; L. R. 2 Ch. 628; Mills v. Borth-wick, 35 L. J. (Ch.) 31. 522

*the operation of the said enactments (q), or either of them, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing to be signed by the party chargeable thereby; and that where there shall be two or more joint contractors, or executors, or administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor, executor, or administrator shall lose the benefit of the said enactments (q), or either of them, so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise made and signed by any other or others of them; provided always, that nothing herein contained shall alter, or take away, or lessen the effect of any payment of any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever; provided also, that in actions to be commenced against two or more joint contractors, or executors, or administrators, if it shall appear at the trial or otherwise that the plaintiff, though barred by either of the said recited Acts or this Act, as to one or more of such joint contractors, or executors, or administrators, shall nevertheless be entitled to recover against any other or others of the defendants by virtue of a new acknowledgment, or promise, or otherwise, judgment may be given and costs allowed for the plaintiff, as to such *defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover, and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff."