(k) Parker v. Ibbetson, 27 L. J. (C. P.) 236. (/) Syers v. Jonas, 2 Ex. 111.

*terms of a contract without altering its effect, more or less " (m).

The following are incidents in which the usage has been held inconsistent with the contract:-Where one carried on business as a tallow merchant, through an agent who always used his own name, but was universally known to represent the merchant, evidence of a custom in the tallow trade to reject on such contracts the principal, and to look to the broker alone for the fulfilment of the contract, was held inadmissible as being inconsistent with it (n). And again, where in a

(m) Brown v. Byrne, 23 L. J. (Q B.) 313; 3E.&B. (77 E. C. L. R.) 703. (n) Trueman v. Loder, 11 A. & E. (39 E. C. L. R.) 589; Magee v. Atkinson, policy of assurance it was expressed that the insurance on the ship should continue until she was moored twenty-four hours, and on the goods till safely landed, it was held that a usage that the risk on the goods as well as on the ship expired in twenty-four hours was inadmissible (0).

Upon the same ground, where an attorney entered into a written contract whereby he agreed to take into partnership in the business of an attorney a person who had not at that time been admitted, no time being fixed by the writing for the commencement of the partnership, it was decided that (no *time being expressly appointed) the partnership commenced from the date of the agreement; and that parol evidence could not be received to show that the agreement was not to take effect until the intended partner should be duly admitted, for such evidence would make the agreement different from that which it purported to be, namely, an agreement for a present partnership (p).

Moreover, where terms are used which are known and understood by a particular class of persons in a certain special and peculiar sense, evidence to that effect is admissible for the purpose of applying the instrument to its proper subject-matter; and the case seems to fall within the same consideration as if the parties, in framing their contracts, had made use of a foreign language, which the Courts are not bound to understand. Thus, where by a charter-party, a vessel with a cargo of coals to Algiers was to be unloaded at a certain rate per day, and if detained longer the charterer was to pay so much per day from the time of the vessel being ready to unload and in turn to deliver, evidence was admitted to show, that, in the port of Algiers, these words had acquired a peculiar meaning (q). And where one of the terms of a charter-party was that the vessel should proceed to Newcastle and there be ready " in regular turns of loading," it was decided that *the question what was loading in a reasonable time ought not to be decided without reference to the usage of the port in respect of loading, a custom in this respect having been proved to exist (r). Upon this principle evidence has been admitted to show that in mercantile contracts the Gulf of Finland is considered as within the Baltic, although the two seas are considered separate and distinct by geographers (s). So evidence is admissible to prove that, in similar contracts, the Mauritius is treated as an Indian island, although treated by geographers as African (t). Parol evidence has been received to show the meaning of the word "level" in a lease of coal mines (u); that the word London has a colloquial sense other than the City (x); and that, by the usage of a particular district, 1000, applied in a lease to rabbits on the land, meant 1200 (y). In like manner, where an auctioneer was employed to sell land under a written contract, that he should be paid 1 per cent. commission, but if the estate were not sold within two months after the day of auction, then he should be paid 1/2 per cent. only; it was *held that, although this time by itself meant two months of four weeks each, yet evidence of those words being used in the auction trade (q) Robertson v. Jackson, 2 C B. (52 E. C. L. R.) 412. (r) Leidman v. Schultz, 23 L. J. (C. P.) 17; 14 C. B. (78 E. C. L. R.) 38; Bee Hudson v. Clementson, 25 L. J. (C. P.) 234; 18 C. B. (86 E. C. L. R.) 213. (s) Udhe v. Walters, 3 Camp. 16. (1) Robertson v. Money, Ry. & Mood. 75. (u) Clayton v. Gregson, 5 A. & E. (31 E. C. L. R.) 302. (x) Mallan v. May, 13 M. & W. 511. (y) Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. (23 E. C. L. R.) 728. 78 in the sense of calendar months was admissible, from which the jury might find that they were so used in this contract (z): Where a contract was made to sell mess pork of Scott & Co., evidence was admitted to show that in the market it was understood to mean manufactured by Scott & Co. (a); and where a corn-merchant abroad sent instructions to his corn factor in London to sell oats on his account, evidence was admitted to show that, by the custom of the London corn trade, a factor acting under such instructions was warranted in selling in his own name (b). In another instance, a memorandum for a wager on a steeple-chase described the race as four miles across a country, and evidence was received to explain that across a country meant that the riders were to go over all obstructions, and not to avail themselves of an *open gate (c). In another case, an agreement in writing was made by an actress to perform at defendant's theatre, who agreed to engage her for three years, and to pay her so much a week. In an action for the salary, the defendant was allowed to prove that, according to uniform usage in the theatrical profession, the actress was to be paid during the theatrical season only-that is, while the theatre was open (d). Upon the same principle, where the defendant contracted by a charter-party to load at Trinidad a full and complete cargo of sugar, molasses, or other lawful produce, and he did load as many puncheons of sugar and molasses as the ship would hold, he was held to have fulfilled his contract, because, by the custom of Trinidad, a full and complete cargo of sugar and molasses meant a cargo of those goods packed in puncheons (e). So it has been decided that a usage and custom that underwriters are not, under the ordinary form of policy, liable to general average for the jettison of timber stowed on deck, is not inconsistent with the terms of such policy, although those terms have been always held to render the insurer ordinarily liable for general average. Such custom is a reasonable *one, for the goods so stowed are not in the part of the ship where goods are usually carried, and are in more than usual peril (f). Again, where mining shares were sold, the written contract for the sale of which specified the times of payment, but not the time of delivery, proof of a usage among brokers in mining shares, that on contracts for the sale and purchase of such shares, the delivery of them should take place concurrently with, and at the time agreed upon for payment, and that the purchaser was not at liberty to demand the delivery of them before the time of payment, was admitted (g).