Under the maxim of the maritime law that "Freight is the mother of wages, the safety of the ship the mother of freight," it was held that in case of the loss of the vessel during a voyage no wages were recoverable.3 Where the ship was lost on the homeward voyage, however, wages were allowed for service up to the arrival of the vessel at her last port of delivery or destination before the loss, and for one half the time she remained at that port.1
1 1876, 1 Q. B. D. 613, 620.
2 See Dakin v. Oxley, 1864, 15 C. B. N. S. 646, 665, (Willes, J.: "As to freight pro rata itineris, in respect of goods accepted, and their future carriage waived, at an intermediate port, it becomes due, not under the charter party, but by a new contract inferred from the conduct of the parties, ... It was in such a case that Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882, 1 W. Bl. 190, said that the merchant, 'if he abandons, is excused freight, and he may abandon all though they are not all lost.' This is correct, if, instead of 'abandon' be read 'decline to accept,' because it is clear, that, where the goods have not been carried all the way, the merchant need not, in order to prevent a liability for frieght pro rata, give up the property to the shipowner; and abandonment, in maritime law, involves a giving up of the property.") ; Callender v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 1813, 5 Binney (Pa.) 525, 533, (Tilghman, C.J., after discussing Lord Mansfield's celebrated case of Luke v. Lyde: ". . . it seems to have been understood, that pro rata freight is not due, unless the consent of the merchant, either by words or actions, has been expressly given, or may be fairly deduced, to accept his goods at an intermediate port; and such consent being given, the original contract is dissolved, and a new one arises.").
3 Hernaman v. Bawden, 1766, 3 Burr. 1844; Lady Durham, 1835, 3 Hagg. Adm. 196; Pitman v. Hooper, 1837, 3 Sumn. (U. S. C. C.) 50; Fed. Cas., No. 11,185; Savary v. Clements, 1857, 8 Gray (Mass.) 155; Van Beuren v. Wilson, 1828, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 158; 18 Am. Dec. 491. For additional authorities, see 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 100, 101.
In Appleby v. Dods,2 because of an express condition "that no seaman shall demand or be entitled to his wages, or any part thereof, until the arrival of the ship at the above mentioned port of discharge," Lord Ellenborough refused to permit a recovery of wages for the outward voyage, although it was conceded that freight had been earned for such outward voyage and assumed that the sole purpose of the condition quoted was to prevent desertion at intermediate ports. As pointed out in a previous section (Sec. 114), if it had been proved that the sole purpose of the condition was to protect the defendant against desertion, the plaintiff would have been entitled, upon principle, to recover the value of his part performance.3
By statute, both in England4 and in the United States,5 seamen are now entitled to wages earned up to the time of the vessel's loss - a rule which accords with quasi contractual principles.