(b) Birkmyr v. Darnell, Salk. 27 ; and the notes to Forth v. Stanton, 1 Wms. Saund, 211 b, 211 c.

1 Sidle v. Anderson, 45 Pa. St. 464.-s.

2 The party for whom the promise is made must be liable to the party to whom it is made: Boykin v. Dohlonde, 37 Ala. 577; Downey v. Hinchman, 25 Ind. 453. A request to one to work for the benefit of a third party and a promise to pay, form an original, not a collateral promise: Brown v. George, 17 N. H. 128; Dorwin v. Smith, 35 Vt. 69; Smith v. Rogers, lb. 140; Williams v Little, lb. 323. A.'s promise to pay a debt due from C. need not be in writing if it is made in consideration of C.'s release therefrom : Day v. Cloe, 4 Bush, 563; Packer v. Benton, 35 Conn. 343; Yale v. Edgerton, 14 Minn. 194; Harris v. Young, 4 Ga. 65; Uhler v. Farmers' Bank, 64 Pa. St. 406. The statute does not apply where the promise is to pay his own debt, though it may be incidentally a guarantee of the obligation of another: Malone v.

Upon these grounds where there were three executors and trustees, and A. Orrell, one of them, renounced to enable himself to purchase some of the testator's property, which, while trustee, he could not do without leave of the Court, and afterwards purchased the property, and losses were incurred by the trustees, and a claim for them was raised in Equity by the legatees, whereupon *Orrell, by his solicitor, wrote to them agreeing to pay 3000 in satisfaction of these losses; the Court of Chancery held that this letter was not within the Statute of Frauds as a promise merely to satisfy the debt of another, but was an undertaking to pay the debt which it was insisted, rightly or wrongly, that Orrell was liable for (c).

For this reason, where the plaintiff had issued execution against Lloyd for debt, and Lloyd, with the plaintiff's consent, conveyed all his property to defendant, who thereupon undertook to pay the plaintiff the debt due from Lloyd upon the plaintiff's withdrawing the execution, and giving up his claim on Lloyd; the defendant's undertaking was held not to be a promise to answer for another's debt for which that other remained liable (d). But where Buxton had sued the defendant in Chancery, and had retained plaintiff in that suit as his solicitor, and costs had been incurred to the plaintiff, and it was agreed by the three that the suit should be discontinued, and that the defendant should pay the plaintiff these costs, it was held that since Buxton's debt to the plaintiff remained, he being still liable to pay plaintiff's costs, the defendant's promise was to pay the debt of another, *and could not be sued upon, not being in writing (e). In another instance, the plaintiff became bail for one Hadley, at the defendant's request, and upon his promise to indemnify the plaintiff from all damages and expenses which he should sustain by reason of his so becoming bail; and the Court clearly held this was a promise to answer for the default of another, and was not the less so because it was in the form of a promise to indemnify (f). In another case the plaintiff contracted to supply A. with iron plates, and delivered a part of them, but refused to deliver the rest unless he was paid in cash. The defendant, who had an interest in the contract, thereupon agreed that if the plaintiff would deliver the remainder he would cash A.'s acceptances for the goods already and thereafter to be delivered, and protect the plaintiff from the bills when due. The defendant was to receive 3 per cent. on the amount of the bills. It was held that a contract to give a guaranty is required to be in writing as much as a guaranty itself: that here there was substantially a contract that if A., the buyer of the goods, did not pay for them when the acceptance became due, the defendant would indemnify the plaintiff against the buyer's default, which was an engagement to answer for the debt *or default of another, and not being in writing could not be enforced (g).

(c) Orrell v. Coppock, 26 L. J. (Ch.) 269; Adams v. Dansey, 6 Bing. (19 E. C. L. R.) 506; Batson v. King, 28 L. J. (Ex.) 327.

(d) Bird v. Gammon, 3 Bing. N. C. (32 E. C. L. R.) 883.

Keener, 44 Pa. St. 107; Stoudt v. Hine, 45 lb. 30; Besshears v. Rowe, 46 Mo. 501; Chamberlin v. Ingalls, 38 Iowa, 300; Blair Land Co. v. Walker, 39 lb. 406; Lester v. Bowman, lb. 611.-s.

Goodman v. Chase (A) presents rather a singular instance of the application of the rule of construction of which I have been speaking. In that case, a debtor had been taken in execution, and Chase, in consideration that the creditor would discharge him out of custody, promised to pay his debt; when the debtor was accordingly discharged. It was held, that this promise need not be in writing; for that, by discharging the debtor out of execution, the debt was gone; it having been, as you are probably aware, before the coming into operation of stat. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (The Debtor's Act, 1869), ss. 4, 5, a rule of law that if a debtor were once taken in execution and discharged by his creditor's consent, that operated as a satisfaction of the debt ;1 and therefore that, the debtor having ceased to be liable, the promise to pay the amount was not a promise to pay any sum for which another person was responsible, and therefore did not require to be reduced into writing. If what was originally the debt of another has been made by the defendant his own debt, it cannot afterwards, as between the creditor and himself, be considered the debt of another (i).

(e) Tomlinson v. Gell, 6 A. & E. (33 E. C. L. R.) 564.

(/) Green v. Cresswell, 10 A. & E. (37 E. C. L. R.) 453. See Cripps v. Hartnoll, 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 381, Ex. Ch.

(g) Mallett v Bateman, 16 C B. (N. S.) (1ll E. C. L. R.) 530; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 243; S. C. in Ex. Ch., L. R. 1 C. P. 163; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 40.

(h) 1 B. & Ald. 297; Butcher v. Steuart, 11 M. & W. 857.

*But take the case where one makes a promise to be answerable for the debt of another, and that other never becomes legally indebted to the promisee. Is that within this branch of the 4th sect.