It is now the favored doctrine that a corporation's capacity to contract is not limited by its charter but is coextensive with that of a natural person.1 However, in England, in the United States Supreme Court, and in some of the States, it is still insisted that a corporation is legally incompetent to make any contract not reasonably incidental to the objects of its incorporation.2 And it is everywhere conceded that, whether competent or not, a corporation is, as a matter of public policy, impliedly prohibited from making such a contract. It follows that where the so-called doctrine of general capacity obtains, the only objection that may be urged against the enforcement of an ultra vires contract is that of illegality; while in jurisdictions accepting the so-called doctrine of special capacity, an ultra vires contract may be attacked both as unwarranted by law and as void for want of capacity to contract.

1 Professor Harriman, 14 Harv. Law Rev. 332, 335; Machen, "Corporations," Sec. Sec. 1019, 1020; Morawetz, "Corporations," Sec. 648; George Wharton Pepper, 9 Harv. Law. Rev. 255; Wald's Pollock, "Contracts" (Williston's ed.), 139, note 16.

2 Ashbury Ry., etc., Co. v. Riche, 1875, L. R. 7 H. L. 653; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's, etc., Co., 1891, 139 U. S. 24; 11 S. Ct. 478; Chewacla Lime Works v. Dismukes, 1889, 87 Ala. 344; 6 So. 122; 5 L. R. A. 100; National Home Bldg. Assn. v. Home Sav. Bank, 1899, 181 I11. 35 ; 54 N. E. 619; 64 L. R. A. 399; 72 Am. St. Rep. 245; Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United Gas Co., 1893, 85 Me. 532; 27 Atl. 525; 35 Am. St. Rep. 385; Western Maryland R. Co. v. Blue Ridge Hotel Co. 1905, 102 Md. 307; 62 Atl. 351; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 887; 11 Am. St. Rep. 362; Buckeye Marble Co. v. Harvey, 1892, 92 Tenn. 115; 20 S. W. 427; 18 L. R. A. 252; 36 Am. St. Rep. 71; Metropolitan Stock Exch. v. Lyndonville Nat. Bank, 1904, 76 Vt. 303; 57 Atl. 101.