(n) Smith v. Surman, 9 B. & C. (17 E. C. L. E.) 561: Archer v. Baynes, 5 Ex. 625; Philliniore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 513; Jackson v. Lowe, 1 Bing. (8 E. C. L. E.) 9; Pierce v. Corf, L. E. 9 Q. B. 210.

(o) Jordan v. Norton, 4 M. & W. 155; Hutchison v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535. See Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. (79 E. C. L. R.) 103; 20 L. J. (Q. B.) 529.

It was said by Lord Ellenborough in Egerton v. Matthews (r), that the word bargain, used in this section, does not render so strict a statement of the transaction necessary, as the word agreement, used in the 4th, does of matters within that section. It has, however, been decided that the names of both parties must appear in the memorandum, though the signature of the party to be bound alone is *requisite; for, as the Court observed, there cannot be a bargain without two parties, and therefore a memorandum naming one only is not a memorandum of a bargain (s). But it seems to be quite enough if the parties are sufficiently described (t). And the price ought to be stated if one was agreed on, for that is part of the bargain (u). A

(p) Parton v. Crofts, 33 L. J. (C. P.) 189.

(q) Thompson v. Gardiner, 1 C. P. D. 777; and see ante, pp. *93, *94.

(r) 6 East, 307.

(s) Champion v. Plummer, 1 B. & P. (N. R.) 252; Williams v. Lake, 2 E. & E. (105 E. C L. R.) 349; 29 L. J. (Q. B.) 1; Vandenbergh v. Spooner, L. R. 1 Ex. 316; 35 L. J. (Ex.) 201; see Newell v. Radford, L. R. 3 C. P. 52; 37 L. J. (C. P.) 1.

(t) See ante, pp. *82-*85, and the cases there cited with reference to the 4th section. There seems no distinction in this respect, in point of principle, between the 17th and 4th sections.

(u) Elmore v. Kingscote, 5 B. & C. (11 E. C. L. R.) 583; Hoadley v. M'Laine, 10 Bing. (25 E. C. L. R.) 482.

Memorandum is not sufficient that does not mention price, if an agreement has been come to on that point. Thus, when the seller showed the buyer a list of prices, and the buyer only agreed to purchase on condition of a deduction of 25 per cent. from such prices for cash payment, and then wrote an order for certain of the articles, not specifying anything as to price; this was held not enough to satisfy the statute, and a subsequent letter from him declining to take the goods, was deemed also insufficient to take the case out of the statute (x). If no price be named, the parties must be understood to have agreed for what the thing is *reasonably worth (y). Thus, an order for goods "on moderate terms" is a sufficient memorandum within the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds (z). A contract for the sale of goods of the value of 10 is within the 17th section, although it includes other matters for which a writing is not necessary (a). And if the memorandum contains all that was to be done by the party sought to be charged, it has been held sufficient to satisfy the 17th section, though not to make a valid agreement in cases within the 4th section (b). But it is important to be borne in mind that in construing these memoranda the surrounding circumstances may be considered, which often make that quite plain which would be obscure without them (c).

It is now decided, that a memorandum is sufficient which contains all the terms of the bargain, and acknowledges it to have been made, but at the same time repudiates the contract. Thus, where the purchaser of goods wrote to the seller, referring to all the material terms of the contract, but stating that he had never received the goods, and declined to do so because they had been damaged by the carrier before they reached him; the Court *considered that the former part of the letter contained a memorandum of the contract, which was all that was required by the statute; and that the existence in the same writing of the refusal to abide by the bargain did not neutralize the acknowledgment (d). But although the statute invalidates all contracts for the sale of goods unless in writing, or unless the buyer accept the goods, or give earnest, or pay in whole or part, and therefore virtually, and in effect forbids their being in any way varied or altered by parol (e); yet it does not forbid their being rescinded by parol; and there is no doubt that they may be so rescinded (/).

(x) Goodman v. Griffiths, 26 L. J. (Ex.) 145; 1 H. & N 574.

(y) Valpy v. Gibson, 4 C. B. (56 E. C. L. R.) 837.

(z) Ashcroft v. Morrin, 4 M. & Gr. (43 E. C. L. R.) 450.

(a) Harman v. Reeves, 25 L. J. (C. P.) 257; 18 C. R. (86 E. C. L. R.) 5S7; Watts v. Friend, 10 B. & C. (21 E. C. L. R.) 446.

(b) Sarl v. Bourdillon, 26 L. J. (C. P.) 78; 1 C. B. (N. S.) (87 E. C. L. R.) 188; Egerton v. Matthews, 6 East, 307.

(c) Newell v. Radford, L. R. 3 C. P. 52; 37 L. J. (C. P.) 1.

Another case, formerly of considerable importance, in which the legislature required that a particular contract should be in writing, was that of an infant. There are many contracts which, when entered into by an infant under the age of twenty-one years, are invalid, as I shall have occasion to explain to you at greater length when I arrive at that part of the subject which relates to *the competency of parties to contracts, but which, before recent legislation, were capable of being ratified by the infant when he arrived at his full age of twenty-one. This ratification might, at common law, have been by parol; but, it was enacted by 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, s. 5, that no action should be maintained whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification after full age of any promise or simple contract made during infancy, unless such promise or ratification were in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith. The law on this subject however has recently been altered by "The Infants Relief Act, 1874" (37 & 38 Vict. c. 62), s. 2, which is as follows: "No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy, or upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or contract made during infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age." And this section applies to and makes void ratifications made after the passing of the Act, of contracts made before that time (g).