(g) Piggott v. Stratton, 29 L. J. (Ch.) 1.

(h) 11 Q. B. (63 E. C L. R.) 454.

"To get at the intention of covenants it is not necessary to look for any technical form of words. The principles upon which covenants are to be construed are elaborately and lucidly laid down and illustrated in the judgment of Lord Chancellor Chelmsford in the case of Monypenny v. Monypenny, in which he overruled (I think very properly) the judgment of two Common Law Judges, who had departed from these principles."

The few strong expressions used by Lord Tenter den in the case of Doe d. By water v. Brandling (i), as to the mode of construing Acts of Parliament, are equally applicable to the mode of *construing contracts; and their reasonableness will appear from the mere enunciation of them :-" We are to look, not only at the language of the preamble or of any particular clause, but at the language of the whole Act; and if we find in the preamble or in any particular clause, an expression not so large and extensive in its import as those used in other parts of the Act, and upon a view of the whole Act we can collect from the more large and extensive expressions used in other parts the real intention of the Legislature, it is our duty to give effect to the larger expressions, notwithstanding the phrases of less extensive import in the preamble or in any particular clause." In like manner, general words may be restrained by the recital, where it is evident from the whole agreement that they were intended to apply to the matter recited. Thus, a deed, recited that disputes were subsisting between Simons and Johnson, about which actions at law had been brought, and that it had been agreed, in order to put an end thereto, that each of them should execute a release of all actions and causes of action, claims, and demands which each of them then had or might claim by reason of anything whatsoever. "I cannot read this," said Lord Tenterden, "without seeing that the release which follows was intended to apply to the matter recited, namely, the actions then depending, and that the object was to put an end to them. The generality *of the language was, then, confined by the recital" (k).

(i) 7 B. & C. (14 E. C. L. R.) 660.

An important instance of the rule which we have been considering, is, that where general words follow others of more particular meaning, they are to be construed as applicable to things ejusdem generis with the former particular words (l). Thus, an action was brought upon a policy of insurance in the ordinary form, wherein the perils which the insurers are to bear are stated to be "of the sea, men-of-war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of mart and countermart, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainment of all kings, princes, and people, of what nation, condition, or quality soever, barratry of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandise and ship, etc, or any part thereof." The facts of the case were, that the ship and goods had been sunk at sea by another and friendly vessel firing upon her, mistaking her for an enemy; and the question was, whether the injury was within the general words with which the perils enumerated were concluded. The Court decided *that the assured was entitled to recover, as the loss was of the same kind as the perils expressly mentioned, and was, therefore, within the general terms. "If," said Lord Ellenborough, in delivering the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, "it be a loss by perils of the sea, merely because it is a loss happening upon the sea, as has been contended, all the other causes of loss specified in the policy are, upon that ground, equally entitled so to be considered; and it would be unnecessary ever to assign any other cause of loss than a loss by perils of the sea. But, as that has not been the understanding and practice on the subject hitherto, and inasmuch as the very insertion of the general or sweeping words, as they are called, in the policy after the special words, imports that the special words were not understood to include all perils happening on the sea, but that some more general words were required to be added in order to extend the responsibility of the underwriters unequivocally to other risks not included within the proper scope of any of these enumerated perils, I shall think it necessary only to advert shortly to some of the reasons upon which we think that the general words, thus inserted, comprehend a loss of this nature. The extent and meaning of the general words have not yet been the immediate subject of any judicial construction in our courts of law. As they must, however, be considered as introduced into the policy in *furtherance of the objects of marine insurance, and may have the effect of extending a reasonable indemnity to many cases not distinctly covered by the special words, they are entitled to be considered as material and operative words, and to have the due effect assigned to them in the construction of this instrument; and which will be done by allowing them to comprehend and cover other cases of marine damage of the like kind with those which are specially enumerated and occasioned by similar causes (m)."

(k) Simons v. Johnson, 3 B. & Ad. (23 E. C. L. R.) 175; Payler v. Homer-sham, 4 M. & Sel. 423.

(l) Cullen v. Butler, 5 M. & Sel. 461; Naylor v. Palmer, 22 L. J. (Ex.) 329; 8 Exch. 739 S. C; Jones v. Nicholson, 23 L. J. (Ex.) 330; 10 Exch. 28 S. C; Lozano v. Janson, 28 L. J. (Q. B.) 337. See also ante, p. *279.

Another very clear example (n) of the same rule is afforded by a case where a ship loaded with corn was forced by stress of weather into Elly harbour, in Ireland, and there happening to be a great scarcity of corn there at the time, the people came on board the ship in a tumultuous manner, took the government of her, and suffered her to drive on rocks, where she was stranded. The question was whether she was detained by people as in the policy above mentioned. "The word ' people,' " said Mr. Justice Buller, "in the policy means the supreme power, the power of the country, whatever it may be. This appears clear from another part of the policy; for when the underwriters insure against the wrongful acts of individuals, they describe them by the names of *pirates, rovers, thieves; then, having stated all the individual persons against whose acts they engage, they mention other risks, those occasioned by the acts of kings, princes, and people of what nation, condition or quality soever. These words, therefore, must apply to nations in their collective capacity." They did not, therefore, include a mob of rioters.